LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


CAMPAIGN    OF    1 


A      NARRATIVE 


CAMPAIGN 


01  the 


1861. 


BY    ROBERT    PATTERSON, 

LATE    MAJOR-GENERAL    OP    VOLUNTEERS. 


PHILADELPHIA. 

SHERMAN    &    CO.,    PRINTERS. 

1865. 


TO     THE 

GALLANT     MEN 

WHO     SERVED     UNDER     MY     COMMAND, 

AND     WHO     WERE     THE     FIRST     TO     TAKE     UP     ARMS 
AT    THE     CALL     OF    THEIR    COUNTRY, 


THE      FOLLOWING     NARRATIVE      OF     THE 

CAMPAIGN    OF    1861. 


224119 


NARRATIVE. 


IT  has  long  been  my  desire  to  lay  before  the  public 
the  facts  and  documents  which  explain  the  operations  of 
the  forces  under  my  command  in  the  campaign  of  1861. 
The  misapprehensions,  the  misrepresentations  which 
obtained  currency  in  the  absence  of  correct  information 
on  the  subject,  strongly  prompted  me  to  supply  it,  in 
justice  to  myself  and  to  those  who  served  with  me.  I 
have,  however,  been  delayed  in  doing  so  by  public  con 
siderations  to  which  I  will  presently  advert ;  but  as  they 
have,  by  lapse  of  time,  lost  the  force  that  was  attributed 
to  them,  I  now  feel  myself  at  liberty  to  make  a  brief 
but  well-attested  contribution  to  the  earlier  history  of 
the  war. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  1861,  the  term  of  the  three 
months'  troops  from  Pennsylvania,  whom  I  commanded, 
having  expired,  I  was  relieved  from  the  command  of  my 
Department  in  Virginia,  and,  having  been  honorably 
discharged  from  the  military  service  of  the  United  States, 
returned  to  civil  life. 

The  arms  of  the  country  had  recently  met  with  a 
severe  disaster  at  Bull  Run,  and  the  public,  whose  ex- 

2 


10  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

pectation  of  success  had  been  of  the  most  sanguine  cha 
racter,  were  correspondingly  depressed.  Although  con 
scious  that  I  had  executed,  as  far  as  lay  in  my  power, 
every  order  that  I  had  received,  and  was  in  no  degree 
responsible  for  a  disaster  that  I  could  not  prevent,  I  was 
not  surprised  that  I,  as  well  as  every  other  officer  hold 
ing  any  command  of  importance  at  the  time,  should  be 
the  object  of  popular  clamor.  I  was  quite  satisfied, 
however,  to  await  the  returning  sense  of  the  people,  and 
to  abide  by  their  decision,  when  the  natural  passion  and 
disappointment  of  the  hour  should  pass  away,  and  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  facts  should  enable  them  to  form  an 
intelligent  and  dispassionate  judgment.  This  would 
very  surely  and  certainly  have  come  about,  had  it  not 
been  the  interest  of  a  great  many  persons  in  authority 
that  the  truth  should  not  be  known,  and  that  no  fair 
judgment  of  the  cause  of  the  disaster  should  be  arrived 
at  by  the  public. 

It  was  of  course  desirable  for  those  who  had  directed 
the  movements  at  Bull  Run  to  refer  their  defeat,  if 
possible,  to  an  occurrence  for  which  they  were  not  respon 
sible,  and  not  allow  it  to  be  attributed  to  any  want  of 
foresight  or  military  skill  on  their  part.  The  theory, 
therefore,  that  it  was  Johnston's  unexpected  arrival  with 
reinforcements  that  lost  them  the  battle,  for  which  I  was 
entirely  responsible,  answered  the  purpose  exactly,  w^as 
most  ingenious,  and  highly  gratifying  to  the  wounded 
self-love  of  the  army  and  the  country. 

The  only  drawback  to  the  theory  was  that  it  was 
untrue.  The  truth  is,  I  could  not  hold  Johnston  in  the 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  11 

position  where  they  had  placed  me,  and  they  knew  it. 
His  arrival  was  not  unexpected,  for  I  had  apprised  them 
of  it ;  and  his  coming  did  not  cause  the  loss  of  the  battle, 
as  I  can  show  by  the  testimony  of  the  most  distinguished 
soldiers  who  were  present  at  it. 

In  determining  upon  the  best  mode  of  repelling  these 
charges,  bearing  a  semi-official  character,  I  deemed  it 
wise  to  consult  with  some  of  the  regular  officers  of  high 
distinction,  who  had  served  under  me,  and  in  whose 
judgment  I  had  alway  placed  great  reliance.  Major- 
General  George  H.  Thomas,  who  had  held  a  command 
under  me,  and  wrhose  subsequent  brilliant  career  has 
justified  the  high  opinion  I  was  then  led  to  entertain 
of  him,  writes  to  a  mutual  friend  as  follows : 


"  CAMP  NEAR  HYATTSTOWN,  MD., 
August  25,  1861. 

"  DEAR  COLOXEL  : 

"  Your  note  has  just  been  handed  me.  I  had  a  conver 
sation  with  Newton  yesterday  on  the  subject  of  General 
Patterson's  campaign.  He  was  on  the  eve  of  writing  to  the 
General,  and  asked  me  what  he  should  state  was  my  opinion 
as  to  the  General's  course.  I  told  him  that  lie  could  say 
that,  if  I  were  situated  as  he  was,  I  would  make  a  statement 
of  all  the  facts  to  the  General-in-chief,  or  the  Secretary  of 
War,  fortifying  it  with  copies  of  the  orders,  £c.,  and  demand 
justice  at  their  hands,  and,  if  they  were  not  disposed  to  give 
it,  I  would  then  demand  a  court  of  inquiry. 

"Yours  truly, 

"  GECK  II.  THOMAS. 

"  P.  S.  I  tliink,  however,  that  time  will  set  the  General 
all  right,  as  I  see  the  papers  are  much  more  favorable  to  him 
than  at  first." 


12  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

General  John  Newton  and  General  Fitz-John  Porter 
both  concurring  that  the  course  indicated  by  General 
Thomas  was  the  true  one,  and  that  a  newspaper  contro 
versy  was  both  an  improper  and  unsoldierly  way  of  set- 
ting  myself  right,  I  addressed  the  following  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  after  I  supposed  that  a  sufficient  time 
had  elapsed  to  prevent  any  information  derived  from  an 
investigation  being  of  detriment  to  the  public  service 
(Report  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  114). 


"PHILADELPHIA,   PENNSYLVANIA. 

November  1,  1861. 
"Sin: 

"  Believing"  to  the  present  moment  that,  on  account  of 
other  persons,  a  public  examination  into  the  manner  in  which 
the  affairs  of  the  Department  of  Pennsylvania,  while  under 
my  command,  were  conducted,  and  the  publication  of  the 
correspondence  with,  and  orders  to  me  of  the  General-in- 
chief,  especially  connected  with  the  late  campaign  in  Mary 
land  and  Virginia,  might  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  of 
the  service,  I  have  refrained  from  asking  for  an  investiga 
tion  or  permission  to  publish  the  orders  by  which  I  was  con 
trolled. 

"  The  same  reason  has  caused  me  studiously  to  avoid  ver 
bal  statements  on  the  subject,  in  reply  to  numerous  inquiries. 

"  Charges  have  been  made  publicly  through  the  press, 
and  the  impression  created,  that  the  design  of  the  campaign 
was  not  carried  out  by  me,  but  rather  deranged  by  my 
neglect  or  violation  of  orders. 

"  Intimations  against  my  loyalty  have  been  insidiously 
circulated. 

"  From  the  silence  of  my  immediate  commander,  I  infer 
he  does  not  design  to  relieve  me  from  the  odium  attached  to 
these  reports  and  rumors. 

"  While  I  am  willing,  if  the  general  good  demand  it,  to 
suffer  personally,  and  am  desirous  that  no  course  on  my  part 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  13 

shall  prove  injurious  to  public  interests,  yet  I  believe  the 
time  has  arrived  when  the  question  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  I  executed  the  duties  intrusted  to  me  may  be  fully 
investigated  with  safety,  so  that  the  failure  to  accomplish 
certain  results,  never  anticipated  of  my  command  by  the 
General-in-chief  until  he  saw  his  defeat,  may  be  ascribed  to 
the  real  cause. 

"  Further  silence  on  my  part  would  confirm  the  impression 
that  I  plead  guilty  to  the  charges  against  my  honor,  my 
loyalty,  and  my  military  capacity.  I  have  a  right  at  least  to 
be  relieved  from  the  position  in  which  my  long  silence, 
caused  solely  by  an  earnest  desire  for  the  success  of  our  cause, 
has  left  me. 

"  In  presenting  this  my  application  for  a  court  of  inquiry, 
or  permission  to  publish  my  correspondence  with  the  General- 
in-chief,  I  claim,  and  am  now  ready  to  substantiate, 

"  1st.  That  if  the  General-in-chief  ever  designed  my  com 
mand  to  enter  upon  the  soil  of  Virginia  with  prospect  of 
success,  he  destroyed  my  power  when  greatest,  and  when 
that  of  the  enemy  was  weakest,  by  recalling  to  Washington, 
after  they  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  all  my  regular  troops, 
with  the  Rhode  Island  regiment  and  battery,  leaving  me  but 
a  single  company  of  cavalry,  which  had  not  then  been  one 
month  in  service,  and  entirely  destitute  of  artillery. 

"2d.  The  General-in-chief  forbade  my  advance,  and  com 
pelled  me  to  recall  to  Maryland  all  the  troops  which,  confi 
dent  of  success,  had  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Virginia,  in 
execution  of  a  plan  which  had  been  submitted  to  him  and 
had  received  his  cordial  approbation. 

"  3d.  That  for  a  long  time  the  General-in-chief  kept  my 
command  in  a  crippled  condition,  and  demanded  my  advance 
after  he  had  withdrawn  from  me  ail  my  available  artillery, 
and  only  after  the  enemy  had  had  time  to  become  vastly 
my  superior  in  artillery,  infantry,  and  cavalry,  and  was  in 
trenched.  In  answer  to  my  earnest  appeals,  he  reinforced 
me  only  after  the  occasion  for  employing  reinforcements 
had  passed  away. 

"  4th.  That  if  the  General-in-chief  designed  me  to  do 


14  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

more  than  threaten  the  enemy  at  Winchester,  he  did  not 
divulge  his  wish. 

"  5th.  That  if  the  General-in-chief  expected  me  to  follow 
to  Manassas  c  close  upon  the  heels  of  Johnston/  he  expected 
a  physical  impossibility ;  the  enemy  moving  part  of  the  way 
by  rail,  from  an  intermediate  point,  and  my  army  on  foot, 
entering  an  enemy's  country,  and  guarding  a  heavy  train, 
and  a  depot  retained  by  him  in  an  improper  place. 

"  6th.  The  General-in-chief  forbade  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
in  the  event  that  he  should  retire  towards  Manassas,  fearing 
to  press  him  on  Washington. 

"  7th.  That  I  was  informed  by  the  General-in-chief  that 
the  attack  on  Manassas  would  be  made  on  Tuesday,  the  16th 
of  July,  instead  of  Sunday,  the  21st,  at  which  time  he  directed 
me  to  make  such  a  demonstration  upon  Winchester  as  to 
keep  the  enemy  at  that  place.  I  claim  that  the  demonstra 
tion  was  made  on  that  day,  and  that  he  did  not  avail  himself 
of  the  fruits  of  that  movement,  as  he  had  expected  to  do. 
All  that  was  demanded  of  me,  and  more,  was  effected. 

"  8th.  That  if  the  army  I  commanded  had  attacked  Win 
chester  on  Tuesday,  the  16th  of  July,  as  it  has  since  been 
claimed  I  was  ordered  to  do,  two  armies  instead  of  one  would 
have  been  demoralized,  and  the  enemy  would  have  turned 
with  all  the  flush  of  victory  to  a  triumph  in  front  of  Wash 
ington. 

"  9th.  That  I  have  suffered  additional  injustice  at  the  hands 
of  the  General-in-chief,  who  sanctioned  and  fixed  the  impres 
sion  that  the  enemy  at  Winchester  was  inferior  to  me  in 
force  in  every  arm  of  the  service,  and  yet  has  not  corrected 
the  report,  although  he  knew,  two  days  after  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run,  that  siege  artillery,  three  times  as  numerous,  and 
heavier  than  mine,  had  been  left  by  the  enemy  at  Winches 
ter,  while  a  greater  number  of  guns  had  been  carried  away. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General." 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  15 

This  application  was  acknowledged  as  follows  : 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  November  3,  1861. 

"DEAR  Sm  : 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
letter,  bearing  date  November  1.  The  Secretary  of  War  is 
absent  on  a  visit  North.  I  will  forward  it  to  him  by  this 
day's  mail,  and  ask  for  instructions. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"  THOMAS  A.  SCOTT, 

"GENERAL  K.  PATTERSON,  "Ass't  Secretary  of  War. 

"Philadelphia." 

After  waiting  a  reasonable  time  for  an  answer  to  my 
application,  I  again  appealed  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
as  follows  : 

"  PHILADELPHIA,  November  26,  1861. 
"  SIR  : 

"  I  respectfully  request  that  you  will  do  me  the  justice  to 
refer  to  my  letter  of  the  1st  instant,  and  give  it  your  early 
attention.  I  cannot  refrain  from  intimating  a  confident 
hope  that  my  application  for  a  court  of  inquiry  will  meet 
with  your  favorable  consideration,  and  that  an  order  for  the 
detail  will  be  made  at  the  earliest  moment  consistent  with 
the  interests  of  the  service. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect, 
"Your  obedient  servant, 

"K,  PATTERSON, 

"HoN.  SIMON  CAMERON,  "Major-General. 

"Secretary  of  War." 

This  brought  me  the  following  refusal  of  my  applica 
tion  : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  November  30,  1861. 

"  GENERAL  : 

"  I  have  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the 
26th  instant,  calling  my  attention  to  your  communication  of 


16  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

the  1st  November,  which  contains  a  request  for  an  inquiry 
into  the  late  campaign  in  Virginia,  in  which  you  commanded 
a  part  of  the  United  States  forces. 

"  Your  letter  did  not  reach  me  until  my  return  to  this 
city,  and  subsequent  to  the  departure  of  Lieutenant-General 
Scott  for  Europe. 

"  There  appears  to  have  been  no  precedent  in  our  service 
for  an  investigation  or  trial  of  an  officer's  conduct  after  he 
has  received  an  honorable  discharge.  The  inquiry  you  desire 
to  have  instituted  would  equally  concern  the  late  General- 
in-chief,  and,  as  it  appears  to  me,  in  justice  to  him,  should 
not  be  made  in  his  absence. 

"  The  respect  I  have  always  entertained  for  you,  as  well 
as  the  friendly  relations  which  have  long  existed  between 
us,  would  claim  for  any  personal  request  from  you  the  most 
prompt  and  favorable  attention ;  but,  in  my  public  capacity, 
in  the  present  condition  of  affairs,  I  cannot  convince  myself 
that  my  duty  to  the  Government  and  to  the  country  would 
justify  me  in  acceding  to  your  request.  I  must,  therefore, 
reluctantly  decline  the  appointment  of  a  court  of  inquiry  at 
this  time. 

"  With  much  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  SIMON  CAMERON, 

"  GENERAL  R.  PATTERSON,  "  Secretary  of  War. 

"Philadelphia,  Penna." 

The  voyage  of  the  General-in-chief  to  Europe  was,  of 
course,  as  unexpected  to  me  as  it  was  to  the  public  at 
large,  although  the  additional  insinuation  was  made 
against  me  that  I  had  taken  advantage  of  his  absence  to 
make  my  request  for  a  trial.  The  receipt  of  my  letter 
asking  an  investigation  was,  however,  fortunately  ac 
knowledged  before  he  left  the  country,  and  his  speedy 
return  removed  at  least  one  reason  for  refusing  to  allow 
me  to  be  heard.  Determined  to  persevere  and  obtain 
an  investigation,  if  possible,  I  went  to  Washington  and 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  17 

called  at  the  War  Department,  had  a  long  interview 
with  the  Secretary,  General  Cameron,  and  the  Assistant 
Secretary,  Hon.  T.  A.  Scott,  showed  the  orders  and 
correspondence,  and  insisted  on  an  investigation. 
Both  admitted  that  the  official  orders  and  correspon 
dence  as  presented  placed  the  case  in  a  very  different 
light  from  their  previous  understanding  of  it.  Mr.  Scott 
said  I  ought  to  have  a  court  in  order  that  justice  might 
be  done  to  me  and  all  others  interested  in  the  matter. 
To  this  the  Secretary  assented,  but  said  that  a  court 
would  throw  the  blame  on  General  Scott,  and  this  he 
would  never  consent  to ;  that  General  Scott  had  now 
retired  from  the  service  full  of  years  and  full  of  honors; 
that  he  desired  him  to  pass  the  remainder  of  his  life  in 
repose,  enjoying,  as  he  deserved,  the  gratitude  of  the 
whole  country;  and  that  no  consideration  on  earth 
would  induce  him  to  do  any  act  that  would  plant  a 
thorn  in  General  Scott's  pillow.  To  all  this  I  cordially 
assented,  adding  that  there  was  no  man  living  I  more 
honored  and  venerated  than  General  Scott,  and  that,  if 
it  were  simply  a  question  between  General  Scott  and 
myself  as  to  who  should  bear  the  blame,  if  the  blame 
rested  with  either,  I  would  be  willing  to  bear  it,  and 
go  down  to  the  grave  with  it;  but  that  I  had  chil 
dren  and  grandchildren  and  warm  friends,  and  it  was 
due  to  them,  and  to  Pennsylvania,  whose  officer  I 
was,  as  well  as  to  the  troops  I  commanded,  that  the 
truth  should  be  made  manifest ;  that  I  must  have  a  trial, 
or  an  official  order  or  letter  referring  to  my  services  and 
approving  them.  To  this  General  Cameron  assented, 


18  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

and  promised  to  give  one,  but,  unfortunately  for  me. 
before  it  was  given,  circumstances  occurred  which  in 
duced  him  to  leave  the  Cabinet,  after  which  he  could  not 
issue  an  order.     At  the  close  of  the  interview,  General 
Cameron  said  he  would  like  the  President  to  see  the 
official  orders  and  correspondence,  to  which  I  replied 
that  I  desired  this  exceedingly.     Mr.  Scott  offered  to  see 
the  President  at  once.     He  did  so.     The  President  fixed 
7J  o'clock  in  the  evening,  at  the  Executive  Mansion. 
I  called  at  that  hour,  was  most  kindly  received,  and 
read  the  orders  and  correspondence,  to  which  the  Presi 
dent  attentively  listened.     When  I  had  finished,  and 
after  some  conversation,  the   President  addressed  me 
in  nearly  the  following  words  :  "  General   Patterson,  I 
have  never  found  fault  with  or  censured  you ;  I  have 
never  been  able  to  see  that  you  could  have  done  anything 
else  than  you  did  do.     Your  hands  were  tied ;  you  obeyed 
orders,  and  did  your  duty,  and  I  am  satisfied  with  your 
conduct,"    This  was  said  with  a  manner  so  frank,  so  can 
did,  and  so  manly,  as  to  secure  my  respect,  confidence, 
and  good  will.     I  expressed  to  the  President  my  great 
gratification  with,  and  tendered  my  sincere  thanks  for, 
his  fairness  towards  me,  and  his  courtesy  in  hearing  my 
case,  and  giving  me  some  five  hours  of  his  time.     I  said 
that  so  far  as  he  and  the  War  Department  were  con 
cerned  I  was  satisfied,  but  that  I  must  have  a  court  and 
a  trial  by  my  peers,  in  order  to  have  a  public  approval 
of  my  conduct,  and  stop  the  abuse  daily  lavished  upon 
me.     The   President  replied  that  he  would  cheerfully 
accede  to  any  practicable  measure  to  do  me  justice,  but 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE   SHENANDOAH.  19 

that  I  need  not  expect  to  escape  abuse  as  long  as  I  was 
of  any  importance  or  value  to  the  community,  adding 
that  he  received  infinitely  more  abuse  than  I  did,  but 
he  had  ceased  to  regard  it,  and  I  must  learn  to  do  the 
same. 

My  next  application  for  redress  was  to  Congress.  At 
my  request,  Mr.  Sherman  offered  the  following  resolu 
tion  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  (Report,  p.  117, 
No.  3) : 

"  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

December  17,  1861. 
"  On  motion  of  Mr.  Sherman, 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  he  requested,  if  not 
incompatible  with  the  public  interest,  to  furnish  the  Senate 
with  copies  of  the  correspondence  between  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott  and  Major-General  Patterson,  with  all  orders 
from  the  former  to  the  latter,  from  the  16th  day  of  April, 
1861,  to  the  25th  day  of  July  inclusive." 

To  this  resolution  of  the  Senate,  unanimously  adopted, 
the  following  response  was  made  : 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  December  24th,  1861. 
"  SIR  : 

"  In  answer  to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  17th  in 
stant,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  a  report  of  the 
Adjutant-General,  from  which  it  will  be  perceived  that  it  is 
not  deemed  compatible  with  the  public  interest  at  this  time 
to  furnish  the  correspondence  between  Generals  Scott  and 
Patterson,  as  called  for. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  SIMON  CAMERON, 

"  HON.  H.  HAMLIN,  "  Secretary  of  War. 

"  President  of  the  Senate." 


20  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 


"HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  WASHINGTON, 

December  23,  1861. 
"  Sill : 

"  In  compliance  with  your  instructions,  I  have  the  honor 
to  report  that,  after  due  consideration,  the  General-in-chief 
is  of  the  opinion  it  would  be  '  incompatible  with  the  public 
interest  to  furnish  the  Senate  with  copies  of  the  correspon 
dence  between  Lieutenant-General  Scott  and  Major-General 
Patterson,  and  with  all  orders  from  the  former  to  the  latter 
from  the  16th  day  of  April,  1861,  to  the  25th  day  of  July,  in 
clusive,'  as  called  for  in  the  Senate  resolution  of  December 
17th,  1861. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

UL.  THOMAS, 

"HoN.  SECRETARY  OF  WAR."  "Adjutant-General. 


Had  a  court  of  inquiry  been  allowed  me,  no  publica 
tion  of  the  orders  or  correspondence  would  have  been 
necessary.  The  court  would  have  investigated  the  case, 
and  if  it  had  appeared  that  I  had  obeyed  my  orders  and 
done  my  duty,  they  would  have  said  so.  I  would  have 
been  satisfied,  and  there  the  case  would  have  terminated. 

The  refusal  to  publish  my  correspondence  and  orders, 
being  put  upon  the  ground  "  that  it  was  not  deemed 
compatible  with  the  public  interest,"  not  only  deprived 
me  of  their  official  publication,  but  debarred  me  from 
publishing  them  in  any  other  way,  although  I  was  daily 
the  subject  of  attack,  upon  points  which  they  would  in 
stantly  have  refuted.  I  was  thus  placed  in  a  position 
in  which  I  could  be  attacked  with  perfect  impunity, 
while  any  answer  by  myself  would  have  rendered  me 
liable  to  the  reproach  of  publishing  what  the  highest 
military  authorities  deemed  detrimental  to  the  public 


IN    THE   VALLEY    OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  21 

service.  I  therefore  bore,  and  have  borne  without  a 
word  of  reply,  the  absurd  calumnies  that  have  been 
heaped  upon  me.  Nothing  was  too  gross  for  popular 
belief.  It  was  even  asserted  as  a  fact  beyond  all  doubt, 
that  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  commanded  the 
forces  opposing  me,  and  with  whom  I  had  no  connection 
or  relationship,  was  my  brother-in-law,  and  it  is  proba 
bly  now  credited  everywhere  out  of  Philadelphia. 

The  facts  which  I  have  stated,  certainly  prove  that 
I  had  no  desire  to  avoid  an  investigation  of  my  official 
conduct,  but  that. I  was  then  as  I  am  now,  not  only  will 
ing  but  anxious  to  meet  frankly  and  fairly  any  allega 
tion  that  could  be  made  against  me.  That  I  had  been 
honorably  discharged  from  the  service  of  my  country, 
was  not,  as  it  might  have  been,  put  forward  by  me  as  a 
reason  why  I  should  not  ask  for  an  investigation,  but  was 
the  excuse  given  by  the  Government  for  not  granting  it. 
Having  by  an  honorable  discharge  declared  they  had  no 
fault  to  find  with  me,  they  said  that  no  court  they  could 
grant  me  could  do  any  more. 

I  certainly  think,  therefore,  I  can  claim  that  I  was 
justified  by  those  who  had  full  knowledge  of  what  I  had 
done,  and  full  authority  to  rebuke  me  had  I  done  wrong. 

The  day  after  the  War  Department  had  declined  to 
furnish  the  Senate  with  copies  of  the  correspondence 
and  orders  received  by  me  from  the  Commander-in-chief, 
as  being  detrimental  to  the  public  interest,  a  Committee 
of  Congress  on  the  "  Conduct  of  the  War"  began  an  in 
vestigation  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  Battle  of 
Bull  Run,  including  my  operations.  This  struck  me  as 


22  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

somewhat  inconsistent,  but  the  suggestion  did  not  then 
occur  to  me  that  the  object  was,  by  a  Star  Chamber  pro 
ceeding,  to  prepare  a  report  setting  all  fair  play  and  truth 
at  defiance.  This  too  plainly  appeared  subsequently. 
At  the  time  I  was  much  gratified,  supposing,  of  course, 
that  the  investigation  would  be  full,  fair,  and  candid.  I 
need  hardly  say,  in  addressing  American  citizens,  that 
in  a  question  involving  all  that  is  dear  to  a  man  or  an 
officer,  I  expected  to  be  confronted  with  any  witness 
who  should  testify  against  me.  I  presumed  that  I  should 
be  allowed  to  cross-examine  them.  I  supposed  that  at 
least  my  own  witnesses  would  be  examined.  Not  so, 
however,  did  it  appear  to  this  Honorable  Committee.  I 
never  was  allowed  to  hear  the  evidence  of  a  single  wit 
ness.  I  never  was  permitted  to  have  a  copy  of  any  testi 
mony  affecting  my  character  or  conduct.  I  was  refused 
the  privilege  of  having  examined  the  witnesses  I  deemed 
most  material.  Even  the  following  questions,  left  with 
the  Committee,  certainly  unobjectionable,  which  I  re 
quested,  if  not  myself  permitted  to  be  present,  might  be 
asked  by  the  Committee,  appear  by  the  published  testi 
mony  never  to  have  been  put  to  a  single  witness: 

1.  Were  you  with  General  Patterson's  column  in  July 
last  ?     If  so,  in  what  capacity  ? 

2.  Did  or  did  not  General  Patterson  possess  the  re 
spect  and  confidence  of  his  officers  and  men? 

3.  What  was  the  effect  on  General  Patterson's  army 
of  the  order  of  the  Commander-in-chief  directing  him  to 
send  to  Washington  all  his  regular  troops,  with  the  Rhode 
Island  regiment  and  battery,  and  the  consequent  recross- 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  23 

ing  of  the  Potomac  by  that  part  of  the  army  which  had 
entered  Virginia? 

4.  Was  General  Patterson's  movement  from  Martins- 
burg  by  Bunker  Hill  and  Charlestown,  on  the  15th,  16th, 
and  17th  of  July,  in  your  judgment,  judicious  or  other 
wise,  and  were  this  and  his  other  movements  well  con 
ducted  or  otherwise? 

5.  Which  do  you  consider  the  better  strategic  point, 
Martinsburg  or  Charlestown? 

6.  What  at  that  time,  according  to  your  knowledge 
and  information,  was  the  relative  strength  in  men  and 
guns,  of  the  armies  of  General  Patterson  and  General 
Johnston  ? 

7.  Did  you  then  or  do  you  now  think  that  General 
Patterson  ought  to  have  attacked  General  Johnston  at 
Winchester,  and  if  he  had  done  so,  what  in  your  opinion 
would  have  been  the  probable  result? 

8.  Was  there  any  open  opposition  to  a  further  ad 
vance  by  officers  or  men,  and  if  so,  where  or  when? 

9.  Did  or  did  not  General  Patterson  use  his  influ 
ence  with  the  volunteers  of  his  command,  whose  term 
of  service  was  about  to  expire,  to  remain  with  him  a 
week  or  ten  days  longer,  to  enable  him  to  hold  his  posi 
tion  at  Charlestown  till  reinforced  with  three-years  men, 
or  to  obey  any  order  he  might  receive  from  General  Scott, 
and  if  so,  what  was  the  character  of  his  appeal,  and  what 
was  the  response  to  it? 

On  the  first  day  of  my  own  examination,  I  said  to  the 
Committee,  "  If  any  testimony  has  been  given  that  affects 
the  management  of  my  column,  I  would  like  to  have  it 


24  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

read  before  I  begin.  I  believe  it  is  customary  to  have 
that  done."  The  Chairman  in  response  to  this  said, 
"  What  Congress  expects  of  us,  is  to  obtain  such  facts  as 
we  suppose  will  be  useful  in  throwing  light  upon  the 
military  operations  of  the  army,  in  order  to  apply  any 
remedy  that  may  be  necessary.  I  perceive  by  the  docu 
ments  that  you  have  before  you,  that  you  are  about 
entering  upon  what  is  a  very  minute  narration :  that 
might  be  necessary  if  you  were  accused ;  it  might  then 
be  very  proper."  The  Hon.  Andrew  Johnson  here  in 
terfered,  and  on  his  motion  I  was  allowed  to  proceed 
and  make  my  statement,  certainly  under  the  impression 
that  before  the  Committee,  at  least,  to  use  the  words  of 
the  Chairman,  "  I  was  not  accused,"  and  had  therefore 
nothing  to  reply  to. 

It  now  appears  from  their  Report,  that  the  main 
portion  of  the  testimony  upon  which  they  have  relied 
to  make  out  an  accusation  against  me,  was  then  in  their 
possession,  yet  it  was  thus  withheld  from  me,  and  it  was 
only  by  the  courtesy  of  Mr.  Johnson  that  I  was  per 
mitted  to  make  a  statement. 

That  it  was  not  the  intention  of  Congress  that  any 
committee  of  their  body  should  so  prostitute  their  func 
tions,  I  sincerely  believe.  No  stronger  evidence  can  be 
given  of  their  sense  of  the  gross  unfairness  of  the  course 
pursued  by  this  Committee  than  the  resolution  adopted 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1862,  on  the  motion 
of  Mr.  Colfax. 

Mr.  Colfax's  resolution  was  adopted, — yeas  90,  nays 
41.  It  is  as  follows: 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  25 

"  Resolved,  That  the  course  adopted  by  the  Naval  Investi 
gating  Committee  of  1859,  of  communicating  to  the  officers 
of  the  Government  copies  of  the  evidence  apparently  adverse 
to  them,  and  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine 
the  witnesses  against  them,  or  to  refute  or  explain  their  tes 
timony,  is,  in  the  opinion  of  this  House,  worthy  of  imitation, 
whenever  practicable,  by  the  investigating  committees  ap 
pointed  by  order  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  especially 
when  the  said  committees  receive  and  collect  such  testimony 
in  secret  session;  and  that  it  is  contrary  to  the  plainest  princi 
ples  of  justice  to  condemn  any  citizen  upon  ex  parte  evidence, 
taken  against  him  by  a  committee  in  secret,  and  the  purport 
of  which  has  not,  if  practicable,  been  laid  before  him  by  the 
said  committee,  with  an  opportunity  to  explain  or  refute  it 
before  the  report  is  made  public." 

Any  body  or  committee  seeking  truth  could  hardly 
have  acted  otherwise.  It  is  only  those  bent  on  making 
a  report  consonant  with  their  own  wishes,  who  could 
lose  sight  of  all  fairness  and  justice  in  effecting  their 
purpose. 

Since  the  Committee,  in  its  published  Report  on  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  has  endeavored  to  countenance  the 
imputation  of  blame  to  me  for  "failure  to  hold  the  forces 
of  Johnston  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,"  I  pre 
sume  that  I  am  at  liberty,  as  I  can  no  longer  hope  for  a 
military  investigation,  to  state  my  own  case  without 
detriment  to  the  public  interest.  This  I  propose  now 
to  do. 

On  the  15th  of  April,  1861,  the  President,  by  procla 
mation,  called  for  a  military  force  of  seventy-five  thou 
sand  men,  of  which  the  quota  assigned  to  Pennsylvania 
was  at  first  sixteen  (afterwards  reduced  to  fourteen)  regi- 


^0  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

ments,  to  serve  as  infantry  or  riflemen,  for  the  term  of 
three  months,  unless  sooner  discharged.  On  the  ICth, 
myself  and  the  late  Major-General  W.  H.  Keim  were 
selected  by  Governor  Curtin  as  the  Major-Generals  to 
command  the  Pennsylvania  troops. 

On  the  same  day,  instantly  relinquishing  the  large 
business  in  which  I  was  engaged,  I  commenced  organ 
izing  regiments  for  service  in  Philadelphia,  with  great 
and  immediate  success. 

To  use  the  words  of  the  then  Adjutant-General  of  our 
State : 

"  Pennsylvania  not  only  furnished  promptly  her  assigned 
quota  of  fourteen  regiments,  but  increased  the  number  to 
twenty-five,  and  such  was  the  patriotic  ardor  of  the  people 
that  the  service  of  about  thirty  additional  regiments  had  to 
be  refused,  making  in  all  more  than  one-half  the  requisition 
of  the  President.  Four  days  after  this  call,  Pennsylvania 
had  placed  at  the  national  capital  six  hundred  men,  the  first 
to  arrive  for  its  defence,  and  ten  days  later  the  entire  twenty- 
five  regiments  were  organized  and  in  the  field." 

While  performing  my  part  in  this  preparation,  in 
which  all  were  zealous  and  active,  I  was  by  the  order  of 
Lieutenant-General  Scott,  placed  in  command  of  "the  De 
partment  of  Washington,"  embracing  the  States  of  Penn 
sylvania,  Delaware,  and  Maryland,  and  the  District  of 
Columbia,  my  headquarters  being  in  Philadelphia,  I  was 
unceasingly  occupied  in  organizing,  equipping  and  for 
warding  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  city  of  Washing 
ton,  in  sustaining  the  Union  feeling  in  Maryland  and 
Delaware,  and  in  the  adoption  of  means  to  prevent  one 
or  both  from  seceding  and  joining  the  States  in  rebellion. 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENAXDOAH.  27 

I 

also,  in  providing  means  for  the  defence  and  protection 
of  the  frontier  of  my  Department,  and  of  the  Delaware 
River.  My  attention  was  also  early  engaged  in  opening 
a  route  to  Washington  via  Annapolis,  for  which  pur 
pose  I  sent  the  Hon.  John  Sherman  of  Ohio,  one  of  my 
aides-de-camp,  to  General  Scott,  with  a  despatch  pointing 
out  the  advantage  of  the  Annapolis  route  at  that  time. 

My  suggestion  was  adopted,  and  the  Annapolis  route 
approved.  Pending  this,  I  had  ordered  Brigadier-Gene 
ral  B.  F.  Butler  with  a  Massachusetts  regiment  to  pro 
ceed  to  Annapolis,  in  a  steamboat  patriotically  furnished 
for  the  purpose  by  S.  M.  Felton,  Esq.,  President  of  the 
Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore  Railroad  Com 
pany.  General  Butler  was  ordered  to  hold  Annapolis, 
to  employ  the  regiments  as  they  arrived  there  in  opening 
the  way  to  Washington,  to  seize  the  Annapolis  Junction, 
to  station  a  competent  force  there,  and  guard  the  whole 
line  of  road  thoroughly.  These  services  he  rendered  in 
conformity  with  my  orders. 

Having  succeeded  in  securing  a  well-protected  line 
of  communication  with  Washington,  I  turned  my  atten 
tion  to  re-establishing  the  route  through  Baltimore, 
and  compelling  the  turbulent  spirits  of  that  city  to  sub 
mit  to  lawful  authority,  and  in  this  I  was  well  aided  by 
his  Excellency  Governor  Hicks.  The  troops  to  force  a 
passage  through  Baltimore,  were  the  First  Regiment 
Pennsylvania  Volunteer  Artillery  (Seventeenth  of  the 
line),  and  Sherman's  Battery,  the  whole  under  com 
mand  of  my  son,  the  late  General  Francis  E.  Patterson. 
It  is  due  to  the  officers  and  men  of  this  command  to  say, 


28  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

\ 

that  their  entrance  into  and  passage  through  Baltimore, 
was  an  encouraging  exhibition  of  Union  determination. 

I  had  been  deeply  convinced  that  the  contest  upon 
which  we  were  entering  was  very  much  underrated  by 
our  rulers,  and  that  the  three  months'  troops,  though 
very  well  for  the  moment,  should  not  be  our  sole  depen 
dence  for  carrying  on  operations  of  the  magnitude  which 
I  thought  that  I  foresaw. 

I  felt  that  if  advantage  was  not  taken  of  the  time 
which  their  service  gave  us  to  prepare  for  the  future,  we 
should  find  ourselves  at  some  critical  moment  with  all 
our  troops  going  out  of  service  and  none  coming  in  to 
replace  them. 

The  interruption  of  all  communication  with  Wash 
ington  left  me,  in  the  absence  of  orders,  to  rely  wholly 
upon  my  own  judgment  as  commander  of  the  Depart 
ment,  and  I  then  took  a  step  by  which  I  incurred  very 
great  responsibility;  and,  although  I  received  the  implied 
censure  of  the  War  Department  by  their  revocation  of 
my  order,  as  soon  as  they  were  able  to  communicate 
with  the  North,  yet  I  have  never  regretted  it,  and  I  con 
fidently  appeal  to  subsequent  events  to  justify  my  action. 

On  the  25th  of  April  I  addressed  the  following  letter 
to  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania: 


"HEADQUARTERS 

MILITARY  DEPARTMENT  or  WASHINGTON, 

PHILADELPHIA,  April  25th,  1861. 
"SIR: 

"  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  express  to  you  my  clear  and  decided 
opinion  that  the  force  at  the  disposal  of  this  Department 
should  be  increased  without  delay. 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  29 

"  I,  therefore,  have  to  request  your  Excellency  to  direct 
that  twenty-five  additional  regiments  of  infantry  and  one 
regiment  of  cavalry  be  called  for  forthwith,  to  be  mustered 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

"  Officers  will  be  detailed  to  inspect  and  muster  the  men 
into  service  as  soon  as  I  am  informed  of  the  points  of  rendez 
vous  which  may  be  designated  by  your  Excellency. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  PATTERSON, 

"  His  EXCELLENCY  ANDREW  Gr.  CURTIN,  "Major-Greneral. 

"  Governor  of  Pennsylvania." 

The  Governor,  with  his  usual  promptness,  responded 
to  this  appeal,  and  had  actually  raised  a  large  body  of 
men,  when  the  War  Department  declined  to  indorse  my 
call.  On  the  contrary,  they  would  not  enlarge  their  first 
requisition  to  cover  the  regiments  already  in  the  field 
from  Pennsylvania,  but  stated  "  that  it  was  more  im 
portant  to  reduce  than  enlarge  the  number." 

In  spite  of  this  rebuff,  I  determined  to  make  one  more 
effort  to  obtain  at  least  some  troops  "for  the  war"  while 
they  had  the  disposition  to  enlist  for  that  term.  With  this 
view,  I  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War  my  aide-de-camp,  the 
Hon.  John  Sherman,  Senator  from  Ohio,  who  had  done 
me  the  honor  of  serving  on  my  staff,  hoping  that  his  well- 
known  character  for  patriotism  and  ability  might  add 
weight  to  my  views,  and  induce  the  Secretary  to  modify 
his  determination,  and  permit  me  to  secure  at  least  three 
of  my  finest  regiments,  who  were  willing  to  remain  and 
re-enlist.  But  in  vain,  as  the  following  letter  will  show : 

"WASHINGTON,  May  30,  1861. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  I  have  had,  as  you  suggested,  an  interview  with  the 


30  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Secretary  of  War.  He  says  he  cannot  now  accept  any  more 
regiments  for  the  war;  that  no  doubt  the  three  years'  men 
will  be  needed,  but  that  the  question  of  their  acceptance  for 
the  war  cannot  be  decided  until  near  the  expiration  of  their 
present  enlistment.  I  feel  very  well  assured  that  if  the  as 
pect  of  affairs  is  not  materially  changed  that  these  regiments 
will  be  accepted,  if  within  the  next  month  they  justify  your 
confidence  in  them. 

"  The  Secretary  informs  me  that  the  two  ^ew  York  regi 
ments  now  at  Harrisburg  will  be  left  under  your  command. 

"  I  write  in  great  haste  to  send  by  present  opportunity. 
"  With  great  respect, 

"  JOHN  SHERMAN. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  PATTERSON." 

The  Executive  of  Pennsylvania  fortunately  took  a 
broader  view  of  the  subject,  and  induced  the  Legislature 
to  pass  an  act  to  take  into  the  service  of  the  State  the 
men  whom,  at  my  request,  he  had  commenced  raising 
for  the  United  States.  In  his  message  of  1862  he  says: 

"  Men  more  than  sufficient  in  number  to  form  some  ten 
regiments  of  the  Reserve  Corps  had,  previous  to  the  15th  of 
May,  been  accepted  by  me  in  pursuance  of  a  call  on  me 
(afterwards  rescinded)  for  twenty-five  regiments,  and  were 
then  already  assembled  and  subject  to  my  control.  Most  of 
these  men  volunteered  for  the  Reserve  Corps,  and  were  im 
mediately  organized." 

This  was  the  origin  of  the  famous  Reserve  Corps  of 
Pennsylvania,  which  was  so  gladly  taken  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  and  by  its  prompt  transfer  from  Harrisburg  to 
Washington,  gave  security  to  the  national  capital. 

Of  their  glorious  after  career,  it  is  not  necessary  for 
me  to  speak ;  it  forms  one  of  the  brightest  pages  in  the 


IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  31 

history  of  the  war.  Had  they  been  accepted  by  the 
Government  when  I  asked  for  them,  they  could  have 
been  ready  for  the  movement  of  General  McDowell,  and 
twenty-five  thousand  three  years'  troops  would  thus 
have  been  added  to  his  force.  If  added  to  my  column, 
I  could  have  left  the  Pennsylvania  border  amply  pro 
tected  on  my  advance,  and  could  have  joined  battle 
without  violating  my  instructions,  to  be  "  in  superior 
or  equal  force,"  and  with  every  prospect  of  a  brilliant 
result. 

Having  established  order  in  Baltimore  and  secured 
free  communication  with  Washington,  my  attention  was 
next  turned  to  the  recapture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  then  held 
by  the  rebels  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston. 

To  accomplish'  this  a  camp  was  formed  at  Chambers- 
burg,  under  the  late  Major-General  W.  H.  Keim.  On 
the  2d  of  June  I  left  Philadelphia  and  took  command 
in  person  of  the  troops  at  Chambersburg,  intending  to 
carry  out  a  plan  previously  submitted  to  and  approved 
by  General  Scott,  to  attack  and  capture  or  disperse  the 
enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  4th  of  June  I  was 
forbidden  to  advance  until  certain  reinforcements  were 
sent  me.  The  order  was  as  follows  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  June  4th,  1861. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON,  U.  S.  A., 

Chambersburg,  Pa. 

"  General  Scott  says,  do  not  make  a  move  forward  until 
you  are  joined  by  a  battery  of  the  Fourth  (4th)  Artillery  and 
a  battalion  of  five  (5)  companies  Third  U.  S.  Infantry,  to 


32  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

leave  here  the  6th  inst.  for  Carlisle.     Company  F,  Fourth 
Artillery,  is  the  one  to  be  mounted. 

"  Orders  have  been  given  to  purchase  horses  and  collect 
the  guns,  equipments,  &c.,  as  soon  as  possible  at  Carlisle. 
It  will  require  some  days,  but  the  General  considers  this 
addition  to  your  force  indispensable.  If  two  (2)  Ohio  regi 
ments  come  to  you,  retain  them. 

"Also  halt  the  first  two  (2)  regiments  that  may  pass 
through  Harrisburg  from  the  North  to  this  city  and  add  them 
to  your  force.  You  will  receive  a  letter  from  the  General 
before  you  move. 

"E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"  Asst.  Adjt.  Genl." 

The  following  is  the  letter  of  instructions  referred  to 
(See  Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  118)  : 

"HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  June  8,  1861. 
"  biR : 

"  I  think  your  expedition  against  Harper's  Ferry  well 
projected,  and  that  success  in  it  would  be  an  important  step 
in  the  war.  But  there  must  be  no  reverse.  Hence  I  have 
given  you  the  best  reinforcements  within  my  reach,  and 
have  just  ordered  Colonel  Burnside's  fine  Rhode  Island  reo-i- 

o 

ment  of  infantry  with  its  battery  (about  twelve  hundred 
strong)  to  proceed  to  Carlisle  and  there  receive  your  orders. 
A  company  of  the  Fourth  Artillery  (to  receive  its  horses  and 
battery  at  Carlisle),  with  the  battalion  of  the  Third  Infantry, 
took  the  same  route,  and  with  the  same  instructions,  yester 
day.  This  battery  may  not  be  ready  for  you  in  time.  These 
heavy  rains  must  swell  the  Potomac  and  delay  your  passage 
some  days.  I  am  organizing  to  aid  you  a  small  secondary 
expedition  under  Colonel  Stone.  He  will  have  about  twenty- 
five  hundred  men,  including  two  troops  of  cavalry  and  a 
section  (two  pieces)  of  artillery. 

"  The  movements  by  road  and  canal  will  commence  the 
10th  inst.,  and,  passing  up  the  country  (touching  at  Rock- 
ville),  be  directed  upon  the  ferry  opposite  Leesburg.  This 
may  be  but  a  diversion  in  your  favor,  but  possibly  it  may  be 


IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  33 

turned  into  an  effective  co-operation.  Colonel  Stone  will  be 
instructed  to  open  a  communication  with  you,  if  practicable, 
and  you  will  make  a  corresponding  effort  on  your  part.  I 
do  not  distinctly  foresee  that  we  shall  be  able  to  make  any 
diversion  in  your  behalf  on  the  other  side  of  the  Potomac, 
beyond  repairing  the  lower  part  of  the  railroad  leading  from 
Alexandria  towards  the  Manassas  Gap. 

"  I  have  said  that  we  must  sustain  no  reverse ;  but  this  is 
not  enough :  a  check  or  a  drawn  battle  would  be  a  victory 
to  the  enemy,  filling  his  heart  with  joy,  his  ranks  with  men, 
and  his  magazines  with  voluntary  contributions. 

"  Take  your  measures,  therefore,  circumspectly ;  make  a 
good  use  of  your  engineers  and  other  experienced  staff  offi 
cers  and  generals,  and  attempt  nothing  without  a  clear  pros 
pect  of  success,  as  you  will  find  the  enemy  strongly  posted 
and  not  inferior  to  you  in  numbers. 

"  With  entire  confidence  in  your  valor  and  judgment, 
"  I  remain  your  brother  soldier, 

"WlNFIELD    SCOTT. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON, 

"  United  States  Forces.'1 


When  General  Johnston  perceived  that  I  was  about  to 
cross  the  Potomac,  he  abandoned  Harper's  Ferry  and 
retreated  towards  Bunker  Hill. 

On  the  next  day  my  forces  commenced  crossing  the 
Potomac  in  pursuit.  Part  of  my  forces  were  on  one 
side  of  the  river  and  part  on  the  other,  all  in  the  highest 
state  of  confidence  and  excitement,  when  I  received  a 
telegraphic  despatch  to  send  "  all  the  regular  troops, 
horse  and  foot,  and  the  Rhode  Island  regiment,  to  Wash 
ington." 

"  WASHINGTON,  June  16th,  1861. 

"  What  movement,  if  any,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
do  you  propose  to  make  consequent  on  the  evacuation  of 


34  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Harper's  Ferry  ?  If  no  pursuit,  and  I  recommend  none, 
specifically,  send  to  me,  at  once,  all  the  regular  troops,  horse 
and  foot,  with  you,  and  the  Rhode  Island  regiment. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON." 


In  my  response  to  this  despatch,  I  said  (Report,  vol.  ii, 
p.  122),  "  To-day  and  to-morrow  about  9000  will  cross  to 
Virginia,  there  to  await  transportation,  and  to  be  sent 
forward  in  detachments  well  sustained  ;"  and  I  requested 
that  "the  regulars  be  permitted  to  remain  for  the  pre 
sent,"  and  I  submitted  my  desire,  "first,  to  transfer  to 
Harper's  Ferry  my  base  of  operations,  depots,  headquar 
ters,  &c.  ;  second,  to  open  and  maintain  free  communica 
tion  east  and  west  along  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road;  third,  to  hold  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Martinsburg,  and 
Charlestown,  a  strong  force,  gradually  and  securely  ad 
vancing,  as  they  are  prepared,  portions  towards  Win 
chester,  &c.,  and  operate  with  the  column  in  the  third 
proposition  towards  Woodstock,  and  cut  off  all  commu 
nication  with  the  west.  We  will  thus  force  the  enemy 
to  retire,  and  recover  without  a  struggle  a  conquered 
country,"  &c.  I  also  added,  "  If  I  am  permitted  to  carry 
out  this  plan,  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eailroad  and  Canal 
will  be  in  operation  in  a  week,  and  a  free  line  to  St. 
Louis  established."  In  answer  to  this  the  General-in- 
chief  telegraphed  to  me  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  June  16,  18G1. 

"  Why  a  detachment  upon  Winchester  ?  If  strong  enough, 
the  detachment  would  drive  the  enemy  from  Winchester, 
Strasburg,  and  Manassas  Junction,  or  perhaps  from  Winches 
ter  via  Staunton,  towards  Richmond.  What  would  be  the 


IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  35 

gain  by  driving  the  enemy  on  either  of  these  places  ?  And  if 
your  detachment  be  not  strong,  it  would  be  lost.  Hence  the 
detachment,  if  not  bad,  would  be  useless.  The  enemy  is 
concentrating  upon  Arlington  and  Alexandria,  and  this  is  the 
line  to  be  looked  to.  Is  Wallace,  at  Cumberland,  threatened 
from  below?  If  so,  the  threatening  detachment  is  cut  off  by 
your  passage  of  the  Potomac.  McClellan  has  been  told  to 
day,  to  send  nothing  across  the  mountains  to  support  you, 
since  the  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry.  You  are  strong 
enough  without.  The  regulars  with  you  are  most  needed 
here ;  send  them  and  the.  Rhode  Island  regiment  as  fast  as 
disengaged.  Keep  within  the  above  limits  until  you  can 
satisfy  me  you  ought  to  go  beyond  them.  Report  frequently. 

"WlNFIELD  SCOTT. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON,  Commanding." 

"  WASHINGTON,  June  16,  1861. 

"  You  tell  me  you  arrived  last  night  at  Hagerstowii,  and 
McClellan  writes  you  are  checked  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Where 
are  you  ? 

"  WlNFIELD  SCOTT. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON,  Commanding." 

"HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  June  17th,  1861. 
"  To  GENERAL  PATTERSON  : 

"  We  are  pressed  here.     Send  the  troops  I  have   twice 

called  for,  without  delay. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT." 

This  last  was  imperative,  arid  the  troops  were  sent, 
leaving  me  without  a  single  piece  of  artillery,  and  for 
the  time  with  but  one  troop  of  cavalry,  which  had  not 
been  in  service  over  a  month.  Of  this  recall  General 
Cadwalader,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  thus  speaks : 

"  Answer.  My  division,  as  a  part  of  General  Patterson's 


36  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

column,  was  in  the  advance.  I  crossed  the  Potomac  from 
Williamsport,  and  when  Johnston  retreated,  as  we  advanced 
upon  Harper's  Ferry,  we  went  down  as  far  as  Falling  Waters, 
on  the  Virginia  side. 

"  I  was  there  met  with  an  order  to  send  to  Washington 
all  the  regular  troops— they  were  all  under  my  command- 
as  it  was  thought  that  Johnston  had  fallen  hack  to  reinforce 
Beauregard,  and  that  Washington  was  in  danger.  All  the 
regular  troops  being  ordered  to  Washington,  and  the  ohject 
of  dislodging  the  enemy  from  Harper's  Ferry  having  been 
accomplished,  General  Patterson  was  compelled,  or  rather 
induced,  to  give  me  the  order  to  fall  back.  I  was  then  on 
the  way  to  Martinsburg,  and  had  got  as  far  as  Falling  Waters, 
some  miles  on  the  other  side  of  the  Potomac.  General  Pat 
terson  was  still  at  Hagerstown.  A  great  misfortune,  by-the- 
by,  was  that  recall." 

The  Hon.  John  Sherman,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  me 
dated  August  30,  1861,  gives  it  as.  his  judgment  that 
"The  great  error  of  General  Scott  undoubtedly  was,  that 
he  gave  way  to  a  causeless  apprehension  that  Washing 
ton  was  to  be  attacked  before  the  meeting  of  Congress, 
and  therefore  weakened  you  when  you  were  advancing. 
No  subsequent  movement  could  repair  that  error."  This, 
I  venture  to  say,  will  be  the  conclusion  of  any  one  who 
dispassionately  examines  the  subject.  I  was  mortified 
and  humiliated  at  having  to  recross  the  river  without 
striking  a  blow.  I  knew  that  my  reputation  would  be 
grievously  damaged  by  it,  the  country  could  not  under 
stand  the  meaning  of  this  crossing  and  recrossing,  this 
marching  and  countermarching  in  face  of  the  foe,  and 
that  I  would  be  censured  without  stint  for  such  appa 
rent  vacillation  and  want  of  purpose.  In  this  I  was  not 
mistaken,  for  not  only  the  public,  but  persons  in  "  the 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SHENANDOAH. 


37 


highest  military  positions"  at  Washington,  did  great 
injustice  to  me  and  my  command.  I  was  criticized,  too, 
for  not  doing,  exactly  what  my  own  plan  contemplated, 
and  what  I  was  actually  carrying  out,  when  forced  to 
return  to  this  side  of  the  Potomac  by  the  action  of  the 
General-in-Chief.  Of  this  I  was  informed  in  the  sub 
joined  letter  from  the  Hon.  John  Sherman. 

"  WASHINGTON,  June  30,  1861. 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  : 

«  .  .  .  .  Great  injustice  is  done  you  and  your  command 
here, 'and  by  persons  in  the  highest  military  positions.  I 
have  been  asked  over  and  over  again  why  you  did  not  push 
on  to  Martinsbun?,  Harper's  Ferry,  and  Winchester.  I  have 
been  restrained  by  my  being  on  your  staff  from  saying  more 
than  simply,  that  you  executed  your  orders,  and  that  when 
you  were  prepared  to  advance  your  best  troops  were  recalled 

to  Washington 

"  Very  truly,  yours, 

"  JOHN  SHERMAN. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  E.   PATTERSON." 

On  the  20th  of  June,  the  General-in-chief  asked  me 
"without  delay  to  propose  to  him  a  plan  of  operations." 
On  the  21st  I  submitted  one,  as  follows  (Report,  vol.  ii, 
p.  123)  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

HAGERSTOWN,  MARYLAND,  June  21,  1861. 
"  COLONEL: 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  tele 
gram  of  the  General-in-chief,  calling  for  a  plan  of  operations, 
with  a  portion  of  my  force,  to  sweep  the  enemy  from  Lees- 
burg,  &c. 

"Inclosed  is  a  copy  of  my  telegraphic  reply.  The  fol 
lowing  is  my  plan.  To  carry  out  the  views  of  the  General- 
in-chief,  I  propose, — 

"  1st.  To  occupy  the  Maryland  Heights,  with  a  brigade 


NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

(2100  men);   fortify  and  ami  with  Doubleday's   artillery; 
provision  for  20  days,  to  secure  against  investment. 

"  2d.  To  move  all  supplies  to  Frederick,  and  immediately 
thereafter  abandon  this  line  of  operations,  threatening  with 
a  force  to  open  a  route  through  Harper's  Ferry,  this  force 
to  be  the  sustaining  one  for  the  command  on  Maryland 
Heights. 

"  3d.  To  send  everything  else  available,  horse,  foot  and 
artillery,  to  cross  the  Potomac  near  Point  of  Bocks,  and 
unite  with  Colonel  Stone  at  Leesburg.  From  that  point  I 
can  operate  as  circumstances  shall  demand  and  your  orders 
require. 

"If  no  blow  is  to  be  struck  here,  I  think  this  change  of 
position  important  to  keep  alive  the  ardor  of  our  men,  as 
well  as  to  force  an  enemy.  The  reasons  for  this  change  of 
depot  will  be  so  apparent  to  the  General-in-chief  that  I  need 
not  refer  to  them.  By  the  employment  of  the  local  trans 
portation  of  the  country,  I  can  soon  make  the  necessary 
changes,  and  will  hasten  to  carry  out  your  orders. 

"  I  have  many  reports  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  the 
force  opposite  us  in  Virginia,  and  have  reason  to  believe  that 
when  the  regulars  were  withdrawn,  General  Johnston,  with 
13,000  men  and  22  pieces  of  artillery,  was  marching  to  the 
attack,  that  night  posted  his  forces,  expecting  an  attack  the 
following  morning.  I  regret  we  did  not  meet  the  enemy,  so 
confident  am  I  that  with  this  well-appointed  force,  the  result 
would  have  been  favorable  to  us,  and  that  this  portion  of  Vir 
ginia  would  now  be  peaceably  occupied.  Reports  of  the 
enemy  having  returned  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  driven  the 
occupants  to  this  shore,  reached  me  yesterday.  I  imme 
diately  despatched  a  strong  force  to  take  the  position  in  the 
vicinity  of  Sharpsburg,  and  protect  all  parties  on  this  side  of 
the  river,  and  drive  back  any  force  which  may  attempt  to 
cross. 

"  I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

*  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C." 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  39 

Had  this  plan  been  adopted,  the  army  of  General 
McDowell  and  my  own  would  have  been  precisely  where 
they  ought  to  have  been.  I  would  have  been  in  a  posi 
tion  to  have  aided  General  McDowell,  and  to  have  taken 
and  torn  up,  if  I  could  not  have  held,  a  portion  of  "  the 
railroad  leading  from  Manassas  to  the  Valley  of  Vir 
ginia."  This  would  not  only  have  destroyed  "  the  com 
munications  between  the  forces  under  Beauregard  and 
those  under  Johnston,"  but  it  would  have  prevented 
either  from  throwing  large  reinforcements  to  the  other 
when  assailed. 

And  if  I  could  not  prevent  Johnston  from  joining 
Beauregard,  which  I  certainly  could  not  do  while  sta 
tioned  anywhere  between  Williamsport  and  Winchester, 
I  could  have  joined  McDowell  in  the  attack  on  Manas 
sas,  and  assailed  and  turned  the  enemy's  left.  Had  my 
suggestions  been  adopted,  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  might 
have  been  a  victory,  instead  of  a  defeat. 

It  thus  appears  that,  just  one  month  before  the  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  knowing  that  I  was  upon  a  false  line  and 
could  do  no  good  there,  I  proposed  to  abandon  it  and 
go  to  Leesburg,  where  it  is  now^  admitted  I  ought  to 
have  been.  The  wisdom  of  this  plan  is  singularly  con 
firmed  by  the  opinion  of  one  of  the  ablest  military 
writers  and  critics  of  the  day,  Major-General  Halleck. 
In  an  article  on  "  The  Art  of  War,"  published  in  the 
New  York  Times,  of  the  22d  of  July,  1862,  and  written 
in  entire  ignorance  of  my  having  previously  suggested 
the  very  course  he  recommends,  he  says : 


40  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  Patterson  and  McDowell's  columns  moved  on  exterior 
lines,  leaving  the  armies  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  be 
tween  them;  they  concentrated  their  forces  at  Bull  Run  and 
defeated  McDowell's  army,  and  might  have  done  the  same 
thing  to  the  army  of  Patterson.  Had  the  latter  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  Leesbitrg,  he  would  have  threatened  Johnston's  com 
munications  much  more  effectually  than  at  Martinsburg,  and  at 
the  same  time  would  have  been  near  enough  to  McDowell  to  assist 
him.,  or  to  receice  assistance  from  him,  as  circumstances  might 
have  required, 

"  Johnston  must  then  have  abandoned  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Winchester,  and  united  with  Beauregard,  or  the  latter  must 
have  moved  to  the  assistance  of  the  former;  for  had  they 
remained  separate,  both  Patterson  and  McDowell  could  have 
moved  between  them. 

"  In  that  case,  Beauregard  must  have  fallen  back  towards 
Richmond,  and  Johnston  must  have  been  isolated.  If  John 
ston  had  fallen  back  upon  Manassas  Junction  (as  in  fact  he 
did  on  the  21st  day  of  July),  Patterson  would  have  been  able 
to  assist  McDowell  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run ;  whereas,  by 
his  exterior  line  of  operations  he  actually  gained  nothing. 
Newspaper  critics  have  attempted  to  throw  all  the  blame  of 
this  defeat  upon  Patterson,  and  have  compared  him  to 
Grouchy  at  Waterloo.  From  all  the  information  we  can 
obtain  on  this  subject,  we  can  see  no  parallel  in  the  two 
cases.  Grouchy  made  an  eccentric  movement  from  interior 
lines,  thus  changing  his  interior  to  an  exterior  position, 
leaving  the  great  body  of  Blucher's  army  nearer  to  that  of 
Wellington  than  he  was  to  Napoleon.  Nevertheless,  he  was 
near  enough  to  hear  the  cannonading  of  Waterloo,  and 
might  have  reached  the  field  of  battle  in  time  to  prevent 
the  disastrous  retreat,  if  not  to  save  the  defeat.  The  coun 
try  was  an  open  one.  and  his  army  could  have  moved  as 
rapidly  as  that  of  the  enemy.  On  the  contrary,  Patterson's 
position  was,  from  the  beginning,  an  exterior  one ;  he  was 
some  sixty  miles  from  the  battle-field,  with  a  strong  force 
between  him  and  McDowell.  Moreover,  Johnston  had  a 
railroad  at  his  command,  and  could  reach  Manassas  June- 


IN    THE   VALLEY    OF    THE   SHEtfANDOAH.  41 

tion  in  a  few  hours;  whereas,  Patterson,  without  cars  (the 
railroad  being  obstructed  and  the  bridges  destroyed),  could 
not  have  reached  Bull  Run  in  less  than  two  days,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  opposition  which  he  would  have  encountered 
from  the  army  of  Johnston. 

"  We  know  nothing  of  the  reasons  why  Patterson's  army 
was  at  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry, — whether  his  line 
of  operations  and  his  positions  were  of  his  own  selection,  or 
were  the  result  of  superior  orders;  our  criticism  is  based 
solely  upon  the  movements  as  they  occurred,  without  any 
intention  to  blame  or  to  exculpate  any  one." 

I  now  return  to  my  correspondence  with  the  General- 
in-chief.  On  the  23d  of  June,  I  reported  as  follows  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  or  PENNSYLVANIA, 

HAGERSTOWN,  MARYLAND,  June  23,  1861. 
"  COLONEL  : 

"  Up  to  the  present  instant  I  have  received  from  Captain 
J.  Newton,  Engineer  Corps,  only  a  report  of  a  part  of  his 
reconnoissance  of  the  Maryland  Heights  and  the  ground  ad 
jacent,  made  in  compliance  with  the  injunctions  of  the  Ge- 
neral-in-chief.  I  hasten  to  give  the  result  thus  far,  expecting 
to-morrow  evening  to  present  the  whole. 

"  Captain  Newton  approached  the  Heights  from  this  side, 
ascending  over  rough  and  steep  roads,  difficult  for  artillery. 
The  summit  he  found  capable  of  defence,  of  ample  character, 
by  about  500  men.  The  main  difficulty  to  be  overcome  is 
the  supply  of  water,  the  springs,  which  a  week  since  afforded 
an  ample  supply,  having  become  dry.  He  found  no  water 
within  a  half  mile  of  the  position  selected  on  the  Heights 
for  an  intrenched  camp.  In  Pleasant  Valley,  on  the  east, 
near  the  base  of  the  mountain,  springs  are  reported  to 
abound;  their  character  will  be  ascertained  to-morrow. 
Water  would  have  to  be  hauled  from  this  valley,  and  he 
reports  the  ascent  very  difficult, 

"  In  this  valley  I  propose  to  place  the  force  sustaining  that 
on  the  Heights.  The  whole  command,  if  the  location  prove 
favorable,  need  not  exceed  2500  men.  That  force  would 


42  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

render  the  position  safe;  anything  less  would  invite  attack. 
The  following  is  what  I  have  to  report  in  relation  to  the 
enemy.  Deserters  from  their  ranks,  some  one  or  more  of 
whom  come  in  daily,  all  agree  in  saying  that  the  whole  of 
the  force  originally  at  Harper's  Ferry  (said  to  have  heen 
25,000  men)  is  still  between  Williamsport  and  Winchester; 
about  8000  coming  this  way  arrived  on  Friday  at  Martins- 
burg.  The  remainder  are  distributed  in  a  semicircle,  and 
on  the  route  to  Winchester  within  four  hours'  march  of  the 
advance.  The  advance  is  approaching  Falling  Waters,  under 
the  command  of  General  Jackson,  who  now  commands  the 
whole. 

"  The  force  under  Jackson  controls  the  people  of  Berkeley 
County,  whom,  I  believe,  are  sorely  oppressed,  and  would  wel 
come  our  approach.  That  force  has  become  some  little  en 
couraged  from  our  not  advancing,  and  may  soon  annoy  us. 
If  so,  I  shall  not  avoid  the  contest  they  may  invite;  indeed, 
if  it  meets  the  approval  of  the  General-in-chief,  I  would 
march  my  whole  force,  as  soon  as  the  batteries  receive  har 
ness,  upon  the  enemy,  and  drive  him  step  by  step  to  Win 
chester. 

"  I  believe  this  force  can  in  ten  days  rid  the  adjoining 
portion  of  Virginia  of  its  oppressors.  I  may  be  forced  to 
this  course.  My  fear  is  that  I  may  interfere  with  the  general 
plan  of  the  General-in-chief,  and  drive  the  enemy  to  the  aid 
of  the  main  body. 

"  They  would,  however,  go  as  fugitives  to  aid  in  its  demo 
ralization.  My  means  of  transportation  are  coming  in  ra 
pidly. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

u  Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

•'  A.  A.  Gen.  TJ.  S.  Army,  Washington  City." 

I  here  distinctly  state  all  that  I  could  effect  "  to  drive 
the  enemy  to  Winchester."  Once  there  I  had  no  doubt 
that  he  could  intrench  and  defy  me,  or,  by  striking  the 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        43 

railroad,  elude  me,  and  by  destroying  it  or  removing 
the  cars,  prevent  me  from  following  him. 

Two  days  afterwards  I  received  the  following  (No. 
18,  p.  125,  Conduct  of  the  War]  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  June  25,  1861. 

"  I  write  by  mail  in  substance.  Remain  in  front  of  the 
enemy  while  he  continues  in  force  between  Winchester  and 
the  Potomac.  If  you  are  in  superior  or  equal  force  you  may 
cross  and  attack  him.  If  the  enemy  should  retire  upon  his 
resources  at  Winchester,  it  is  not  enjoined  that  you  should 
pursue  him  to  that  distance  from  your  base  of  operations, 
without  a  well-grounded  confidence  in  your  continued  supe 
riority. 

"  Your  attention  is  invited  to  a  secondary  object,  a  com 
bined  operation  on  Leesburg  between  a  portion  of  your 
troops  and  the  column  of  Colonel  Stone  at,  and  probably 
above,  the  Point  of  Rocks,  to  hold  that  village.  The  enemy 
has  reinforced  Leesburg  to  sixteen  hundred  (1600)  men,  and 
may  increase  the  number.  Inquire. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON." 

This  gave  me  the  permission  I  desired  "  if  I  consi 
dered  myself  superior  or  equal  in  force  to  the  enemy." 
I  had  at  this  time  ten  thousand  volunteer  infantry,  six 
hundred  and  fifty  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  six  guns, 
but  no  means  of  moving  them.  The  force  of  the  enemy 
was  reported  by  Captain  (now  Major-General)  Newton, 
of  the  U.  S.  Engineers,  who  had  been  for  two  days  en 
gaged  at  Harper's  Ferry  in  obtaining  intelligence,  as 
consisting  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  and  twenty  to  twenty- 
four  guns ;  while  General  Cadwalader's  information  was 
that  the  enemy  had  twenty  guns ;  "  they  were  counted 


44  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

as  they  passed."  The  accuracy  of  these  reports  is  fully 
confirmed  by  the  report  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
which  has  since  been  published.  He  says : 

"  I  assumed  command  of  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  23d  of 
May.  The  force  at  that  point  consisted  of  nine  regiments 
and  two  battalions  of  infantry,  four  companies  of  artillery, 
with  sixteen  pieces,  without  caissons,  harness,  or  horses,  and 
about  three  hundred  cavalry.  I  was  employed  until  the 
13th  of  June  in  continuing  what  had  been  begun  by  my 
predecessor,  Colonel  (now  Major-General)  Jackson,  the  or 
ganization,  instruction,  and  equipment  of  the  troops,  and 
providing  means  of  transportation  and  artillery  horses.  On 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  army  left  Harper's  Ferry  for 
Winchester.  The  force  had  been  increased  by  three  regi 
ments  (i.  e.,  the  Tenth,  and  Thirteenth.  Virginia  and  Third 
Tennessee)  since  the  1st  of  June,  and  encamped  four  miles 
beyond  Charlestown." 
/ 

By  the  admission  of  the  enemy,  therefore,  his  force 
consisted  of  12  regiments  and  2  battalions  of  infantry, 
4  companies  of  artillery,  16  guns,  300  cavalry,  which 
was  increased  before  the  2d  of  July,  when  I  crossed  the 
river,  according  to  General  Johnston,  "  by  the  arrival 
of  General  Bee  and  Colonel  Elzey,  and  the  Ninth 
Georgia  regiment." 

Yet  the  Commander-in-chief,  who  had  on  the  25th 
given  me  permission  to  offer  battle  "  if  superior  or  equal 
in  force,"  on  the  27th,  when  he  knew  I  had  but  six 
guns  and  no  mode  of  moving  them,  telegraphs  :  "I  had 
expected  your  crossing  the  river  to-day  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy."  To  this  I  wrote  the  following  reply  ( Conduct 
of  the  War,  p.  126,  No.  21)  : 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  45 


"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

HAGERSTOWN,  MARYLAND,  June  28,  1861. 
"  COLONEL  : 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  a  tele 
gram  from  the  General-in-Chief,  dated  27th  instant,  saying : 
'  I  had  expected  your  crossing  the  river  to-day  in  pursuit  of 
the  enemy.' 

"  I  infer  from  this  that  orders  have  been  sent  me  to  cross 
and  attack  the  enemy.  If  so,  I  have  not  received  them. 
Captain  Newton,  of  the  Engineers,  returned  at  midnight, 
after  two  days'  absence  in  the  direction  of  Sharpsburg  and 
Dam  ~No.  4,  and  reports,  on  information  he  considers  reliable, 
five  thousand  men  from  Falling  Waters  to  Dam  No.  4,  four 
thousand  five  hundred  men  in  the  vicinity  of  Shepherdstown 
under  General  Jackson,  and  a  reserve  of  five  thousand  five 
hundred  men,  under  General  Johnston,  near  Bunker  Hill. 
He  also  reports  twenty  to  twenty-four  guns,  and  a  large 
cavalry  force  with  General  Jackson,  and  thinks  General 
Negley,  whose  brigade  is  on  my  left,  near  Sharpsburg,  will 
be  attacked,  the  river  being  fordable  at  almost  every  point. 
To  meet  this  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  with  twenty-two 
guns,  and  nearly  one  thousand  cavalry,  I  have  about  ten 
thousand  volunteer  infantry,  and  six  hundred  and  fifty  ca 
valry  and  artillery,  the  latter  being  nearly  all  recruits.  The 
horses  are  untrained,  and  we  are  still  without  harness  for 
the  battery.  I  have  repeatedly  asked  for  batteries,  and  ought 
to  have  one  for  each  brigade,  but  have  none.  The  only  one 
fit  for  service  sent  me  was  the  Rhode  Island  battery,  and 
that  the  General-in-chief  was  compelled,  by  the  necessities 
of  his  own  position,  to  take  from  me,  when  most  wanted, 
and  within  a  week  after  it  joined  me. 

"  I  have  neither  cavalry  nor  artillery  sufficient  to  defend 
the  fords  of  the  river  between  Harper's  Ferry  and  Hancock, 
but  I  would  much  rather  attack  than  defend,  and  would 
have  more  confidence  in  the  result.  While  I  will  not,  on 
my  own  responsibility,  attack  without  artillery  and  superior 
force,  I  will  do  so  cheerfully  and  promptly  if  the  General-in- 
chief  will  give  me  an  explicit  order  to  that  effect. 


46  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  To  insure  success,  I  respectfully  but  earnestly  request 
that  the  troops  taken  from  me  when  Washington  was  me 
naced  be  sent  to  me  with  all  speed,  with  a  number  of  field 
guns  equal  to  those  of  the  insurgents.  I  will  then  be  en 
abled  to  choose  my  point  of  attack,  offer  battle  to  the  enemy, 
and,  I  trust,  drive  them  before  me,  clearing  the  valley  in 
front,  and  taking  such  position  as  the  General-in-chief  may 
indicate. 

"  I  respectfully  suggest  that  Colonel  Stone's  column  be 
sent  me,  with  other  reinforcements,  and  venture  to  add  that 
the  sooner  I  am  reinforced  with  reliable  troops  and  abundant 
field  artillery  the  better.  I  am  making  arrangements  for 
crossing  the  river,  and  will  do  so  without  waiting  for  orders 
or  reinforcements,  if  I  find  that  the  strength  of  the  enemy 
has  been  overrated. 

"  I  beg  to  remind  the  General-in-chief  that  the  period  of 
service  of  nearly  all  the  troops  here  will  expire  within  a 
month,  and  that,  if  we  do  not  meet  the  enemy  with  them, 
we  will  be  in  no  condition  to  do  so  for  three  months  to  come. 
The  new  regiments  will  not  be  fit  for  service  before  Septem 
ber,  if  then,  and  meanwhile  this  whole  frontier  will  be  ex 
posed. 

"  I  have  got  my  command  into  as  good  condition  as  I 
could  expect  in  so  short  a  time. 

"  Officers  and  men  are  anxious  to  be  led  against  the  in 
surgents,  and  if  the  General-in-chief  will  give  me  a  regiment 
of  regulars  and  an  adequate  force  of  field  artillery,  I  will 
cross  the  river  and  attack  the  enemy,  unless  their  forces  are 
ascertained  to  be  more  than  two  to  one. 

"  I  beg  you  to  assure  the  General-in-chief  of  my  sincere 
desire  to  sustain  him  faithfully,  and  to  promote,  by  all  the 
means  at  my  command,  the  success  of  his  general  plan  of 
operations. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

"Your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  PATTERSOX, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 
11  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

«'  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Washington,  D.  C." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.       47 

On  the  29th  of  June,  the  harness  for  my  battery  ar 
rived.  On  the  30th  a  reconnoissance  in  force  was  made, 
my  troops  were  then  concentrated  at  Williamsport,  and 
on  the  2d  of  July  I  crossed  the  Potomac  with  less  than 
11,000  men  and  with  one  battery  of  six  smooth-bore 
guns,  to  which  the  horses  had  never  been  attached  until 
I  moved,  and  to  the  sound  of  which  they  were  entirely 
unaccustomed. 

After  crossing  the  Potomac,  just  .beyond  Falling 
Waters,  the  advance  brigade  of  the  enemy,  3500  infan 
try,  with  artillery  and  a  large  cavalry  force,  all  under 
"  Stonewall"  Jackson,  were  encountered,  and  after  a 
sharp  contest,  principally  with  General  Abercrombie's 
brigade,  were  forced  back  and  driven  before  our  troops 
several  miles,  the  relative  loss  of  the  enemy  being  very 
heavy. 

The  following  official  report  of  the  affair  was  trans 
mitted  to  the  War  Department: 


"  HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

MARTINSBURG,  VIRGINIA,  July  6, 1861. 
"  SIR  : 

"  I  telegraphed  my  intention  to  cross  the  Potomac  on  the 
1st  instant.  I  now  have  the  honor  to  report  my  movements 
since  that  date. 

"  I  left  Hagerstown  on  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  ult,  the 
earliest  day  my  command  could  take  the  field  in  a  proper 
condition  for  active  service,  intending  the  folio  wing  morning 
to  enter  Virginia  with  two  columns  (at  Dam  No.  4,  and  at 
Williamsport),  to  be  united  the  same  day  at  Hainesville,  the 
location  of  the  rebels.  Owing  to  the  danger  and  difficulty 
attending  the  fording  at  Dam  No.  4, 1  placed  all  the  force  at 
Williamsport. 


48  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  My  order  of  march  for  the  2d  instant  is  given  in  the 
accompanying  circular.  The  advance  crossed  the  Potomac 
at  4  A.  M.,  all  taking  the  main  road  to  Martinsburg,  with 
the  exception  of  Negley's  brigade,  which,  about  one  mile 
from  the  ford,  diverged  to  the  right,  to  meet  the  enemy 
should  he  come  from  Hedgesville,  to  guard  our  right,  and 
to  rejoin  at  Ilainesville. 

"  About  five  miles  from  the  ford  the  skirmishers  in  front 
and  on  the  flank  suddenly  became  engaged  with  the  enemy 
posted  in  a  clump  of  trees.  At  the  same  time  their  main 
body  appeared  in  front,  sheltered  by  fences,  timber,  and 
houses.  Abercrombie  immediately  deployed  his  regiments 
(First  Wisconsin  and  Eleventh  Pennsylvania)  on  each  side  of 
the  road,  placed  .Hudson's  section,  supported  by  the  First 
Troop  Philadelphia  City  Cavalry,  in  the  road,  and  advanced 
to  the  attack  against  a  warm  fire  before  him. 

"  The  enemy  being  supported  by  artillery,  resisted  for 
twenty-five  minutes  with  much  determination.  Lieutenant 
Hudson,  after  getting  in  position,  soon  silenced  their  guns. 

"  In  the  meantime,  Thomas's  brigade  rapidly  advanced 
and  deployed  to  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy.  The  enemy, 
seeing  the  movement  and  being  pressed  by  Abercrombie, 
retired,  hotly  pursued  for  four  miles  by  artillery  and  infantry. 

"  The  cavalry  could  not  be  employed,  on  account  of  nu 
merous  fences  and  walls  crossing  the  country. 

"In  the  enemy's  camp  was  found  camp  equipage,  provi 
sions,  grain,  &c. 

"  This  brush  was  highly  creditable  to  our  arms,  winning, 
as  we  did,  the  day  against  a  foe  superior  in  numbers  to  those 
engaged  on  our  side. 

"  They  were  well  posted,  sheltered  by  timber,  and  sus 
tained  by  artillery  and  cavalry.  Our  men  advanced  over 
open  ground  against  a  warm  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry. 
I  present  the  report  of  Colonels  Abercrombie  and  Thomas 
and  Lieutenants  Perkins  and  Hudson,  and  take  much  plea 
sure  in  bearing  testimony  as  an  eye-witness  to  the  admirable 
manner  in  which  their  commands  were  handled,  and  their 
commendations  earned. 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  49 

"I  also  bear  testimony  to  the  efficient  service,  in  posting 
portions  of  the  troops  and  conducting  them  to  the  front  and 
into  action,  rendered  by  the  members  of  my  staff  present 
and  on  the  field  of  battle,  Colonel  Porter,  Captain  John  New 
ton,  and  Lieutenant  Babcock,  and  Majors  E.  Butler  Price 
and  Craig  Biddle,  who  were  employed  conveying  orders, 
also  Surgeon  Tripler  in  attending  to  the  wounded. 

"  The  loss  of  the  enemy  was  over  sixty  in  killed.  The 
number  of  wounded  cannot  be  ascertained,  as  a  large  num 
ber  were  carried  off  the  field. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  E.  PATTERSON, 
"Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Army, 

"Washington,  D.  C." 

Subsequent  operations  of  our  forces,  upon  much 
grander  scales,  have  caused  this  brilliant  little  affair  to 
be  forgotten.  At  the  time,  however,  being  the  first  in 
stance  that  any  number  of  our  troops  had  been  under 
fire,  their  gallant  behavior  in  resisting  an  attack  led  by 
so  able  a  commander  as  "  Stonewall"  Jackson,  was  a 
matter  of  very  general  congratulation  and  natural  pride. 

On  the  3d  of  July,  the  army  under  my  command 
entered  Martinsburg.  There  I  was  compelled  to  halt 
and  send  back  for  supplies,  and  to  wait  for  Colonel 
Stone's  command,  ordered  on  the  30th  of  June  to  join 
me,  which  he  did  on  the  8th  of  July.  My  means  of 
transportation  were  utterly  inadequate,  without  an  in 
crease  of  which  it  was  impossible  to  advance.  I  had 
wagons  and  teams  for  baggage  only,  and  none  for 
a  supply  train.  The  reinforcements  being  without 
wagons  only  added  to  my  difficulty.  Not  one  wagon, 


50  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

horse,  mule,  or  set  of  harness,  was  sent  to  me  from 
Washington.  All  the  transportation  I  had  was  fur 
nished,  under  my  own  orders,  by  the  energetic  efforts 
of  my  efficient  Deputy  Quartermaster-General,  Colonel 
Grossman. 

As  an  evidence  of  this,  I  insert  the  following,  from 
other  orders  of  the  same  character  issued  at  this  time 
(Report  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  135): 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
MARTINSBURG,  July  8,  1861. 

"  SPECIAL  ORDERS,  ^o.  94. 

"  Division  and  brigade  commanders  will  require  those 
regiments  which  have  not  reduced  their  number  of  tents  to 
four  common  and  one  wall  tent  for  each  company,  and  one 
wall  tent  for  other  officers,  at  once  to  pack  the  surplus,  mark 
them,  and  turn  them  in  to  Captain  Woods,  Acting  Assistant 
Quartermaster,  at  the  depot.  The  spare  wagons  which  will 
thus  be  created  must  be  used  to  carry  provisions. 

"  Every  wagon  which  can  be  spared  from  transporting  the 
regiments  will  at  once  be  taken  to  Colonel  Grossman,  who 
is  authorized  to  call  for  what  he  requires. 

"The  commanding  General  calls  upon  every  one  to  re 
duce  their  amount  of  transportation,  to  enable  him  to  move 
a  larger  force  to  the  front,  and  to  keep  his  army  provisioned. 

"By  order  of  Major-General  Patterson. 

"F.  J.  PORTER, 

"  Ass't  Adjutant-General." 

This  deficiency  of  transportation,  which  I  had  anti 
cipated  on  advancing  on  this  line,  now  began  to  be  a 
source  of  serious  embarrassment. 

Immediately  on  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Stone  I  issued 
the  following  order  to  advance,  the  object  being  to  attack 
the  enemy  at  Winchester  (Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  135)  : 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  51 


"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
MARTINSBURG,  VA.,  July  8,  1861. 

"  GENERAL  ORDER.     CIRCULAR. 

"  The  troops  will  move  to-morrow  morning,  in  the  follow 
ing  order : 

"  The  First  (Thomas's)  Brigade,  with  the  Rhode  Island 
Battery  temporarily  attached  thereto,  will  advance  by  the 
Winchester  turnpike,  accompanied  by  one  squadron  of  ca 
valry. 

"  The  Seventh  (Stone's)  Brigade,  with  Perkins's  Battery 
attached  thereto,  will  take  the  main  street  of  the  town  (by 
the  Court-house),  and  will  continue  on  the  road  parallel  to 
and  east  of  the  Winchester  turnpike.  One  company  of  ca 
valry  will  be  attached  to  this  command. 

"  The  First  (Cadwalader's)  Division  will  follow  the  march 
of  Thomas's  Brigade.  Doubleday's  Battery  will  advance 
with  this  division,  one  regiment  of  which  will  be  detailed 
for  its  guard,  to  accompany  wherever  it  may  be  ordered. 

"  The  Second  (Keim's)  Division  will  pursue  both  routes, 
G-eneral  Negley's  Brigade  following  the  march  of  Colonel 
Stone  and  Colonel  Abercrombie's,  and  General  Wynkoop's 
that  of  General  Cadwalader. 

"  The  Twenty-eighth  and  Nineteenth  New  York  Regi 
ments  will  be  temporarily  attached  to  General  Keim's  Divi 
sion. 

"  General  Keim  will  detail  a  strong  rear-guard  of  his  divi 
sion  for  the  wagon  train.  The  rear-guard  will  march  on  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  train,  and  will  be  reinforced  by  a 
squadron  of  cavalry. 

"  General  Keim  will  detail  a  competent  field-officer  to 
command  the  rear-guard. 

"  The  wagons  will  advance  in  one  train  in  the  rear  of  the 
troops,  and  will  be  required  to  keep  closed. 

"  The  troops  of  the  several  divisions  and  brigades  will 
keep  closed. 

"By  order  of  Major-General  Patterson. 

"  F.  J.  PORTER, 

"  Ass't  Adjutant-General." 


52  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

About  midnight  the  order  was  countermanded,  as 
some  of  the  troops  that  had  arrived  under  Colonel  Stone 
were  reported  by  him  so  weary  and  footsore  as  to  be 
quite  unable,  without  repose,  to  bear  the  fatigue  of  a 
further  march,  and  be  in  a  condition  to  fight. 

On  the  next  morning,  the  9th  of  July,  finding  from 
conversation  with  some  of  my  officers  that  their  opposi 
tion  to  the  plan  of  advancing  upon  Winchester,  made 
known  by  the  circular,  appeared  to  be  very  strong  and 
decided,  I  was  induced,  before  renewing  the  order,  to 
call  a  council  of  all  the  division  and  brigade  comman 
ders,  the  officers  of  Engineers,  and  chiefs  of  the  De 
partments  of  Transportation  and  Supply.  These  were  : 
Major-General  Wm.  H.  Keim,  Brigadier-General  Cad- 
walader  (now  Major-General),  Colonel  Abercrombie 
(now  Brigadier-General),  Colonel  Geo.  H.  Thomas  (now 
Major-General),  Brigadier-General  Negley  (now  Major- 
General),  Colonel  Stone  (now  Brigadier-General),  Cap 
tain  Newton,  U.  S.  Engineers  (now  Major-General), 
Captain  Simpson,  U.  S.  Topographical  Engineers  (now 
Colonel) ,  Captain  Beckwith,  SubsistenceDepartment  (now 
Colonel),  Lieutenant-Colonel  Grossman,  Quartermaster's 
Department  (now  Colonel) :  seven  distinguished  officers 
of  the  regular  service,  and  three  experienced  officers  of 
the  Volunteers,  the  survivors  of  whom  are  all  now  in  the 
service,  where  they  have  earned  new  laurels  and  high 
promotion. 

I  had  the  less  hesitation  in  consulting  with  these 
officers,  because,  after  they  were  ordered  to  my  com 
mand,  and  I  was  about  to  attack  Harper's  Ferry,  the 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SIIENANDOAH.  53 

General-in-chief,  in  his  despatch  of  June  8th,  already 
quoted,  says: 

"  I  have  said  we  must  sustain  no  reverse ;  but  this  is  not 
enough, — a  check  or  a  drawn  hattle  would  he  a  victory  to 
the  enemy,  filling  his  heart  with  joy,  his  ranks  with  men,  and 
his  magazines  with  voluntary  contributions. 

"  Take  your  measures,  therefore,  circumspectly,  make 
good  use  of  your  engineers  and  other  experienced  staff 
officers  and  generals,  and  attempt  nothing  without  a  clear 
prospect  of  success,  as  you  will  find  the  enemy  strongly 
posted  and  not  inferior  to  you  in  numbers." 

The  suggestion  of  a  council  coming  from  these  very 
"  engineers,  staff  officers,  and  generals,"  I  felt  bound  not 
to  disregard,  and,  in  case  of  disaster,  I  could  scarcely 
say  that  "  I  had  attempted  nothing  without  a  clear 
prospect  of  success,"  if  my  defeat  had  been  foretold  by 
the  very  men  I  was  expected  to  consult.  I  submitted 
to  the  council  my  instructions,  orders,  and  the  following 
statement  (Report  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii,  pp.  85, 
86,  87)  : 

"  This  force  was  collected  originally  to  retake  Harper's 
Ferry.  That  evacuated,  it  was  directed  to  remain  as  long  as 
Johnston  remained  in  force  in  this  vicinity.  Threatening, 
as  he  was,  either  to  move  to  the  aid  of  the  force  attacking 
Washington,  or  annoying  the  frontier  of  Maryland,  this 
army  was  permitted  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  offer  battle. 

"  If  accepted,  so  soon  as  Johnston  was  defeated,  to  return 
and  approach  Washington. 

"  The  enemy  retires,  for  what  ?  Is  it  weakness,  or  a  trap  ? 
Can  we  continue  to  advance,  and  pursue  if  he  retires  ?  If 
so,  how  far  ?  When  shall  we  retire  ? 


54  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  Our  volunteer  force  will  soon  dwindle  before  us,  and  we 
may  be  left  without  aid.  If  our  men  go  borne  without  a 
regular  battle,  a  good  field  fight,  they  will  go  home  discon 
tented,  will  not  re-enlist,  and  will  sour  the  minds  of  others. 
We  have  a  long  line  to  defend,  liable  at  any  moment  to  be 
cut  off  from  our  base  and  depot,  and  to  a  blow  on  our  flank. 

"  Our  forces  must  not  be  defeated,  nor  checked  in  battle, 
or  meet  with  reverses.  It  would  be  fatal  to  our  cause. 

"  A  force  threatens  Washington.  If  we  abandon  our 
present  position,  Johnston  will  be  available  to  aid. 

"  The  command  has  been  largely  reinforced  to  enable  us 
to  sustain  our  position,  to  clear  the  valley  to  Winchester,  to 
defeat  the  enemy  if  he  accepts  battle,  and  to  be  in  position 
to  aid  General  McDowell,  or  to  move  upon  Washington, 
Richmond,  or  elsewhere,  as  the  General-in-chief  may  direct. 
General  Sanford,  with  two  rifled  guns  and  three  regiments, 
will  be  up  to-morrow. 

"  Our  force  will  then  be  as  large  as  it  ever  will  be.  Under 
the  prospect  of  losing  a  large  portion  of  our  force  in  a  few 
days,  by  expiration  of  service,  what  shall  be  done  ?" 

The  result  of  the  deliberation  is  given  in  the  following 
minute,  taken  at  the  time  by  Major  Craig  Biddle,  of  the 
staff  (Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  85,  &c.)  : 

"  Minutes  of  Council  of  War,  held  July  9, 1861,  at  Martinsburg, 

Virginia. 

"  Colonel  Grossman,  Quartermaster,  thought  nine  hun 
dred  wagons  would  be  sufficient  to  furnish  subsistence,  and 
to  transport  ammunition  to  our  present  force.  The  calcula 
tion  for  the  original  column  was  seven  hundred  wagons,  of 
which  five  hundred  were  on  hand  and  two  hundred  expected. 
The  great  difficulty  will  be  to  obtain  forage  for  the  animals, 
the  present  consumption  being  twenty-six  tons  daily. 

"  Captain  Beckwith,  Commissary.     The  question  of  sub- 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAII.  55 

sistence  is  here  a  question  of  transportation.  Thus  far  no 
reliance  has  heen  placed  on  the  adjacent  country.  A  day's 
inarch  ahead  would  compel  a  resort  to  it.  As  far  as  known 
those  supplies  would  be  quite  inadequate. 

"  Captain  Simpson,  Topographical  Engineers.  The  diffi 
culty  of  our  present  position  arises  from  the  great  facility 
the  enemy  has  to  concentrate  troops  at  Winchester  from 
Manassas  Junction.  By  the  railroad,  twelve  thousand  men 
could  he  sent  there  in  a  day,  and  again  sent  back  to  Man 
assas.  Our  forces  should  combine  with  the  forces  at  Wash 
ington. 

"  Captain  Newton,  Engineers.  Our  present  position  is  a 
very  exposed  one.  General  Johnston  can  keep  us  where 
we  are  as  long  as  he  pleases,  and  at  any  time  make  a  demon 
stration  on  our  rear.  Our  whole  line  is  a  false  one.  We 
have  no  business  here,  except  for  the  purpoae  of  making  a 
demonstration.  He  threatens  us  now.  We  should  be  in  a 
position  to  threaten  him.  We  should  go  to  Chaiiestown, 
Harper's  Ferry,  Shepherdstown,  and  flank  him. 

"  Colonel  Stone.  It  is  mainly  a  question  for  the  staff. 
Our  enemy  has  great  facility  of  movement,  and  to  extend 
our  line  would  be  accompanied  with  great  danger.  John 
ston  should  be  threatened  from  some  other  point.  We 
might  leave  two  regiments  here,  two  guns  at  Shepherdstown, 
and  proceed  to  Chaiiestown,  and  threaten  from  that  point. 

"  General  Kegley,  ditto  to  Captain  Newton. 

"  Colonel  Thomas  approves  of  a  flank  movement  to 
Chaiiestown. 

"  Colonel  Abercrombie,  the  same. 

"  General  Keim,  the  same. 

"  General  Cadwalader  opposed  to  a  forward  movement." 

The  wisdom  of  this  decision  of  the  council  held  on 
the  9th  was  confirmed  in  my  mind  by  the  receipt  of  the 
following  telegram  from  the  General-in-chief  two  days 
afterwards  (see  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  86)  : 


56  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  July  11,  1861. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON, 

"  Martinsburg,  Virginia. 

"  The  author  of  the  following  is  known,  and  he  believes 
it  authentic : 

"  *  WASHINGTON,  July  9,  1861. 

"  '  The  plan  of  operations  of  the  Secession  army  in  Virginia 
contemplates  the  reverse  of  the  proceedings  and  movements 
announced  in  the  Express  of  yesterday  and  Saturday.  A 
schedule  that  has  come  to  light  meditates  a  stand  and  an  en 
gagement  by  Johnston,  when  he  shall  have  drawn  Patterson 
sufficiently  far  back  from  the  river  to  render  impossible  his 
retreat  across  it  on  being  vanquished,  and  an  advance  then  by 
Johnston  and  Wise  conjointly  upon  McClellan,  and,  after  the 
conquest  of  him,  a  march  in  this  direction,  to  unite  in  an 
attack  upon  the  Federal  forces  across  the  Potomac,  with  the 
army  under  Beauregard  at  Manassas  Junction,  and  the  wing 
of  that  army,  the  South  Carolina  regiments  chiefly,  now  nine 
(9)  miles  from  Alexandria.  Success  in  each  of  these  three 
several  movements  is  anticipated,  and  thereby  not  only  the 
possession  of  the  capital  is  thought  to  be  assured,  but  an 
advance  of  the  Federal  troops  upon  Richmond  prevented. 
The  plan  supposes  that  this  success  will  give  the  Confederate 
cause  such  prestige,  and  inspire  in  it  such  faith,  as  will  insure 
the  recognition  of  its  Government  abroad,  and  at  the  same 

o 

time  so  impair  confidence  in  the  Federal  Government  as  to 
render  it  impossible  for  it  to  procure  loans  abroad,  and  very 
difficult  for  it  to  raise  means  at  home.  Real  retreats,  which 
have  been  anticipated,  it  will  be  seen  are,  by  this  plan,  alto 
gether  ignored.  According  to  it,  fighting  and  conquest  are 
the  orders,' 

"E.    D.    TOWNSEND, 

"  Asst.  Adjt.  Genl." 

This  paper,  transmitted  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
army,  speaks  for  itself. 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        57 

That  this  was  the  plan  agreed  upon  by  the  Confederate 
generals  there  is  no  doubt;  and  it  was  a  judicious  one. 
My  information  of  a  similar  kind  had  come  from  various 
quarters.  My  most  experienced  officers  of  the  regular 
service,  with  whom  I  fully  and  freely  consulted,  Co 
lonels  George  H.  Thomas,  Abercrombie,  and  Grossman, 
Major  Fitz  John  Porter,  Captains  Newton,  Beckwith, 
and  many  others,  men  of  long  service,  merit,  and  great 
experience,  all  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  I  was  too 
far  advanced  at  Martinsburg ;  that  Johnston  had  fallen 
back  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  lead  me  on ;  that  he 
had  a  trap  set  somewhere,  and  that,  if  not  very  cautious, 
I  should  fall  into  it. 

Each  of  these  officers,  not  only  approved  warmly  of 
the  management  of  my  command,  but  opposed,  both  in 
and  out  of  council,  a  further  advance.  With  their  op 
position  to  an  advance  well  known,  five  of  the  number 
have  since  been  made  general  officers. 

The  enemy  were  at  Winchester  intrenched.  The 
phrase  "  intrenchments,"  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
was  very  much  misunderstood,  and  was  popularly  sup 
posed  to  refer  to  permanent  works.  Experience  has 
shown,  on  several  occasions,  that  earthworks  thrown  up 
in  a  night  have  defied  the  efforts  of  the  best  troops. 

The  superiority  of  the  enemy  at  Winchester  in  men 
and  guns  as  well  as  in  position,  was  well  known.  The 
information  was  obtained  from  Union  men  who  had 
been  there,  from  prisoners,  from  deserters,  and  from 
other  sources,  all  agreeing  on  an  average  of  about  forty 
thousand  men  and  over  sixty  guns.  Captain  Wellmore, 

5 


58  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

belonging  to  a  Maryland  regiment,  taken  prisoner  at 
Charlestown  by  a  party  sent  by  me  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
gave  forty  thousand.  A  gentleman  from  Berkeley 
County,  of  high  respectablity,  serving  under  Johnston 
as  an  unwilling  Virginia  volunteer  in  Jackson's  Brigade, 
at  the  battle  of  Falling  Waters,  subsequently  gave  the 
following  statement,  taken  down  by  General  Negley, 
and  by  him  given  to  me : 


"  General  Jackson  retreated  with  his  brigade,  consisting 
then  of  four  regiments  and  four  pieces  of  artillery  (Captain 
Pendleton),  to  Big  Spring,  three  and  a  half  miles  south  of 
Martinsburg.  General  Johnston  arrived  at  Darkesville  the 
same  night  with  about  fourteen  thousand  men.  He  was 
then  reinforced  by  one  regiment  and  one  battery  (four  guns) 
flying  artillery.  General  Jackson  retreated  to  that  point. 
The  army  made  a  stand  there  for  four  days ;  they  then  re 
treated  to  Winchester.  When  we  arrived  there,  we  found 
fortifications  commenced  by  the  militia.  All  the  army 
there  assisted,  and  in  two  days  the  city  was  fortified  all 
around,  within  two  miles  of  the  suburbs,  with  intrench- 
ments.  Reinforcements  commenced  pouring  in.  Ten  42- 
pounders  were  placed,  masked,  around  the  fortifications; 
also,  artificial  thickets  planted  for  riflemen.  The  force 
consisted  of  forty-two  thousand,  including  four  thousand 
militia.  General  Johnston  then  received  a  despatch,  as 
read  to  the  men,  that  General  Patterson  was  out  of  the 
way ;  that  he  had  gone  to  get  in  Beauregard's  rear,  and  that 
Jeff.  Davis  had  ordered  him  to  cut  off  General  Patterson,  in 
order  to  save  the  country;  that  General  Beauregard  had 
been  attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force.  General  John 
ston's  army  moved  at  1  o'clock,  P.M.,  Thursday,  consisting 
of  nine  brigades,  with  fifty-two  pieces  of  flying  artillery, 
including  three  ten-inch  columbiads,  represented  to  me  as 
such.  Among  the  artillery  was  a  detachment  of  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery,  consisting  of  eight  guns,  four  of  which  were 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        59 

rifled  cannon.  General  Johnston  took  with  him  thirty-five 
thousand  men,  leaving  the  militia  and  volunteers,  to  the 
number  of  seven  thousand,  in  Winchester." 

Mr.  McDonald,  a  reporter,  gave  the  following  state 
ment,  taken  down  by  General  Cadwalader,  and  by  him 
given  to  me  : 

"  General  Johnston's  force  at  Winchester  was  forty-two 
thousand  men,  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry;  of  which, 
eight  hundred  Virginia  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Stuart,  and 
three  hundred  from  Southern  States.  Forty  regiments, 
thirty-five  thousand  men,  left  Winchester,  at  1  o'clock,  P.M., 
on  Thursday,  by  order  of  General  Beauregard;  took  the 
road  to  Berry's  Ford,  on  the  Shenandoah,  thirteen  and  a  half 
miles  over  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Piedmont  Station,  on  the  Ma 
nassas  Gap  Railroad,  fifteen  miles,  making  twenty-eight  and 
a  half  miles,  requiring  two  days'  march.  Freight  and  passen 
ger  cars  had  been  hauled  over  the  road,  on  their  own  wheels, 
to  Strasburg  last  week,  and  on  them  Johnston's  forces  were 
expected  to  be  transported,  on  the  Manassas  railroad,  from 
Piedmont  to  Manassas  Junction,  thirty-eight  to  forty-miles. 
There  remained  at  Winchester  seven  thousand  troops  until 
Saturday  afternoon,  when  they  left  for  Strasburg,  on  their 
way  to  Manassas,  except  about  two  thousand  five  hundred  of 
the  militia  of  the  neighboring  counties,  disbanded  and  sent 
home.  A  large  quantity  of  arms  in  boxes  was  sent  to  Stras 
burg.  The  Virginia  Cavalry  remained  (under  Colonel  Stuart), 
and  went  to  Berrysville  to  observe  the  movements  of  Gene 
ral  Patterson's  column.  The  rest  of  the  cavalry  went  with 
General  Johnston.  They  had  at  Winchester  sixty-two  pieces 
of  artillery  in  position  in  the  fortifications;  about  ten  42- 
pounders  (some,  they  thought,  were  columbiads)  were  left. 
The  remainder  were  taken  by  General  Johnston.  A  detach 
ment  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  from  New  Orleans,  had 
eight  heavy  guns,  of  which  four  were  32-pounders.  These 
were  hauled  by  twenty-eight  horses  each ;  the  rest  (smaller 
guns)  by  six  and  four  horses  each.  Part,  if  not  all  of  them, 
were  brass  rifled  guns.  The  fortifications  surrounded  Win- 


60  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Chester,  except  to  the  southward,  upon  the  high  ground; 
very  heavy  earthworks,  made  with  bags  and  barrels  filled 
with  earth,  &c.  In  front  of  the  breastworks  deep  trenches 
were  dug,  communicating  below  with  inside  of  the  works. 
The  guns  were  all  masked  with  artificial  thickets  of  ever 
greens,  which  were  intended  in  some  cases  to  be  used  as 
ambuscades  for  riflemen  and  sharpshooters.  Among  the 
regiments  was  one  of  Kentucky  riflemen,  armed  with  heavy 
bowie-knives.  They  refused  to  take  more  than  one  round 
of  cartridges.  They  proposed  to  place  themselves  in  the 
bushes  for  assault.  All  the  fences  had  been  levelled  for 
miles  in  front  of  Winchester.  The  fortifications  extended 
two  and  a  half  miles.  The  trees  had  been  felled  between 
Bunker  Hill  and  Winchester,  to  impede  an  advance.  Fif 
teen  hundred  sick  at  Winchester,  confined  with  measles, 
dysentery,  and  typhoid  fever.  Prisoners  taken  from  our 
column  were  sent  to  Richmond.  Wise  had  been  recalled, 
it  is  said,  with  his  troops,  from  Western  Virginia.  Beau- 
regard  and  Davis  had  done  it  in  opposition  to  General  Lee's 
advice." 

Mr.  Lackland,  brother  of  Colonel  Lackland,  residing 
a  short  distance  from  Charlestown,  and  just  returned 
from  Winchester,  stated,  July  20,  1861,  that  Johnston 
had  at  that  place, 

"  2  regiments  from  Kentucky,  Duncan  and  Pope,          .         .  1,300 

2  regiments  from  Tennessee,         ......  1,800 

5  regiments  from  Alabama,  strong,     .....  4,500 

5  regiments  from  Georgia,  strong,        .....  4,600 

1  regiment  from  North  Carolina, 1,000 

5  regiments  from  Mississippi,       ......  4,500 

2  regiments  from  Maryland,         ......  1,200 

Several  regiments  from  Virginia,         .....  10,000 

Militia  from  Virginia, 5,000 

One  regiment  of  cavalry,     .......  600 

Several  batteries,          ........  700 


35,200 

"  On  Wednesday,  the  18th,  at  2  P.M.,  he  commenced  his 
movement  southeast.  Number  taken,  30,000  Confederate 
troops;  number  left,  5200  militia." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        61 

These  statements,  with  many  others,  taken  by  differ 
ent  officers,  from  different  persons,  at  different  times 
and  places,  agree  very  much  in  the  main  facts. 

Like  most  other  reports,  these  were  doubtless  exag 
gerated,  and  required,  as  they  received,  due  allowance. 
We  are  not,  however,  to  rush  into  the  other  extreme, 
and  believe  nothing,  because  the  narrator  may  be  sup 
posed  to  have  exceeded  the  truth.  We  have  in  the 
present  case  a  most  valuable  witness,  one  whose  interest 
it  was  to  underrate  his  own  force  and  overrate  mine, 
General  Johnston  himself.  Stating  my  force  at  thirty 
thousand,  he  alleges  his  inferiority  in  men  as  a  reason 
for  not  attacking  me,  and  would  therefore,  to  justify 
himself,  make  his  force  as  small  as  possible.  By  his 
official  report  he  had,  on  the  23d  of  May,  9  regiments  and 
2  battalions  of  infantry,  4  companies  of  artillery,  16 
pieces  of  artillery,  300  cavalry.  To  this  were  added,  on 
the  13th  of  June,  3  regiments  of  infantry,  and,  on  the 
15th  of  July,  8  regiments  of  infantry,  with  2500  militia 
to  man  the  fortifications.  Of  intrenchments  he  says 
that,  after  my  first  advance  across  the  Potomac,  on  the 
16th  of  June,  "  Major  Whiting  was  ordered  to  plan  de 
fensive  works,  and  to  have  some  heavy  guns  on  navy 
carriages  mounted.  About  twenty-five  hundred  militia, 
under  Brigadier-General  Carson,  were  called  out  to  man 
them." 

General  Scott  also,  in  a  despatch  addressed  to  my 
successor,  General  Banks,  which  I  received  before  I  was 
relieved,  gives  the  following  information  as  to  the  num- 


62  NARRATIVE    OF    THE    CAMPAIGN 

ber  of  guns  which  Johnston  had  left  behind  him  at  Win 
chester  (Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  140)  : 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  July  23,  11.30  P.M. 

"  The  following  information  has  just  been  received  from 
A.  K  Rankin,  editor  of  the  Republican  and  Transcript : 
There  are  nine  32-pounders,  four  44-pounders,  and  two 
6-pounders,  and  one  thousand  stand  of  arms  at  Winchester, 
with  but  five  hundred  men,  raw  militia,  to  guard  the  same. 
There  are  also  one  thousand  tents,  and  a  very  large  amount 
of  powder,  balls,  and  shells. 

"WlNFIELD    SCOTT. 
11  MAJOR-GENERAL  BANKS, 

"  Headquarters  Army,  Harper's  Ferry." 

General  Abercrombie,  a  regular  officer  of  more  than 
forty  years'  service,  writes  me  from  Winchester  on  the 
17th  of  March,  1862: 

"  I  rode  over  the  ground  occupied  by  Johnston  in  July, 
and,  after  a  careful  examination,  I  found  that  I  Lad  no  reason 
to  change  my  opinion  as  to  the  course  you  adopted. 

"  The  works  themselves  were  of  no  great  strength,  but 
the  judicious  disposition  made  of  them,  the  favorable  cha 
racter  of  the  ground,  size  and  number  of  guns,  and  numerical 
strength  of  force,  ought  to  have  defeated  double  the  number. 

"  I  think  you  may  rely  on  this  :  Johnston  had  twenty-six 
thousand  volunteers  that  were  mustered  into  the  service, 
and  between  six  and  seven  thousand  of  what  they  call  militia, 
making  some  thirty-two  or  thirty-three  thousand  men.  The 
trenches  extend  some  four  or  five  miles.  They  commence 
at  the  turnpike  leading  to  Charlestown,  due  east  from  Win 
chester,  and  run  to  the  base  of  the  hills  west  of  the  town, 
and  at  every  few  hundred  paces  we  found  platforms  for 
heavy  pivot  guns,  some  of  them  rifled,  so  I  am  told.  On 
the  hills  alluded  to,  some  very  heavy  guns  were  admirably 
arranged,  and  commanded  the  whole  valley.  These  also 
were  made  to  traverse  in  every  direction.  Most  of  these 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  63 

earthworks  were  constructed  with  regard  to  the  Martins- 
burg  route.  On  the  16th,  Johnston  had  his  whole  force 
under  arms,  in  battle  order,  and  waited  some  hours,  under 
the  impression  that  you  were  approaching  from  Bunker  Hill 
to  attack  him,  and  has  since  said  he  regrets  not  having 
attacked  you. 

"  General  Johnston  had  not  less  than  thirty- two  thousand 
men,  a  very  strong  position,  and  between  sixty  and  seventy 
guns,  eleven  of  them  pivot  and  of  heavy  calibre. 

"  I  have  conversed  with  a  number  of  intelligent  persons 
on  the  subject,  and  all  agree  very  nearly  as  to  the  strength 
of  Johnston's  force  and  number  of  guns,  and  my  own  obser 
vations  and  personal  inspection  (of  the  abandoned  earth 
works)  satisfy  me  of  the  correctness  of  their  statements." 

I  will  here  take  occasion  to  say  that  my  force  was 
always  greatly  overestimated,  not  only  by  the  public, 
but  apparently  by  the  General-in-chief  himself.  There 
were  twelve  regiments  ordered  to  join  me,  one  Delaware 
and  three  New  Jersey  on  the  24th  of  May,  two  New 
York  on  the  30th  of  May,  two  Ohio  and  two  Northern 
regiments  on  the  4th  of  June,  and  two  Pennsylvania 
on  the  10th  of  June,  but  they  never  did  so.  I  was, 
therefore,  probably  operating  with  a  force  less  by  twelve 
regiments  than  the  General-in-chief  intended  :  a  fact 
sufficient  to  explain  his  exaggerated  ideas  of  the  strength 
of  my  command.  My  largest  force  was  accumulated  at 
Martinsburg,  about  eighteen  thousand  two  hundred 
men.  When  I  marched  from  there,  I  had  to  leave  two 
regiments,  taking  about  sixteen  thousand  eight  hundred 
men  with  me,  and,  deducting  from  them  the  sick,  the 
rear  and  wagon  guards,  I  could  not  have  gone  into 
action  with  more  than  thirteen  thousand,  and  at  the 


64  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

time  Johnston  marched  from  Winchester  I  could  not 
have  taken  into  action  ten  thousand  men. 

If  I  had  been  defeated  a  large  portion  of  my  army 
would  have  probably  been  destroyed  and  the  others  made 
prisoners  of  war.  The  affair  would  have  been  more 
disastrous  than  Bull  Run,  for  the  Potomac  was  behind 
me  and  I  had  no  reserves  to  fall  back  upon.  The  enemy, 
flushed  with  two  victories  instead  of  one,  with  no  army 
in  position  to  check  them,  might  have  been  in  possession 
of  Washington,  Baltimore  and  Philadelphia,  within  five 
days.  The  reason  assigned  for  not  advancing  on  Wash 
ington  by  the  commander  of  the  Confederates  in  his 
official  report  after  Bull  Run,  was  the  fact  of  my  army 
being  intact  and  ready  to  advance.  This  Shenandoah 
Valley,  through  which  the  enemy  have  since  twice  pene 
trated  into  Pennsylvania,  I  was  always  loath  to  leave  un 
guarded.  On  the  20th  of  June,  when  about  to  cross  the 
Potomac,  I  had  written  to  General  McCall  as  follows: 
(Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  82) : 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

"  HAGERSTOWN,  June  26,  1861. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  If  I  can  get  permission  to  go  over  into  Virginia,  I  intend 
to  cross  the  river  and  offer  battle  to  the  insurgents.  As  the 
regulars  and  Rhode  Island  regiment  and  battery  have  been 
taken  from  me,  I  will  require  all  the  force  now  here,  and 
must  leave  the  Pennsylvania  line  unguarded.  Please  in 
form  me  how  many  men  you  can  throw  forward,  and  how 
soon. 

"  Very  respectfully  and  truly  yours, 

"  R.  PATTERSON." 


IN    THE  VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  65 

To  which  Major-General  McCall  replied  as   follows 

(p.   82):  !..  ?!,  •. 

11  HARRISBURG,  Sunday,  June  30,  1861. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  On  my  return  from  Pittsburg  this  morning,  I  find  your 
note  of  the  26th  instant,  informing  me  of  your  purpose  to 
cross  the  river  and  offer  battle  to  the  insurgents,  and  asking 
what  force  I  can  throw  forward  on  the  Pennsylvania  line. 

"  In  reply  I  have  to  say  that  the  only  force  (one  regiment 
rifles,  and  one  infantry,  with  a  section  of  artillery)  of  my 
command  as  yet  armed  and  equipped,  has  been  pushed  for 
ward  to  the  support  of  Colonel  Wallace  at  Cumberland,  and 
for  the  protection  of  our  border  settlers  in  that  direction  ; 
the  other  regiments  are  without  clothing,  arms,  or  equip 
ments,  still,  notwithstanding  my  efforts  to  fit  them  for  the 
field.  You  will  therefore  perceive  how  impossible  it  will 
be  for  me,  although  I  much  regret  it,  to  comply  with  your 
request. 

"  With  great  regard,  very  truly  yours, 

"  GEORGE  A.  McCALL." 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  letter  of  General  McCall  that 
with  all  his  efforts,  he  had  but  two  regiments  and  a  sec 
tion  of  artillery  fit  for  the  field,  and  this  force,  under 
Colonel  dharles  J.  Biddle,  was  then  beyond  Bedford, 
"for  the  support  of  Colonel  Wallace  at  Cumberland, 
and  for  the  protection  of  our  border  settlers  in  that 
direction."  I  was  thus  made  responsible  for  our  entire 
frontier  from  Cumberland  to  Edwards'  Ferry,  while  I 
had  not  cavalry  or  artillery  enough  to  guard  the  fords 
between  Hancock  and  Harper's  Ferry.  These  were 
some  of  the  reasons  which  prevented  me  from  attack 
ing  the  enemy  at  Winchester.  My  instructions  were, 
"  If  the  enemy  were  to  retire  upon  his  resources  at  Win- 


66  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

Chester,  it  is  not  enjoined  that  you  pursue  him  to  that 
distance  from  your  base  of  operations  without  a  well- 
grounded  confidence  in  your  continued  superiority." 

Will  any  fair-minded  man  say,  that  I  could  under 
these  circumstances  have  entertained  any  such  confi 
dence  ? 

But  what  was  to  be  gained  by  an  attack,  the  object 
being  to  detain  Johnston  ? 

I  had  been  anxious  to  go  to  Leesburg,  where,  if  John 
ston  attempted  to  elude  me,  I  could  reach  McDowell  as 
soon  as  he  could  join  Beauregard.  This,  however,  was 
not  permitted,  but  I  was  kept  on  a  false  line,  where  I 
could  no  more  prevent  Johnston  by  force  from  going  to 
Manassas  than  an  army  at  Washington  could  prevent 
one  at  Philadelphia  going  to  New  York.  Neither  could 
I  follow  him,  for  he  had  a  railroad  behind  him  which  he 
could  use  and  then  destroy.  Johnston  says,  in  his  of 
ficial  report,  "  I  proceeded  to  Winchester.  There  the 
army  was  in  position  to  oppose  either  McClellan  from 
the  west,  or  Patterson  from  the  northeast,  and  to  form 
a  junction  with  General  Beauregard  when  necessary." 

After  the  conference  with  my  officers,  I  wrote  to  the 
General-in-chief,  as  follows: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
MARTINSBURG,  July  9,  1861. 

"  COLONEL  : 

"  I  have  received  the  telegrams  of  the  General-in-chief, 
notifying  of  the  additional  regiments  sent  to  me.  Colonel 
Stone  and  the  Nineteenth  and  Twenty-eighth  New  York  re 
giments  arrived  yesterday.  General  Sanford,  with  the  Fifth 
and  Twelfth  New  York  regiments  will  join  to-morrow. 

"  Since  I  last  addressed  you,  I  have  made  no  movements  ; 


IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  67 

in  fact,  have  been  prevented  by  the  necessity  of  sending  all 
my  wagons  to  the  rear,  to  obtain  provisions  for  a  few  days 
in  advance  and  to  bring  up  troops.  The  commissary  has 
supplies  (with  those  in  hands  of  troops)  for  about  two  days. 
Though  the  quartermaster  has  spared  no  exertion,  and  his 
agents  have  been  very  active,  he  has  not  as  yet  been  able  to 
provide  a  supply  train  for  the  command.  I  am,  therefore, 
much  restricted  in  my  movements,  being  compelled  after 
three  days'  advance  to  send  back  for  provisions.  The  diffi 
culty  will  increase  as  I  advance ;  indeed,  I  am  now  almost  at 
a  stand.  Instead  of  receiving  aid  from  the  inhabitants,  I 
find  myself  in  an  enemy's  country,  where  our  opponents  can 
procure  supplies  and  we  nothing,  except  by  seizure.  Even 
information  is  studiously  kept  from  us.  Supplies,  especially 
provisions,  are  very  scarce,  and  not  even  one  day's  rations 
can  be  relied  upon.  The  supply  of  grain  also  is  very  limited. 
Under  these  circumstances,  I  respectfully  present  to  the  Gene- 
ral-in-chief  the  following  plan,  which  with  my  present  views 
I  desire  to  carry  into  operation  so  soon  as  I  can  do  so  with 
safety,  and  the  necessity  for  following  Johnston  ceases.  I 
propose  to  move  this  force  to  Charlestown,  from  which  point 
I  can  more  easily  strike  Winchester,  march  to  Leesburg 
when  necessary,  open  communication  to  a  depot  to  be  estab 
lished  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  occupy  the  main  avenue  of 
supply  to  the  enemy.  My  base  will  then  be  some  seven 
miles  nearer,  more  easily  reached  by  road,  and  my  line  of 
communication  rendered  more  secure  than  at  present.  I 
can  establish  communication  with  the  Maryland  shore  by  a 
bridge  of  boats.  In  this  way  I  can  more  easily  Approach 
you,  and  the  movement,  I  think,  will  tend  to  relieve  Lees- 
burg  and  vicinity  of  some  of  its  oppressors.  My  present 
location  is  a  very  bad  one,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  and 
from  it  I  cannot  move  a  portion  of  the  force  without  exposing 
what  remains  to  be  cut  oft". 

"  General  Sanford  informs  me  by  letter  that  he  has  for  me 
a  letter  from  you.  I  hope  it  will  inform  me  when  you  will 
put  your  column  in  motion  against  Manassas,  and  when  you 
wish  me  to  strike.  The  enemy  retired  in  succession  from 


68  NARRATIVE   OF    THE    CAMPAIGN 

Darkesville  and  Bunker  Hill  to  Stevenson's  Station,  a  few 
miles  from  Winchester.  There  he  has  halted,  and  report 
says  is  intrenching.  His  design  evidently  is  to  draw  this 
force  on  as  far  as  possible  from  its  base,  and  then  to  cut  my 
line,  or  to  attack  with  large  reinforcements  from  Manassas. 
As  I  have  already  stated,  I  cannot  advance  far,  and  if  I  could, 
I  think  the  movement  very  imprudent.  When  you  make 
your  attack  I  expect  to  advance  and  offer  battle.  If  the 
enemy  retires,  shall  not  pursue.  I  am  very  desirous  to  know 
when  the  General-in-chief  wishes  me  to  approach  Winchester. 
If  the  notice  does  not  come  in  any  other  way,  I  wish  you 
would  indicate  the  day  by  telegraph  thus:  'Let  me  hear 

from  you  on .' 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  PATTERSON, 

"Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"Washington,  D.  C." 


On  the  13th  I  received  the  following  telegram  from 
General  Scott : 


"  WASHINGTON,  July  12,  1861,  1.30  P.M. 

"  Go  where  you  propose  in  your  letter  of  the  9th  instant. 
Should  that  movement  cause  the  enemy  to  retreat  upon 
Manassas  via  Strasburg,  to  follow  him  at  this  distance  would 
seem  hazardous,  whereas  the  route  from  Charlestown  via 
Keyes'  Ferry,  Hillsboro',  and  Leesburg,  towards  Alexandria, 
with  the  use  of  the  canal  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  for 
transportation,  may  be  practicable.  Consider  this  sugges 
tion  well,  and,  except  in  extreme  case,  do  not  recross  the 
Potomac  with  more  than  a  sufficient  detachment  for  your 
supplies  on  the  canal.  Let  me  hear  from  you  on  Tuesday. 
Write  often  when  en  route. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON, 

"Martinsburg,  Virginia." 


IN    THE    VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  69 

This  gave  me  the  desired  permission  to  go  to  Charles- 
town  ;  and  the  phrase,  "Let  me  hear  from  you  on 
Tuesday,"  announced  that  General  McDowell's  attack 
was  to  begin  on  that  day. 

On  the  next  day,  the  orders  were  substantially  reite 
rated  in  the  following  despatch  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  July  13,  1861. 

"  I  telegraphed  you  yesterday,  if  not  strong  enough  to  beat 
the  enemy  early  next  week,  make  demonstrations  so  as  to 
detain  him  in  the  valley  of  Winchester ;  but  if  he  retreats  in 
force  towards  Manassas,  and  it  be  hazardous  to  follow  him, 
then  consider  the  route  via  Keyes'  Ferry,  Leesburg,  &c. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
"GENERAL  K.  PATTERSON." 

I  did  not  consider  myself  "  strong  enough  to  beat  the 
enemy,"  nor  did  any  officer  with  whom  I  consulted ;  I 
determined,  therefore,  "  to  make  demonstrations  so  as 
to  detain  Johnston  in  the  valley  of  Winchester"  at  the 
time  indicated.  This  gave  me  no  opportunity  to  change 
my  base  promptly,  and  the  attempt  to  do  so  I  thought 
might  send  Johnston  to  Manassas  at  the  very  time  the 
General-in-chief  desired  him  to  be  kept  at  Winchester, 
to  wit,  on  the  following  Tuesday.  I  therefore  post 
poned  my  movement  to  Charlestown  until  after  that  day. 
This  I  considered  a  fulfilment  of  my  orders  to  the  very 
letter,  and  as  I  reported  every  movement  I  was  making 
fully  to  headquarters,  as  appears  by  the  following  letters, 
I  could  at  any  moment  have  been  stopped  by  telegraph, 
had  it  been  desired  that  I  should  act  differently  (Report, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  132,  138,  139)  : 


70  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
MARTINSBURG,  July  14th,  1861. 

"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 
"Washington  City. 

"  COLONEL:  I  have  thus  far  succeeded  in  keeping  in  this 
vicinity  the  command  under  General  Johnston,  who  is  now 
pretending  to  be  engaged  in  fortifying  at  "Winchester,  hut 
prepared  to  retire  beyond  striking  distance  if  I  shall  ad 
vance  far. 

"  To-morrow  I  advance  to  Bunker  Hill,  preparatory  to  the 
other  movement.  If  an  opportunity  offers  I  shall  attack, 
but  unless  I  can  rout  shall  be  careful  not  to  set  him  in  full 
retreat  upon  S  trash  urg. 

"  I  have  arranged  for  the  occupation  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
opposite  which  point  I  have  directed  provisions  to  be  sent. 

"  Many  of  the  three  months'  volunteers  are  very  restless 
at  the  prospect  of  being  retained  over  their  time.  This  fact 
will  cause  you  to  hear  from  me  soon  in  the  direction  of 
Charlestown.  "Want  of  ample  transportation  for  supplies 
and  baggage  has  prevented  my  moving  earlier  in  the  direc 
tion  I  desired. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  PATTERSON, 

"Major-General,  Commanding." 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
BUNKER  HILL,  July  16th,  1861. 

"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"  Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 
"  Washington  City. 

"  COLONEL  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report,  for  the  informa 
tion  of  the  General-in-chief,  my  advance  and  arrival  at  this 
place  yesterday,  opposed  only  by  a  body  of  six  hundred 
cavalry,  of  which  one  was  killed  and  five  taken  prisoners. 

"  To-morrow  I  move  upon  Charlestown.  A  reconnois- 
sance  shows  the  Winchester  road  blocked  by  fallen  trees 
and  fences  placed  across  it,  indicating  no  confidence  in  the 
large  force  now  said  to  be  at  Winchester.  I  send  you  a 


IN    THE    VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  71 

sketch,  prepared  by  Captain  Simpson,  of  the  works  said  to 
have  been  erected  in  the  vicinity  of  Winchester. 

"  Preparations  have  already  been  commenced  to  occupy 
and  hold  Harper's  Ferry  with  the  three  years'  troops.  If 
the  General-in-chief  desires  to  retain  that  place  (and  I  advise 
it  never  to  be  evacuated),  I  desire  to  be  at  once  informed 
by  telegraph. 

"  I  have  to  report  that  the  term  of  service  of  a  very  large 
portion  of  this  force  will  expire  in  a  few  days.  From  an 
undercurrent  expression  of  feeling,  I  am  confident  that  many 
will  be  inclined  to  lay  down  their  arms  the  day  the  term 
expires.  With  such  a  feeling  existing,  any  active  operations 
cannot  be  thought  of,  until  they  are  replaced  by  three  years' 
men.  Those  whose  terms  expire  this  week,  and  will  not 
remain,  I  shall  arrange  to  send  off  by  Harper's  Ferry,  those 
for  Philadelphia  via  Baltimore,  those  for  Harrisburg  via 
Hagerstown. 

"  If  Harper's  Ferry  is  to  be  held,  after  securing  that,  I  shall, 
if  the  General-in-chief  desires,  advance  with  the  remainder 
of  the  troops  via  Leesburg,  provided  the  force  under  John 
ston  does  not  remain  at  Winchester  after  the  success  which 
I  anticipate  from  General  McDowell. 

"  I  wish  to  be  advised  if  these  propositions  meet  with  the 
approval  of  the  General-in-chief. 

"  The  Wisconsin  regiments  are  without  arms  and  accou 
trements,  which  I  have  directed  the  commander  of  the 
Frankford  Arsenal  to  provide. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"Major-General,  Commanding." 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA,  July  17,  1861. 

"  The  terms  of  service  of  the  Pennsylvania  troops  (eighteen 
regiments)  expire  within  seven  days,  commencing  to-mor 
row.  I  can  rely  on  none  of  them  renewing  service.  I  must 
be  at  once  provided  with  efficient  three  years'  men,  or  with 
draw  to  Harper's  Ferry. 

"  Shall   I  occupy  permanently  Harper's  Ferry,  or  with-" 


72  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

draw  entirely?  I  wrote  yesterday  on  this  subject,  and  now 
wish  to  be  informed  of  the  intentions  of  the  General-in-chief. 
My  march  to-day  was  without  opposition  or  incident  of  im 
portance.  The  country  has  been  drained  of  men.  This 
place  has  been  a  depot  for  supplies  for  the  force  at  Winchester, 
and  the  presence  of  the  army  is  not  welcome. 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

11  Major-General,  Commanding. 
'•COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"Washington,  D.  C." 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  July  17th,  1861. 

"  I  have  nothing  official  from  you  since  Sunday,  but  am 
glad  to  learn,  through  Philadelphia  papers,  that  you  have  ad 
vanced.  Do  not  let  the  enemy  amuse  and  delay  you  with  a 
small  force  in  front  while  he  reinforces  the  Junction  with 
his  main  body. 

"  McDowell's  first  day's  work  has  driven  the  enemy  be 
yond  Fairfax  Court-house.  The  Junction  will  probably  be 
carried  to-morrow. 

"WlNFIELD  SCOTT. 
"  GENERAL  PATTERSON, 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Forces,  Harper's  Ferry." 

To  this  I  replied  as  follows  : 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA,  July  18,  1861. 

"  Telegram  of  to-day  received.  The  enemy  has  stolen  no 
march  upon  me.  I  have  kept  him  actively  employed,  and  by 
threats  and  reconnoissance  in  force,  caused  him  to  be  rein 
forced.  I  have  accomplished  more  in  this  respect  than  the 
General-in-chief  asked,  or  could  well  be  expected  in  face  of 
an  enemy  far  superior  in  numbers,  with  no  line  of  communi 
cation  to  protect. 

"  In  future,  Post-office,  Sandy  Hook. 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Washington." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        73 

On  the  same  day  I  received  the  following : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  July  18,  1801. 

"  I  have  certainly  heen  expecting  you  to  beat  the  enemy ; 
if  not,  to  hear  that  you  had  felt  him  strongly,  or  at  least  had 
occupied  him  by  threats  and  demonstrations.  You  have 
been  at  least  his  equal,  and  I  suppose,  superior  in  number. 
Has  he  not  stolen  a  march  and  sent  reinforcements  toward 
Manassas  Junction  ?  A  week  is  enough  to  win  a  victory. 
The  time  of  volunteers  counts  from  the  day  mustered  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States.  You  must  not  retreat 
across  the  Potomac.  If  necessary,  when  abandoned  by  the 
short  term  volunteers,  intrench  somewhere  and  wait  for  re 
inforcements. 

"WlNFIELD  SCOTT. 

u  MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON,  » 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Forces." 

To  this  I  replied  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  or  PENNSYLVANIA, 
CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA, 

July  18,  1861,  1.30  A.  M. 

"  Telegram  of  date  received.  Mine  of  to-night  gives  the 
condition  of  my  command.  Some  regiments  have  given 
warning  not  to  serve  an  hour  over  time.  To  attack  under 
such  circumstances  against  the  greatly  superior  force  at 
Winchester  is  most  hazardous.  My  letter  of  the  16th  gives 
you  further  information.  Shall  I  attack  ? 

"  E.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Washington,  D.  C." 

(To  same,  1  p.  M.) 

"  I  have  succeeded,  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the 
General-in-chief,  in  keeping  General  Johnston's  force  at 
Winchester.  A  reconnoissance  in  force  on  Tuesday  caused 
him  to  be  largely  reinforced  from  Strasburg.  With  the  ex- 

6 


74  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

isting  feeling  and  determination  of  the  three  months'  men  to 
return  home,  it  would  be  ruinous  to  advance,  or  even  to  stay 
here  without  immediate  increase  of  force'to  replace  them. 
They  will  not  remain. 

"  I  have  ordered  the  brigades  to  assemble  this  afternoon, 
and  shall  make  a  formal  appeal  to  the  troops  to  stay  a  few 
days  until  I  can  be  reinforced.  Many  of  the  regiments  are 
without  shoes ;  the  Government  refuses  to  furnish  them ; 
the  men  have  received  no  pay ;  and  neither  officers  or  sol 
diers  have  money  to  purchase  with.  Under  these  circum 
stances  I  cannot  ask  or  expect  the  three  months'  volunteers 
to  stay  longer  than  one  week.  Two  companies  of  Pennsyl 
vania  volunteers  were  discharged  to-day  and  ordered  home.  I 
to-day  place  additional  force  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  establish 
communication  with  Maryland.  I  sent  Captain  Newton  to 
prepare  for  its  defence. 

"  E.  PATTERSON, 

"Major-General,  Commanding." 

Thus,  from  Charlestown  on  Thursday,  the  18th  of 
July,  three  days  before  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  at  1.30 
A.M.,  twelve  hours  before  any  part  of  General  Johnston's 
command  left  Winchester  for  Manassas,  I  telegraphed 
General  Scott  my  opinion  of  the  probable  result  of  an 
attack  on  Winchester,  and  asked,  "  Shall  I  attack  ?" 

To  this  no  answer  w*as  returned,  and  I  was  left  in 
utter  ignorance  of  General  McDowell's  movements  from 
Wednesday,  July  17th,  until  Monday,  the  22d,  when  I 
first  heard  of  the  disastrous  result  through  the  news 
papers.  If  the  Commander-in-chief,  who  was  perfectly 
acquainted  with  my  condition,  desired  me  to  attack,  he 
here  had  an  opportunity  of  directing  it ;  with  his  order, 
I  would  cheerfully  have  advanced,  let  my  force  have 
been  what  it  would  and  the  result  what  it  might.  And 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  75 

if  General  Scott  had  desired  me  to  join  him  at  Manassas, 
an  order  to  me  at  that  time  would  have  effected  it,  and 
I  could  have  been  there,  if  ordered  on  that  day,  as  soon 
or  sooner  than  Johnston. 

On  the  same  day  the  following  letter  was  also  sent : 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA,  July  18,  1861. 
"  COLONEL  : 

"  I  arrived  at  this  place  on  the  17th  instant.  Nothing  of 
importance  occurred  on  the  march.  The  principal  inhabi 
tants  left  some  days  since,  anticipating  its  occupation  by  the 
Federal  troops.  It  was,  till  our  arrival,  the  location  of  a 
band  of  Secession  militia,  engaged  in  pressing  into  the  ser 
vice  the  young  men  of  the  country.  I  have  to  acknowledge 
the  receipt  of  two  telegrams  from  the  General-in-Chief,  of  the 
17th  and  18th  instant,  both  looking  to  a  movement  and 
attack  upon  Winchester.  A  state  of  affairs  existed  which 
the  General-in-chief  is  not  aware  of,  though  in  some  re 
spects  anticipated  by  his  instructions,  that  if  I  found  the 
enemy  too  strong  to  attack,  to  threaten  and  make  demonstra 
tions  to  retain  him  at  Winchester.  I  more  than  carried  out 
the  wishes  of  the  General-in-chief  in  this  respect.  Before  I 
left  Martinsburg,  I  was  informed  of  a  large  increase  in  John 
ston's  command,  and  of  the  visit  to  Winchester  of  the  lead 
ing  members  of  the  Confederate  army.  Just  before  General 
McDowell  was  to  strike,  I  advanced  to  Bunker  Hill,  causing 
surprise,  and  I  have  since  learned  an  additional  increase  of 
force.  On  Tuesday  I  sent  out  a  reconnoitring  party  to 
wards  Winchester.  It  drove  the  enemy's  pickets,  and  caused 
the  army  to  be  formed  in  line  of  battle,  anticipating  an 
attack  from  my  main  force.  This  party  found  the  road 
barricaded  and  blocked  by  fallen  trees.  The  following  day 
I  left  for  this  place. 

"  Before  inarching  from  Martinsburg,  I  heard  of  the  mutter- 
ings  of  many  of  the  volunteer  regiments,  and  their  expressed 
determination  not  to  serve  one  hour  after  their  term  of  ser 
vice  should  expire.  I  anticipated  a  better  expression  of 


76  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

opinion  as  we  approached  the  enemy,  and  hoped  to  hear  of 
a  willingness  to  remain  a  week  or  ten  days.  I  was  disap 
pointed  ;  and  when  I  prepared  for  a  movement  to  the  front, 
by  an  order  for  the  men  to  carry  two  days'  provisions  in 
their  haversacks,  I  was  assailed  by  earnest  remonstrance 
against  being  detained  over  their  term  of  service,  complaints 
from  officers  of  want  of  shoes  and  other  clothing,  all  throw 
ing  obstacles  in  the  way  of  active  operations.  Indeed,  I 
found  I  should,  if  I  took  Winchester,  be  without  men,  and 
be  forced  to  retreat,  thus  losing  the  fruits  of  victory.  Under 
these  circumstances,  neither  I  nor  those  on  whom  I  could 
rely,  could  advance  with  any  confidence.  I  am,  therefore, 
now  here,  with  a  force  which  will  be  dwindling  away  very 
rapidly.  I  to-day  appealed  almost  in  vain  to  the  regiments 
to  stand  by  the  country  for  a  week  or  ten  days.  The  men 
are  longing  for  their  homes,  and  nothing  can  detain  them. 
I  sent  Captain  Newton  to-day  to  Harper's  Ferry  to  arrange 
for  defence  and  re-establish  communication  with  Maryland, 
and  the  Massachusetts  regiments.  The  Third  Wisconsin 
will  soon  be  there.  Lieutenant  Babcock  has  been  at  Sandy 
Hook  several  days  trying  to  get  the  canal  in  operation,  pre 
pare  the  entrance  to  the  ford,  putting  in  operation  a  ferry 
and  reconstructing  the  bridge.  Depots  for  all  supplies  will 
soon  be  established,  and  there  I  shall  cause  to  be  turned  in 
the  camp  equipage,  &c.,  of  the  regiments,  and  to  that  place 
I  shall  withdraw  if  I  find  my  force  so  small  as  to  render  my 
present  position  unsafe.  I  cannot  intrench  sufficiently  to 
defend  this  place  against  a  large  force. 

"  I  shall  direct  the  regiments  to  be  sent  to  Harrisburg  and 
Philadelphia,  to  be  mustered  out  by  Captain  Hastings,  Major 
Ruff,  and  Captain  Wharton. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  PATTERSON, 
"  Major-General,  Commanding. 

"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWXSEND, 

"  Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Washington,  D.  C." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.       77 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  or  PENNSYLVANIA, 
CHARLESTOWN,  YA.,  July  19,  1861. 

"Almost  all  the  three  months'  volunteers  refuse  to' serve 
an  hour  over  their  time,  and,  except  three  regiments  which 
will  stay  ten  days,  the  most  of  them  are  without  shoes  or 
pants.  I  am  compelled  to  send  them  home,  many  of  them 
at  once,  some  to  Harrisburg,  some  to  Philadelphia,  one  to 
Indiana;  and,  if  not  otherwise  directed  by  telegraph,  I  shall 
send  to  the  place  of  muster,  to  which  I  request  rolls  may  be 
sent,  and  Captain  Hastings,  Major  Ruff,  and  Captain  Whar- 
ton  ordered  to  muster  them  out.  They  cannot  march,  and, 
unless  a  paymaster  goes  to  them,  they  will  be  indecently 
clad,  and  have  just  cause  of  complaint. 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  ARMY, 

"Washington,  D.  C." 

I  succeeded  then  in  detaining  Johnston  up  to  the  after 
noon  of  Thursday,  the  18th,  and  no  portion  of  his  force 
arrived  on  the  field  of  battle  at  Manassas  until  the  after 
noon  of  Sunday,  the  2 1st,  so  that  Johnston  was  kept 
from  joining  Beauregard  not  only  on  "  Tuesday,"  or, 
"  the  early  part  of  next  week,"  but  during  the  entire 
week.  That  the  battle  of  Manassas  was  by  that  time 
fought  and  won  by  our  troops  I  had  no  doubt.  General 
Scott  had  telegraphed  me  on  Wednesday,  the  17th : 

"  McDowell's  first  day's  work  has  driven  the  enemy  be 
yond  Fairfax  Court-house;  the  Junction  will  probably  be 
carried  to-morrow." 

So  that  knowing  Johnston  to  be  still  in  my  front,  and 
that  it  would  take  him  three  days  to  reach  Manassas,  I 
felt  confident  that  everything  was  progressing  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  plans  of  the  General-in-chief.  Instead, 


78  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

however,  of  "the  Junction  being  carried  to-morrow" 
(Thursday),  there  was  not  even  an  attack  made  upon 
it  until  Sunday,  the  21st,  and  then  late  in  the  day.  Of 
all  of  which  I  was  profoundly  ignorant,  never  having 
received  an  intimation  of  it  from  any  source  whatever, 
so  that  I  assumed,  and  had  a  right  to  assume,  that  if  the 
General-in-chief  told  me  he  would  fight  on  Tuesday,  the 
16th,  and  on  the  17th  had  told  me  he  had  driven  the 
enemy  beyond  a  certain  point,  and  would  probably  com 
plete  the  operation  on  the  next  day,  that  it  was  his 
duty  to  inform  me  if  he  had  not  done  it,  otherwise,  I 
must  of  course  infer  that  he  had  done  it.  More  especially, 
when  it  was  in  his  power  to  have  communicated  with 
me  by  telegraph. 

I  informed  the  General-in-chief  of  Johnston's  depar 
ture  to  join  Beauregard  in  ample  time  to  enable  him 
to  abstain  from  delivering  battle,  if  he  desired  to  do  so. 

I  telegraphed  as  follows  on  the  20th  of  July : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  or  PENNSYLVANIA, 
CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA,  July  20th,  1861. 

"  With  a  portion  of  his  force  Johnston  left  Winchester, 
by  the  road  to  Millwood,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th ;  his 
whole  force  32,500. 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"Major-General,  Commanding. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"A.  A.  G.  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C." 

In  this  connection,  and  to  show  the  disposition  of 
"  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War"  towards 
myself,  I  will  mention  an  incident  which  occurred  in 
regard  to  this  despatch  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
General  Scott  himself  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  it  in 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  79 

his  commentary  on  my  testimony.  That  I  had  filed  this 
despatch  with  the  Committee  was  well  known  by  John 
Covode  of  Pennsylvania,  and  D.  W.  Gooch  of  Massa 
chusetts,  for  both  spoke  of  it  when  I  handed  it  in,  and 
Mr.  Covode  observed  that  he  knew  the  fact,  as  he  had 
heard  it  from  several  persons;  and  yet  both  afterwards 
denied  the  existence  of  it,  as  may  be  seen  by  reference 
to  the  Daily  Globe  of  15th  February,  1862,  during  a  de 
bate  in  Congress,  when  Mr.  Blair  of  Missouri  was  cen 
suring  the  General-in-chief  for  forcing  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  without  having  my  army  to  join  General  McDow 
ell's  after  it  was  known  that  Johnston  had  come  down. 
Mr.  Blair  said  : 

"  I  wish  to  state  that  it  was  well  known  to  the  General 
commanding  the  United  States  army,  that  General  John 
ston  with  his  forces  had  eluded  Patterson  and  was  present  at 
that  fight  at  the  beginning  of  it.  I  want  to  state  that  it  was 
well  known  by  despatches  from  General  Patterson  himself, 
and  that  when  this  information  came  here,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  went  to  General  Scott  and  protested  against 
the  army  proceeding  against  Bull  Run  and  Manassas,  but 
General  Scott  insisted  upon  its  being  done.  And  that  whole 
defeat  of  the  American  army  there  occurred  with  the  full 
knowledge  of  this  fact  upon  the  part  of  the  General  in  com 
mand,  and  when  they  still  insisted  upon  marching  upon 
Manassas,  they  did  it  with  the  full  knowledge  that  Beaure- 
garcl  had  been  reinforced  by  Johnston,  and  against  the  protest 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  That,  sir,  is  the  fact  in 
reference  to  this  matter.  It  is  a  fact  that  I  stated  in  the 
special  session  of  Congress.  It  was  not  denied  then,  it  can 
not  be  denied  now. 

"  Mr.  Covode.  Do  I  understand  the  gentleman  to  say  that 
General  Patterson  had  telegraphed  General  Scott  that  John 
ston  had  eluded  him  ? 


80  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  Mr.  Blair  of  Missouri.  Yes,  sir,  on  Friday  or  Saturday 
preceding  the  battle  of  Bull  Run. 

"Mr.  Covode.  Well,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  cannot  explain  the 
matter,  but  I  simply  say  to  the  gentleman  from  Missouri, 
that  he  is  mistaken. 

"  Mr.  Blair  of  Missouri.  And  the  gentleman  from  Missouri 
says  he  is  not  mistaken.  He  knows  as  much  in  reference  to 
this  matter  as  the  gentleman  upon  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  and  has  as  high  authority  for  what  he 
states  as  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania. 

"  Mr.  Covode.  I  say  that  General  Patterson  never  tele 
graphed  any  such  thing  to  General  Scott 

"  Mr.  Gooch.  Do  I  understand  the  gentleman  from  Mis 
souri  to  say  that  General  Scott  had  the  information  from 
General  Patterson  that  General  Johnston  had  eluded  him  ? 

"  Mr.  Blair.     Yes,  sir,  General  Patterson. 

"  Mr.  Gooch.  I  think  the  gentleman  from  Missouri  is  mis 
taken,  and  I  would  like  to  know  on  what  authority  he  makes 
the  statement. 

"  Mr.  Blair.  I  know  the  fact.  I  desire  to  be  as  particular 
as  positive.  I  know  that  the  President  and  General  Scott 
were  advised  of  the  fact  by  General  Patterson  himself. 

"  Mr.  Bingham.     When  ? 

"  Mr.  Blair.  I  have  stated  several  times.  It  was  on  Fri 
day  or  Saturday  previous  to  the  battle.  The  President  went 
to  •  General  Scott,  I  do  not  know  whether  he  protested  or 
not,  but  he  suggested  the  propriety  of  waiting  until  General 
Patterson  could  be  here  with  his  forces,  inasmuch  as  John 
ston  had  eluded  him.  General  Scott  disregarded  the  wish 
and  advice  of  the  President  on  the  subject.  The  military 
commander  at  that  time,  sir,  brought  upon  us  the  disaster 
which  befell  our  arms  at  Bull  Run. 

"  Mr.  Gooch.  I  think  it  possible  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  might  have  been  in  possession  of  the  infor 
mation  to  which  the  gentleman  from  Missouri  refers,  but  I 
think,  I  know  that  he  did  not  receive  the  information  from 
General  Patterson  in  any  way  whatever.  The  fact  may  have 
been  telegraphed  to  the  papers  in  Philadelphia,  and  from 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  81 

there  may  have  been  telegraphed  here,  but  I  do  not  think  that 
General  Patterson  ever  sent  it  to  him  or  to  anybody  else  in  Wash 
ington. 

"  Mr.  Covode.  .  .  .In  regard  to  the  telegraphic  de 
spatch  from  General  Patterson.  I  have  been  astonished  that 
the  gentleman  from  Missouri  has  persisted  so  long  in  argu 
ment  with  gentlemen  on  this  floor,  who  had  their  hands  tied, 
and  were  not  in  a  position  to  answer  him,  when  it  was  boldly 
asserted  by  them  that  that  despatch  was  never  sent  by  Gene 
ral  Patterson." 

Here  is  a  series  of  assertions  and  contradictions.  Mr. 
Blair,  an  independent  member,  anxious  to  vindicate  the 
truth  of  history  asserts  facts  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge, 
and  although  not  a  member  of  the  Committee,  nor  hav 
ing  seen  the  evidence  or  documents,  yet,  every  word  he 
utters  is  truth. 

Messrs.  Covode  and  Gooch,  partisan  members  of  the 
Committee,  with  all  the  evidence  and  documents  in  their 
possession,  positively  assert  that  which  was  entirely  false, 
in  their  extreme  anxiety  to  make  me  the  scapegoat.  I 
had  informed  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
Messrs.  Covode  and  Gooch  being  members,  and  both 
present  at  the  time  (see  Report,  vol.  ii,  p.  97),  that  on 
the  20th  July  I  telegraphed  General  Scott  as  follows  : 

"With  a  portion  of  his  force  Johnston  left  Winchester  by 
the  road  to  Millwood  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th." 

It  so  chanced  that  one  of  my  staff,  Major  Craig 
Biddle,  was  present  in  the  House  of  Kepresentatives  at 
this  debate.  Major  Biddle,  knowing  that  I  had  so  in 
formed  General  Scott,  and  that  the  assertions  of  Covode 
and  Gooch  were  untrue,  telegraphed  to  me  for  a  copy  of 


82  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

my  telegram  to  General  Scott,  which  on  receipt  he  placed 
in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Blair,  who  again  brought  the  subject 
before  the  House. 

I  quote  from  the  Congressional  Globe  : 

"  Mr.  Blair  of  Missouri.  ...  In  July  last,  or  1st  of  Au 
gust,  when  I  first  spoke  upon  the  subject  in  this  House,  for 
the  purpose  of  putting  that  responsibilty  where  it  belonged,  I 
stated  what  I  knew  to  be  a  fact,  and  reiterated  that  fact  on 
Friday  last,  that  the  General  in  command  of  the  army  knew 
that  General  Johnston  had  eluded  General  Patterson,  and 
left  Winchester  to  reinforce  General  Beauregard  at  Manas- 
sas.  That  is  what  I  said,  but  it  seemed  that  gentlemen  upon 
the  other  side  were  so  full  of  some  secret  they  had  got  in 
committee,  that  they  at  once  raised  this  side  issue  with  me, 
as  to  whether  General  Patterson  sent  the  despatch  or  not. 

"  Mr.  Gooch.  If  the  gentleman  will  permit  me  to  inter 
rupt  him,  I  desire  to  say  that,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I 
desire  to  raise  no  side  issue  with  him,  so  far  as  the  main 
question  is  concerned,  as  to  this  information  being  received 
by  the  authorities  here.  I  did,  however,  desire  to  correct 
the  gentleman  in  reference  to  his  statement  that  General 
Patterson  furnished  this  information." 

(That  is,  Mr.  Gooch  was  quite  willing  that  Mr.  Blair 
should  say  that  the  authorities  were  informed  of  the 
fact,  but  it  would  not  answer  their  purpose  to  let  it  be 
known  that  General  Patterson  had  given  the  informa 
tion.) 

"  Mr.  Blair  said  :  I  believed  at  the  time  that  this  informa 
tion  came  direct  from  General  Patterson  to  the  General  in  com 
mand  here ;  but  that  General  Scott  received  the  information 
there  is  no  earthly  doubt.  Nor  is  there  any  doubt  that  the 
President  suggested  to  General  Scott  the  propriety  of  wait 
ing  for  General  Patterson's  army,  in  order  to  support  the 
column  of  General  McDowell.  I  have  no  doubt  of  that  fact, 
for  I  have  knowledge  of  it.  It  is  of  no  importance  whether 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SHENANDOAH.  83 

General  Patterson  sent  the  information  or  not,  but  it  appears 
from  the  letter  which  I  hold  in  my  hand  that  I  am  correct, 
and  that  General  Patterson  did  send  a  despatch  to  General 
Scott  on  the  subject.  I  received  the  letter  from  a  gentleman 
with  whom  I  am  very  well  acquainted,  and  I  will  read  it  for 
the  information  of  the  House  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  February  16th,  1862. 

"  MY  DEAR  COLONEL  : 

"  I  inclose  a  copy  of  a  despatch  which  has  been  forwarded 
to  me  by  General  Patterson.  It,  as  well  as  my  own  recol 
lection,  fully  confirms  the  statement  made  by  you  in  the 
House,  that  General  Patterson  on  the  20th  of  July  commu 
nicated  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army  at  Washington  the 
intelligence  that  Johnston  had,  with  a  portion  of  his  force, 
left  Winchester  by  the  road  to  Millwood.  This  despatch 
was  given  in  evidence  before  the  Investigating  Committee, 
as  appears  by  its  record.  General  Patterson's  force  at  Mar- 
tinsburg  was  eighteen  thousand  two  hundred  men. 

"  Very  sincerely  yours, 

"  CRAIG  BIDDLE." 

(Despatch.) 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
CHARLESTOWN,  VIRGINIA,  July  20,  1861. 

"  With  a  portion  of  his  force,  Johnston  left  Winchester 
by  the  road  to  Millwood  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th.  His 
whole  force  thirty-five  thousand  two  hundred. 

"  R.  PATTERSON, 

"  Major-General,  Commanding. 

"COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assistant  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Washington,  D.  C." 

This  debate  gives  a  fair  sample  of  the  "  reliable  in 
formation"  which  members  of  this  Committee  were 
enabled,  by  their  position,  to  foist  upon  the  public,  and 
which  not  every  one  is  so  lucky  as  to  be  able  to  prove 
utterly  mendacious  by  their  own  record,  before  the  very 
body  that  appointed  them. 


84  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

No  one  acquainted  with  the  country  needs  to  be  told 
that  my  movement  from  Martinsburg  to  Charlestown  was 
in  no  respect  a  retreat  or  withdrawal  from  the  enemy. 

When  I  arrived  at  Charlestown,  and  was  about  to 
advance  from  that  point,  the  difficulties  which  I  anti 
cipated  from  the  expiration  of  the  time  of  service  of  the 
regiments  under  my  command  culminated.  I  have 
shown  that  my  requisition  on  the  Governor  of  Pennsyl 
vania  for  three  years'  troops  in  May  had  been  counter 
manded.  I,  therefore,  having  none  but  three  months' 
troops  under  my  command,  in  my  communications  to 
the  General-in-chief  never  failed  to  urge  the  danger  of 
acting  just  as  their  terms  of  service  were  expiring.  On 
the  20th  of  June  I  had  used  to  General  Scott  (Report  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  126)  the  following  em 
phatic,  and,  I  may  say,  prophetic  language  : 

"  I  beg  to  remind  the  General-in-chief  that  the  period  of 
service  of  nearly  all  the  troops  here  will  expire  within  a 
month,  and  that  if  we  do  not  meet  the  enemy  with  them,  we 
will  be  in  no  condition  to  do  so  for  three  months  to  come." 

Yet,  with  this  fact  perfectly  well  known,  the  attack 
on  Manassas  was  delayed  until  the  21st  of  July.  On 
the  16th,  I  had  said  (p.  132) : 

"  I  have  to  report  that  the  term  of  service  of  a  very  large 
portion  of  this  force  will  expire  in  a  few  days.  From  an 
undercurrent  expression  of  feeling,  I  am  confident  that  many 
will  be  inclined  to  lay  down  their  arms  the  day  their  time 
expires.  With  such  a  feeling  existing,  any  active  operations 
towards  Winchester  cannot  be  thought  of,  until  they  are 
replaced  by  three  years'  men." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.       85 

And  on  the  17th,  18th,  and  19th,  the  same  thing 
(Report,  p.  92). 

What  made  the  matter  still  worse,  was  an  order,  pub 
lished  at  Washington,  which  had  become  known  to  the 
command,  directing  that  all  volunteers  in  service  should 
be  returned  to  their  homes  in  time  to  be  mustered  out 
at  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  service.  This  was  in 
accordance  with  the  law  on  the  subject,  but  no  reinforce 
ments  were  sent  me  to  replace  the  troops  of  which  a 
literal  compliance  with  this  order  would  have  entirely 
stripped  me. 

My  time  after  this  was  employed  in  sending  off  the 
troops  under  my  command,  until,  on  the  25th  of  July, 
I  was  relieved  by  General  Banks. 

This  is  a  plain  unexaggerated  statement  of  the  whole 
of  my  operations. 

I  think  that  I  have  shown  : 

"  1st.  That  I  have  always  courted  an  investigation  of  any 
charge  that  could  be  made  against  me. 

"  2d.  That  my  whole  course  was  entirely  approved  by  the 
officers  attached  to  my  column,  whom  I  was  instructed  to 
consult. 

"  3d.  That  I  complied  with  every  order  issued  to  me. 

"  4th.  That  I  kept  Johnston  from  joining  Beauregard,  not 
only  on  the  day  I  was  directed  to  do  so,  but  for  five  clays 
afterwards. 

"  5 tli.  That  I  was  never  informed  that  the  battle  had  not 
been  fought  at  the  time  indicated,  though  within  reach  of  a 
telegraph,  but  on  the  contrary,  the  only  despatch  received 
convinced  me  that  the  battle  had  been  fought. 

"  6th.  That  with  a  delay  in  fighting  it  I  was  in  nowise 
responsible. 


86  NARRATIVE   OF   THE    CAMPAIGN 

"  7th.  That  the  General-in-chief,  when  I  told  him  I  was 
not  strong  enough,  in  my  opinion,  to  attack  Johnston,  could 
have  ordered  me  to  do  so,  if  he  differed  from  me,  as  I  told 
him  all  the  circumstances,  and  asked,  «  Shall  I  attack  ?' 

"  8th.  That  I  informed  him  that  Johnston  had  gone  to 
General  Beauregard,  and  he  himself,  in  his  comments  on 
my  testimony  (see  page  241,  vol.  ii,  Conduct  of  the  War), 
admits  that  he  knew  it  before  delivering  battle  on  the  21st 
of  July." 

Of  the  testimony  taken  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  relative  to  the  operations  of  my 
column,  it  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  make  a  minute 
examination.  The  documentary  evidence  and  the  best 
informed  witnesses  sustain  me  in  all  that  I  have  here 
presented.  Some  of  the  witnesses  were  honest  well- 
meaning  gentlemen,  but  acquainted  neither  with  my 
orders,  my  force,  the  amount  of  my  transportation,  nor 
anything  which  would  enable  them  to  form  a  fair  judg 
ment  Some  were  without  any  military  knowledge  or 
experience.  To  notice  their  strictures  minutely  would 
be  tedious  to  the  reader,  and  seems  to  be  superfluous. 

These  reflections  do  not  apply  to  the  remarks  of  Ge 
neral  Scott,  which  I  desire  to  notice  with  all  the  consi 
deration  to  which  anything  coming  from  him  is  entitled. 
His  statement,  sent  to  the  Committee,  is  as  follows : 

"NEW  YORK,  March  31,  1862. 

"  On  the  statement  of  Major-General  Patterson,  submitted 
by  him  as  evidence  to  the  Honorable  the  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  I  beg 
leave  to  remark : 

"  1.  That  his  statement,  one  hundred  and  forty-eight  long 
pages,  closely  and  indistinctly  written,  has  been  before  me 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  87 

about  forty-eight  hours,  including  a  Sunday  when  I  was  too 
much  indisposed  to  work  or  to  go  to  church ;  that  I  cannot 
write  or  read  at  night,  nor  at  any  time,  except  by  short 
efforts,  and  that  I  have  been  entirely  without  help. 

"  2.  That,  consequently,  I  have  read  but  little  of  the  state 
ment  and  voluminous  documents  appended,  and  have  but 
about  two  hours  left  for  comments  on  that  little. 

"  3.  The  documents  (mainly  correspondence  between  Ge 
neral  Patterson  and  myself)  are  badly  copied,  being  hardly 
intelligible  in  some  places  from  the  omission  and  change  of 
words. 

"  4.  General  Patterson  was  never  ordered  by  me,  as  he 
seems  to  allege,  to  attack  the  enemy  without  a  probability 
of  success ;  but  on  several  occasions  he  wrote  as  if  he  were 
assured  of  victory.  For  example :  June  12th,  he  says  he  is 
*  resolved  to  conquer,  and  will  risk  nothing;'  and  July  4th, 
expecting  supplies  the  next  day,  he  adds,  as  soon  as  they 
6  arrive  I  shall  advance  to  Winchester,  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  that  place.'  Accordingly  he  issued  orders  for  that 
movement  on  the  8th,  next  called  a  council  of  war,  and  stood 
fast  at  Martinsburg. 

"  5.  But  although  General  Patterson  was  never  specifically 
ordered  to  attack  the  enemy,  he  was  certainly  told,  and  ex 
pected,  even  if  with  inferior  numbers,  to  hold  the  rebel  army 
in  his  front  on  the  alert,  and  to  prevent  it  from  reinforcing 
Manassas  Junction,  by  means  of  threatening  manoeuvres 
and  demonstrations,  results  often  obtained  in  war  with  half 
numbers. 

"  6.  After  a  time,  General  Patterson  moved  upon  Bunker 
Hill,  and  then  fell  off  upon  Charlestown,  whence  he  seems 
to  have  made  no  other  demonstration  that  did  not  look  like  a 
retreat  out  of  Virginia.  From  that  movement  Johnston  was 
at  liberty  to  join  Beauregard  with  any  part  of  the  army  of 
Winchester. 

"  7.  General  Patterson  alludes,  with  feeling,  to  my  recall 
from  him,  back  to  Washington,  after  the  enemy  had  evacu 
ated  Harper's  Ferry,  of  certain  troops  sent  to  enable  him  to 
take  that  place,  but  the  recall  was  necessary  to  prevent  the 


NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Government  and  capital  from  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands. 
His  inactivity,  however,  from  that  cause  need  not  have  been 
more  than  temporary,  for  he  was  soon  reinforced  up  to,  at 
least,  the  enemy's  maximum  number  in  the  Winchester 
valley,  without  leading  to  a  battle,  or  even  a  reconnoissance 
in  force. 

"  8.  He  also  often  called  for  batteries  and  rifled  cannon 
beyond  our  capacity  to  supply  at  the  moment,  and  so  in 
respect  to  regular  troops,  one  or  more  regiments.  He  might 
as  well  have  asked  for  a  brigade  of  elephants.  Till  some 
time  afterwards,  we  had  for  the  defence  of  the  Government 
and  its  capital  but  a  few  companies  of  regular  foot  and 
horse,  and  not  half  the  number  of  troops,  including  all  de 
scriptions,  if  the  enemy  had  chosen  to  attack  us. 

"  9.  As  connected  with  this  subject,  I  hope  I  may  be  per 
mitted  to  notice  the  charge  made  against  me  on  the  floor  of 
Congress,  that  I  did  not  stop  Brigadier-General  McDowell's 
movement  upon  Manassas  Junction,  after  I  had  been  in 
formed  of  the  reinforcement  sent  thither  from  Winchester, 
though  urged  to  do  so  by  one  or  more  members  of  the 
Cabinet. 

"  Now,  it  was,  at  the  reception  of  that  news,  too  late  to 
call  off  the  troops  from  the  attack,  and,  besides,  though 
opposed  to  the  movement  at  first,  we  had  all  become  ani 
mated  and  sanguine  of  success ;  and  it  is  not  true  that  I  was 
urged  by  anybody  in  authority  to  stop  the  attack,  which  was 
commenced  as  early,  I  think,  as  the  18th  of  July. 

"  10.  I  have  but  time  to  say  that,  among  the  disadvantages 
under  which  I  have  been  writing  are  these  :  I  have  not  had 
within  reach  one  of  my  own  papers,  and  not  an  officer  who 
was  with  me  at  the  period  in  question. 

"  Respectfully  submitted  to  the  Committee. 

"  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

"NEW  YORK,  March  31,  1862." 

General  Scott's  infirmities,  thus  detailed  by  himself, 
entitle  him  to  the  most  sincere  sympathy.  His  admis 
sion  that  he  has  been  able  to  read  but  little  of  the 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        89 

"  documents  (mainly  correspondence  between  General 
Patterson  and  myself),"  while  it  detracts  very  much 
from  his  comments  upon  them,  is  certainly  creditable  to 
his  frankness.  If  too  numerous  to  read,  they  must  surely 
be  too  numerous  to  remember,  especially  by  one  who, 
at  the  time  they  were  written  or  received,  was  occupied 
in  the  direction  of  other  important  military  operations. 

The  General  admits  that  I  was  "  never  ordered  to 
attack  without  a  probability  of  success." 

In  fact  I  was  never  ordered  to  attack  at  all,  and  as  I 
did  not  see  a  probability  of  success,  nor  did  any  of  the 
officers  he  had  attached  to  my  command  and  instructed 
me  to  consult,  I  claim  that  I  was  right  not  to  attack  the 
enemy's  intrenched  position  at  Winchester. 

Every  despatch  I  ever  received  impressed  upon  me, 
not  the  necessity  of  striking  a  blow,  or  making  a  bold 
dash  upon  the  enemy,  but  the  exercise  of  the  greatest 
caution ;  to  risk  nothing,  and  never  to  give  battle  with 
out  a  well-ascertained  superiority.  All  felt  that  the 
first  blow  should  be  a  decisive  one,  and  that  any  success 
by  the  rebels  would  prove,  as  it  did,  an  encouragement 
to  years  of  resistance.  After  actually  issuing  the  order 
for  an  attack  on  Winchester,  I  yielded  reluctantly  to 
the  belief  of  my  inability  to  do  what  I  hoped,  on  the 
clearest  evidence,  and  upon  the  judgment  of  those  en 
titled  to  be  consulted. 

I  did,  with  greatly  inferior  numbers,  "  hold  the  rebel 
army  in  my  front  on  the  alert,"  and  I  did  prevent  it 
from  reinforcing  Manassas  Junction,  by  means  of  threat 
ening  manoeuvres  and  demonstrations  "  as  ordered  by 

7 


90  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

my  military  superior,"  not  only  on  the  day  General 
Scott  desired  me  to  do  so,  but  for  five  days  afterwards. 
That  no  advantage  was  taken  of  this  was  not  my  fault. 
That  the  General-in-chief  should  cast  any  reflection  upon 
the  movement  to  Charlestown,  is  certainly  singular,  as 
he  had  himself  ordered  me  to  go  there  (ante,  p.  68)  \ 
and  I  had  told  him  the  precise  day  I  was  going  and  the 
route,  ma  Bunker  Hill,  which  I  should  take  (ante,  p.  70). 
After  my  arrival  in  Charlestown  the  expiration  of  the 
term  of  service  of  most  of  my  troops  prevented  any 
further  demonstration.  The  fact  that  they  would  not 
in  any  number  remain  beyond  their  term  of  service  at 
my  request,  created  remark  at  the  time,  but  as  every 
commander  who  has  since  tried  the  experiment,  has  met 
with  similar  experience,  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to 
give  any  of  the  details  of  my  efforts  to  detain  them. 

I  regretted  the  recall  of  certain  troops,  just  as  I  was 
partially  across  the  Potomac,  as  it  left  me  entirely  with 
out  artillery.  If  it  was  necessary  to  paralyze  my  force 
to  save  Washington,  I  have  no  complaint  to  make.  But 
after  it  was  done,  I  do  object  to  being  blamed  for  the 
temporary  delay  occasioned  by  it. 

I  did  subsequently  move,  two  days  after  receiving  a 
single  battery  of  six  guns,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  with 
less  than  11,000  men,  in  the  face  of  a  force  proved  by 
the  official  report  of  General  Johnston  to  be  greatly  my 
superior,  and  having,  according  to  my  information,  24 
pieces  of  artillery. 

Whether  batteries  and  cannon  could  or  could  not  be 
supplied  me,  I  shall  not  discuss.  As  my  adversary  had, 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.        91 

as  he  admits,  at  least  16  pieces  of  field  artillery,  together 
with  heavy  siege  guns,  I  think  no  one  will  blame  me 
for  my  attempts,  ineffectual  though  they  were,  to  obtain 
some  additions  to  my  six.  My  siege  train  when  near 
Winchester  consisted  of  one  30-pounder,  one  24-pounder, 
and  an  old  eight-inch  howitzer. 

General  Scott  scorns  to  avail  himself  of  the  misstate- 
ments  of  the  Committee,  but  frankly  admits  that  he 
received  the  intelligence  of  Johnston's  approach,  but 
determined  to  fight  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  in  spite  of 
it.  How  absurd  is  it  then  to  attribute  the  disaster  of 
that  day  to  the  unexpected  arrival  of  Johnston.  It  was 
known,  but  evidently  deemed  of  small  moment ;  so  great 
was  the  confidence  at  Washington,  that  they  would  not 
wait  until  I  could  come  up.  They  deemed,  and  public 
opinion  supported  them  in  it,  that  their  force  was  per 
fectly  irresistible  against  everything  that  the  rebels  could 
oppose  to  it.  To  use  General  Scott's  own  words  : 

"  Though  opposed  to  the  movement  at  first,  we  had 
all  become  animated  and  sanguine  of  success." 

I  did  not  write  to  General  Scott  "  as  if  assured  of 
victory,"  though  repeatedly  declaring  my  readiness  to 
assault  Winchester  if  ordered  by  him  to  do  so.  I  said 
nothing  in  my  reports  to  foster  the  too  sanguine  ex 
pectation  of  success  which  precipitated  the  attack  of 
McDowell,  while  from  my  position  it  was  impossible  for 
me  to  co-operate  with  him.  That  my  estimate  of  the 
difficulties  of  an  advance  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
with  the  three  months'  volunteers,  was  not  exaggerated, 
sufficiently  appears  from  the  ill  success  that  has  since 


92  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

attended  the  movements,  in  that  direction,  of  more  ex 
perienced  troops,  successively  commanded  by  Generals 
Stone,  Fremont,  Banks,  Miles,  Milroy,  Sigel,  Wallace, 
and  Hunter.  The  first  successful  campaign  there  since 
I  relinquished  the  command  was  made  very  recently,  by 
General  Sheridan,  at  the  head  of  a  veteran  army,  after 
first  meeting  serious  reverses. 

General  Scott,  in  his  recent  Autobiography,  has  added 
nothing  to  his  criticisms  on  this  campaign,  further  than 
to  say,  in  speaking  of  the  attack  on  Vera  Cruz : 

"  Several  Generals  and  Colonels,  among  them  Major-Gene 
ral  Patterson,  an  excellent  second  in  command,  notwith 
standing  his  failure  as  Chief  on  the  Shenandoah  in  1861, 
solicited  the  privilege  of  leading  storming  parties." 

While  I  am  duly  grateful  for  this  compliment  to  my 
services  in  Mexico,  I  must  protest  against  the  assertion 
that  I  acted  "  as  Chief  on  the  Shenandoah  in  1861."  I 
was  a  subordinate,  without  knowing  the  plan  of  my  prin 
cipal.  I  was  ordered  to  co-operate  in  a  movement  which 
was  not — and  I  was  not  informed  of  its  postponement- 
made  at  the  time  indicated.  When  I  was  in  a  condition 
to  move  into  Virginia,  and  had  actually  crossed  the  Po 
tomac,  I  was  ordered  back,  and  told  "  to  keep  within  my 
limits,  until  I  could  satisfy  the  General-in-chief  I  ought 
to  go  beyond  them."  When  I  presented  my  plan  to  go 
to  Leesburg,  it  was  disapproved.  When  I  asked  for  in 
structions,  they  were  not  given.  My  movements  were 
regulated  by  telegraphic  despatches,  received  from  day 
to  day  and  hour  to  hour,  and  I  never  was  invested  with 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  93 

the  dignity  of  "  Chief, "  until  it  became  expedient  to 
make  me  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  campaign. 

It  will  appear  by  an  examination  of  the  testimony  be 
fore,  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  that  the 
arrival  of  General  Johnston  at  Manassas  was  one  of  the 
very  least  of  the  -causes  of  General  McDowell's  defeat. 

In  answer  to  questions  put  by  the  Committee,  the 
following  evidence  was  given. 

General  J.  B.  Richardson  : 

» 

"  I  moved  back  to  see  what  had  become  of  the  JSTew  York 
12th,  on  the  left  It  had  probably  takeu  as  much  as  twenty 
minutes  to  go  through  with  this  formation.  I  found,  on 
arriving  at  the  left,  parts  of  two  companies  of  the  New  York 
12th,  about  sixty  men  altogether,  retreating  outside  of  the 
woods,  carrying  along  a  few  wounded.  I  asked  what  the 
matter  was  and  where  they  were  going.  They  said  the 
regiment  was  all  killed,  and  they  were  falling  back;  the 
regiment  had  fallen  back,  those  that  were  not  killed.  Says 
I,  '  What  are  you  running  for  ?  there  is  no  enemy  here.  I 
cannot  see  anybody  at  all.  Where  is  your  Colonel  ?'  They 
knew  nothing  about  it.  The  men  knew  nothing  about  any 
of  their  officers.  I  could  not  find  any  officers  with  the  men 
at  all,  I  believe. 

"  Question.  Why  was  it  concluded  to  fight  that  battle  on 
Sunday,  without  any  knowledge  of  where  Patterson  and 
his  men  were,  and  of  the  position  of  Johnston  ?  Did  you 
know  at  the  time  where  they  were  ?  I  will  ask  that  first. 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir.  I  knew  General  Johnston  was  on 
our  right  before  we  moved  from  there  at  all" 

General  Richardson  further  says  that  if  he  had  cap 
tured  certain  batteries  on  Thursday  night,  which  he 
could  have  done,  there  would  have  been  no  serious  fight ; 


94  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

that  reinforcements  from  Richmond  under  General 
Davis,  and  from  Winchester  under  General  Johnston, 
came  during  Friday,  and  Saturday  nights,  and  he  gives 
very  clear  reasons  for  the  defeat  at  Bull  Run.  He  says : 

"  There  is  another  thing  I  would  like  to  say.  From  what 
we  have  learned  since,  the  enemy  handled  every  reserve 
they  had,  whereas  our  reserves  were  not  handled  at  all.  The 
three  brigades  of  reserves,  Blenker's,  Davis's,  and  mine, 
that  were  on  the  field  that  day,  and  Remyar's  reserve,  which 
was  at  Fairfax  Station,  six  miles  off',  I  believe,  and  not  han 
dled  at  all,  m^ke  24,000  who  were  useless,  whereas  the  enemy 
handled  all  their  reserves.  This  is  nothing  new.  I  said  the 
same  that  night." 

General  Richardson  adds  : 

"  We  marched  50,000  men  and  49  pieces  of  artillery,  of 
which  we  saved  35  pieces." 

Major-General  Heintzelman  attributes  the  loss  of  the 
battle  to  the  delay  in  bringing  it  on,  and  to  improper 
disposition  of  the  troops.  Tyler's  division,  having  but 
the  shortest  distance  to  go,  was  ordered  to  move  first. 
Hunter's,  which  had  the  longest  distance  to  go,  followed 
Tyler's ;  and  Heintzelman  says  : 

"I  think  if  we  had  reversed  it,  let  Hunter  go  first,  then 
let  me  follow  him,  and  then  Tyler  follow  me,  that  delay  at 
Centreville  would  not  have  occurred. 

"  Question  to  General  Heintzelman.  What  in  your  opinion 
really  led  to  the  disaster  of  that  day  ? 

"  Answer.  It  is  hard  to  tell.  There  were  a  number  of 
causes.  In  the  first  place,  the  delay  of  Friday  and  Saturday 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  95 

at  Centreville  was  an  efficient  cause.     Another  cause  was 
the  three  hours  lost  at  Centreville  on  Sunday  morning." 

Major-General  Franklin  : 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  I  have  always  wondered 
that  the  battle  was  fought  then,  when  it  was,  after  it  was 
understood  in  the  army  that  Johnston  had  come  down,  con 
trary  to  the  expectation  which  was  entertained,  that  Patter 
son  would  hold  him  in  check. 

"  Answer.  I  will  tell  you  what  suggested  itself  to  me, 
when  I  got  to  Bull  Run,  and  that  is :  we  ought  to  have  en 
camped  at  the  fine  hills  there,  and  waited  there  overnight, 
and  got  up  early  in  the  morning,  when  we  could  have  whip 
ped  them. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  It  has  always  seemed  to  me 
that,  when  you  knew  that  Johnston  had  come  down,  you 
should  have  got  twenty-five  thousand  men  from  here,  and 
as  many  more,  perhaps,  from  Fortress  Monroe,  and  then  you 
would  have  had^  the  thing  sure.  I  always  wondered  why 
that  was  not  done  when  Patterson  had  not  held  Johnston  in 
check,  as  it  was  understood  he  would  do. 

"  The  witness.  Patterson's  officers  give  a  very  good  account 
of  him.  He  knew  nothing  about  what  the  army  was  to  do. 
He  supposed  the  battle  had  come  off  on  Tuesday,  and  knew 
nothing  about  what  was  really  doing. 

"  The  Chairman.  It  strikes  me  that  it  was  a  great  fault 
that  so  important  a  circumstance  was  not  understood  before 
the  battle  was  begun. 

"  The  witness.  I  think  that  if  we  had  stopped  at  Sudley's 
stream  they  would  have  fought  us  in  the  morning,  but  we 
would  have  fought  them  on  our  own  ground,  and  would 
have  whipped  them. 

"  The  Chairman.  They  would  then  have  lost  the  benefit 
of  all  their  batteries.  I  have  always  wondered  at  you  going 
into  that  fight  there,  when  you  should  really  have  got  rein 
forcements  of  twenty  to  thirty  thousand  more  men. 

"  The  witness.  I  think  it  would  have  been  an  advisable 


96  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

plan  to  have  stopped  there  at  Bull  Run.  We  would  probably 
have  had  to  fight  about  the  same  time,  but  then  we  should 
have  fought  on  our  own  ground,  and  should  have  had  a 
better  position  than  they  could  have  got.  We  could  have 
got  a  beautiful  position." 


From  the  testimony  of  General  Wadsworth  : 

"  Question.  What  is  your  opinion  as  to  the  result  of  that 
battle,  had  the  provisions  and  transportation  been  brought 
up  on  Thursday,  and  the  battle  fought  on  Friday  morning, 
instead  of  Sunday  ? 

"  Answer.  We  would  have  walked  over  the  field.  John 
ston  is  regarded  by  our  officers  as  much  superior  to  Beau- 
regard  ;  as  much  the  ablest  officer  in  this  army.  All  the 
reports  show  that  he  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  dispo 
sition  of  the  enemy  on  that  day." 

General  Henry  W.  Slocum : 

"  Question  by  Mr.  Odell.  You  were  in  Hunter's  division 
and  rested  at  Centreville,  did  you  not? 

"  Answer.   Yes,  sir. 

"  Question.  Do  you  remember  why  it  was  you  rested  there 
an  hour  or  an  hour  and  a  half  on  Sunday  morning  ? 

"  Answer.  I  never  understood  that.  I  understood  that 
there  was  some  confusion  among  the  troops  ahead  of  us ; 
somebody  in  the  way,  I  understood.  It  was  a  very  unfor 
tunate  resting  spell. 

"  Question  by  Mr.  Chandler.  But  for  that  you  would 
have  won  the  day  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir,  I  think  so." 

General  William  F.  Barry : 

"  Question.  Can  you  state  to  us  what  led  to  the  rout  of 
our  army  on  the  field  that  day  ? 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE   SHENANDOAH.  97 

"Answer.  I  think  the  principal  cause  was  the  uninstructed 
state  of  our  troops.  The  troops  were  raw,  many  of  the 
officers  were  indolent,  arid  they  did  not  behave  themselves 
as  they  should  have  done  on  that  day." 

Further  on,  General  Barry  says : 

"  It  was  impossible  to  rally  the  Eleventh  regiment,  the 
Fire  Zouaves.  I  rode  in  among  them,  and  implored  them 
to  stand.  I  told  them  the  guns  would  never  be  captured  if 
they  would  only  stand,  but  they  seemed  paralyzed ;  standing 
with  their  eyes  and  mouths  wide  open,  and  did  not  seem  to 
hear  me.  I  then  reminded  them  of  all  the  oaths  they  had 
sworn  at  Alexandria,  after  the  death  of  Ellsworth,  and  that 
that  was  the  best  chance  they  would  ever  have  for  vengeance, 
but  they  paid  no  attention  to  what  I  said  at  all. 

"  Question.  So  far  as  the  whole  fight  was  concerned,  the 
enemy  had  infinitely  the  advantage  of  our  troops  in  position  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir,  the  ground  was  of  their  own  selecting. 
I  think  if  the  battle  had  been  fought  at  the  hour  it  was 
expected  to  be  fought,  at  8J  or  8|  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
we  would  have  won  it.  There  was  a  loss  of  three  hours 
then,  which  I  think  had  a  very  important  effect  on  the  suc 
cess  of  the  day.  It  enabled  their  fresh  troops  to  get  up ; 
it  prevented  our  turning  their  flank  so  completely  as  we 
would  have  done  by  surprise,  for  when  our  column  halted 
the  enemy  discovered  the  direction  we  were  going  to  take, 
and  prepared  for  it;  and,  worse  than  that,  the  halting,  the 
standing  still,  fatigued  the  men  as  much,  if  not  more,  than 
by  marching  that  time. 

"  Question.  So  that  our  men  were  really  very  much  ex 
hausted  when  they  went  into  the  field  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

"  Question.  But  if  the  battle  had  been  fought  three  or 
four  hours  earlier,  then  Johnston's  reserves  would  not  have 
been  up  in  time  ? 

"  Answer.  I  think  the  fate  of  that  day  would  have  been 
decided  before  they  got  upon  the  ground.  I  look  upon  that 
delay  as  the  most  unfortunate  thing  that  happened.  The 


98  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

troops  that  ought  to  have  been  out  of  the  way  were  in  the 
way  before  we  could  get  to  the  turning-off  point  of  the  road." 

General  E.  D.  Keyes : 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  To  what  do  you  attribute 
the  disaster  of  the  day  ? 

"  Answer.  To  the  want  of  ten  thousand  more  troops.  That 
is,  I  think  if  we  had  ten  thousand  more  troops  than  we  had 
to  go  into  action,  say  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  we 
should  certainly  have  beaten  them.  I  followed  along  down 
the  stream,  and  Sherman's  battery  diverged  from  me,  so 
that  it  left  a  wide  gap  between  us,  and  ten  thousand  men 
could  have  come  in  between  me  and  Sherman,  which  was 
the  weak  point  in  our  line,  &c. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  Had  it  been  known  that 
Patterson  had  not  detained  Johnston,  would  it  not  have  been 
imprudent  to  hazard  a  battle  then  anyhow  ? 

"  Answer.  If  it  had  been  known  that  the  thirty  to  forty 
thousand  men  that  Johnston  was  said  to  have  had,  would 
have  been  upon  us,  it  would  have  been  impolitic  to  have 
made  the  attack  on  Sunday. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  Even  after  the  disaster,  what 
prevented  your  making  a  stand  at  Centreville,  and  sending 
for  reinforcements  and  renewing  the  fight  there  ? 

"  Answer.  I  was  not  the  Commander-in-chief. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  Was  there  not  a  strong  bri 
gade  on  Centreville  Heights  that  had  not  been  in  the  en 
gagement  at  all  that  day? 

"  Answer.  There  was  a  division  there, — three  brigades." 

General  John  G.  Barnard,  chief  engineer  to  General 
McDowell : 

"  Question  by  Chairman.  Without  going  minutely  into 
the  matter,  will  you  state  concisely  to  what  you  attribute  the 
disaster  to  our  army  in  that  battle  ? 

"  Answer.  One  of  the  influential  causes  was,  I  think,  the 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE   SHENANDOAH.  99 

loss  of  time  in  getting  under  way  the  morning  of  the  fight. 
The  fact  the  repulse  turned  into  a  disastrous  defeat,  I  at 
tribute  to  the  fact  that  our  troops  were  all  raw.  General 
McDowell  had  not  even  time  to  see  all  his  troops.  They 
were  brigaded  only  for  the  march,  and  put  under  officers 
whom  the  troops  had  not  time  to  know,  and  who  had  no 
time  to  know  the  troops,  &c. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.  You  attribute  the  first  bad 
phase  of  that  battle  to  the  fact  that  our  troops  did  not  get 
on  the  ground  in  time  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  one  hour's  difference  would 
have  gained  the  battle.  We  had  almost  gained  it  as  it  was. 

"  Question.  What  caused  that  delay  ? 

"Answer.  There  were  two  causes,  distinct  from  each 
other.  One  was,  that  in  the  plan  of  the  attack,  General 
Tyler's  division  was  to  move  first,  &c.  The  second  was, 
the  much  longer  time  it  took  for  the  column  of  Hunter  to  get 
around  Sudley's  Ford  than  we  calculated  for,7'  &c. 

Captain  (now  General)  Charles  Griffin  : 

In  answer  to  the  question  of  the  Chairman,  "  Will 
you  please  inform  us  what,  according  to  your  best  judg 
ment,  led  to  the  disaster  of  that  day  ?"  replies  at  length, 
and  gives  as  reason,  that  his  battery,  also  the  battery 
of  Captain  Ricketts,  were  put  entirely  too  far  in  advance, 
in  a  wrong  position  and  without  an  adequate  support, 
with  only  the  New  York  Fire  Zouaves ;  that  he  took 
the  position  he  was  ordered  to,  against  his  judgment, 
saying,  the  Zouaves  would  not  support  him ;  saying,  "  I 
will  go,  but  mark  my  words,  they  will  not  support  us," 
and  that  when  the  firing  began,  the  supports  "  broke 
and  run,"  and  the  batteries  were  lost. 

"  Question  by  the  Chairman.     You  say  if  your  battery  and 


100  NARRATIVE  OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Iticketts'  had  been  properly  supported,  it  could  not  have  been 
taken  ? 

"  Answer.  If  those  eleven  guns  had  been  properly  sup 
ported,  I  think  the  day  would  have  been  different,  and  I 
think  that  if  we  had  not  been  moved  on  that  point,  and  the 
Captains  of  the  batteries  had  been  allowed  to  exercise  their 
own  judgment,  the  day  would  have  resulted  differently. 

"  Question.  Was  it  not  necessary,  in  your  advanced  posi 
tion,  that  you  should  have  had  the  largest  requisite  number 
to  support  you  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir.  In  the  first  place,  a  battery  should 
never  have  been  sent  forward  to  reconnoitre.  That  is  a 
military  mistake ;  of  course  I  am  only  a  Captain,  and  a  great 
many  would  censure  me  for  saying  this,  but  it  is  so.  It  was 
the  duty  of  the  infantry  to  have  gone  forward  and  found  out 
what  the  enemy  were  doing,  and  not  to  have  sent  the  bat 
tery  forward  to  find  that  out." 


Further  on  he  says  (p.  174)  : 

"  My  last  words  were,  'These  Fire  Zouaves  will  never 
support  me.' 

"  Question.  Why  did  you  think  that  ? 

"  Answer.  I  had  seen  them  on  the  field  in  a  state  of  dis 
organization,  and  I  did  not  think  they  had  the  moral  courage 
to  fight.  I  do  not  think  that  any  troops  that  will  go  through 
the  country  in  a  disorganized  state,  thieving  and  robbing, 
are  brave  men.  I  had  no  support  all  daylong,  with  the 
exception  that  the  New  York  14th  came  to  me  when -I  was 
in  my  second  or  third  position.  An  officer  said,  <  I  have  been 
ordered  here  to  support  you  ;  where  shall  I  go?'  He  went 
to  a  fence  in  rear  of  the  batteries.  I  said,  <  Don't  go  in 
rear  of  us,  for  you  will  stand  a  chance  of  being  hit.  If  their 
batteries  fire  at  me  and  don't  hit  me,  it  will  pass  over  me 
and  hit  you.'  They  then  went  to  one  side,  and  when  I  saw 
them  again  they  were  falling  back,  every  man  for  himself, 
about  five  hundred  yards  from  me.  That  was  the  last  I  saw 
of  that  regiment  that  day. 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF    THE    SHENANDOAH.  101 

"  Question.  You  consider  one  of  the  errors,  the  serious 
error  of  the  day,  was  the  fact  that  the  artillery  was  not  pro 
perly  supported  hy  the  infantry  ? 

"  Answer.  Undoubtedly.  I  consider  that  the  first  great 
error  that  was  committed  that  day  was  the  sending  these 
batteries  forward  without  support. 

"  Question.  These  two  errors  you  think  led  to  the  first  and 
most  important  repulse  of  the  day  ? 

"  Answer.  I  think  these  two  errors  led  to  the  first  and 
the  repulse  of  the  day." 

Colonel  Thomas  A.  Davies: 

"  Question.  What  led  to  the  final  defeat,  as  near  as  you 
could  ascertain  on  the  ground  ? 

"  Answer.  I  can  tell  you  what  I  think  is  the  cause  of  the 
whole  defeat  of  that  day.  The  troops  were  raw;  the  men 
had  been  accustomed  to  look  to  their  Colonels  as  the  only 
men  to  give  them  commands.  They  had  never  been  taught 
the  succession  of  officers,  &c.,  &c.  The  officers  did  not  them 
selves  know  what  to  do.  They  were  themselves  raw  and 
green,  &c.,  &c.  That  I  think  was  the  cause  of  many  of  the 
regiments  returning  from  the  field,  not  from  any  cowardice 
or  fear  of  fighting,  but  because,  having  lost  their  Colonels, 
they  supposed  they  were  out  of  the  battle.  I  consider  that 
the  great  cause  of  our  army  being  put  in  rout  on  the  right 
wing. 

"  Question.  What  would  have  been  the  effect  had  you  waited 
there  at  Centreville  Heights,  and  rested  your  men  a  day  or 
two,  seeing  that  Johnston  was  down  there,  until  Patterson's 
army  had  followed  him  there,  and  been  ordered  to  turn  their 
left? 

"  Answer.     We  should,  undoubtedly,  have  won  the  battle. 

"  Question.  Would  you  have  had  any  difficulty  in  rallying 
your  whole  forces  and  holding  your  position  on  Centreville 
Heights,  while  you  sent  for  Patterson,  or  for  reinforcements 
from  here  and  Fortress  Monroe?  Would  you  not  have 
worsted  the  enemy  in  that  way  ? 


102  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

"  Answer.  We  never  should  have  been  compelled  to  leave 
the  place,  with  what  troops  I  had  under  my  command.  I 
could  have  held  my  position  there  with  the  troops  I  had, 
which  were,  my  brigade,  Richardson's  brigade,  Blenker's 
brigade,  and  some  batteries. 

"  Question.  Was  it  not  a  terrible  military  blunder  to  come 
back  to  Washington  in  disorder  ? 

"  Answer.  That  is  putting  it  rather  strong.  I  should  not 
like  to  say  it  was  a  military  blunder. 

"  Question.  Well,  it  was  a  mistake  then  ? 

"Answer.  I  think  this:  that  we  could  have  held  our 
position  there.  There  is  no  doubt  about  that. 

"  Question.  Then  you  ought  to  have  held  it,  ought  you 
not? 

"  Answer.  That  is  a  matter  I  am  not  responsible  for,  &c. 

"Question.  Would  it  not  have  been  easier  to  have  de 
fended  Washington  on  Centreville  Heights  than  to  have 
come  pellmell  here  to  do  it  ? 

"  Answer.  I  can  answer  that  very  readily.  I  think  it 
would.  There  is  no  doubt  about  that." 

General  Daniel  Tyler : 

"  Question  by  Chairman.  Please  give  a  brief  and  concise 
statement  of  what  you  saw  there,  and  how  the  battle  was 
conducted,  &c.,  &c.  Do  this  without  questioning  at  first. 
I  want  to  get  particularly  what,  in  your  judgment,  caused 
the  disaster  on  that  day. 

"  Answer.  The  first  great  trouble  was  the  want  of  disci 
pline  and  instruction  in  the  troops.  The  troops  needed  that 
regimental  and  brigade  instruction  which  would  have  en 
abled  them  to  act  together  in  masses  to  advantage. 

"  Question.  Were  there  any  more  proximate  causes  than 
that? 

"  Answer.  There  was  a  great  want  of  instruction  and  pro 
fessional  knowledge  among  the  officers, — the  company  and 
regimental  officers. 

"  Question.  Why  did  you  move  first,  as  you  were  to  move 
the  shortest  distance  on  the  road  ? 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  103 

"  Answer.  That  was  the  order  of  march  by  General  Mc 
Dowell." 

General  Andrew  Porter  was  asked  the  following 
leading  question  : 

"  Had  Patterson  detained  Johnston  in  the  valley  of  Win 
chester,  so  that  no  reinforcements  would  have  been  brought 
down  by  Johnston  to  Beauregard,  what,  in  your  opinion, 
would  have  been  the  result  of  that  battle  ? 

"  Answer.  Well,  it  might  have  ended  one  way  or  the 
other.  Our  troops  could  not  stand  the  attacking  of  the 
enemy;  they  were  played  out  quite  early.  The  men  were 
exhausted ;  somehow  or  other,  they  seemed  to  have  no  heart 
in  the  matter.  The  officers  were  more  to  blame  than  the 
men,"  &c.,  &c. 


General  William  W.  Averill : 

a  Question.  What,  in  your  judgment,  caused  the  disaster 
of  that  day  ? 

"  Answer.  They  commenced,  I  presume,  almost  from  the 
time  we  started  from  Arlington,  from  the  other  side  of  the 
river.  There  were  a  great  many  causes  that  combined  to 
lose  the  day  to  us.  The  most  apparent  cause,  however,  at 
the  time  we  first  felt  w^e  were  beaten,  that  we  had  to  retire, 
and  that  we  had  felt  for  some  time  beforehand,,  was  the 
want  of  concentration  of  the  troops;  the  feeling  that  we 
ought  to  have  had  more  men  in  action  at  one  time. 

"  Question.  The  want  of  concentration  in  the  field? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir.  We  crossed  the  Run  with  eighteen 
thousand  men.  I  do  not  believe  there  were  over  six  or  eight 
thousand  actually  engaged  at  any  one  time. 

"  Question.  Was  not  the  nature  of  the  battle-field  such, 
that  it  was  exceedingly  difficult  to  bring  a  large  body  of 
men  into  action  at  any  one  time  ? 

"  Answer.    I  think  it  was  about  as  fine  a  battle-field  as 


104  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

you  could  find  between  here  and  Richmond.  I  have  no 
idea  there  was  any  better. 

"  Question.  Was  the  field  favorable  for  the  movements  and 
manoeuvring  of  large  bodies  of  men  ? 

"  Answer.  One  or  two  divisions  of  the  size  we  had  there 
could  have  manoeuvred  very  well." 

Further  on,  General  Averill  says  (p.  214)  : 

"  There  was  the  want  of  a  headquarters  somewhere  on  the 
field.  All  the  staff  officers  who  knew  anything  about  the 
position  of  the  enemy,  had  to  act  without  orders." 

General  Ricketts  : 

"  Question.  Was  it  good  generalship  to  order  you  to  ad 
vance  with  your  battery  without  more  support  than  you  had? 

"  Answer.  Do  you  mean  the  one  regiment? 

"  Question.  Yes,  sir,  the  Fire  Zouaves  you  speak  of. 

"  Answer.  No,  sir,  I  do  not  think  it  was,  &c.,  &c. 

"  Question.  Suppose  that  battle  could  have  been  fought 
two  weeks  before  it  was  fought,  what  would  have  been  the 
result  ? 

u  Answer.  I  believe  if  we  had  fought  it  even  two  days 
before,  we  would  have  walked  over  the  field. 

"  Question.  As  a  military  man,  to  what  circumstances  do 
you  attribute  our  disaster  on  that  day  ? 

"  Answer.  I  impute  it  to  the  want  of  proper  officers 
among  the  volunteers. 

"  Question.  Do  you  mean  the  Colonels  and  Generals  ? 

"  Answer.  I  mean  throughout.  I  cannot  say  particular 
Colonels  and  particular  Captains,  because  many  of  them 
were  excellent.  But,  as  a  general  rule,  many  of  the  officers 
were  inferior  to  the  men  themselves,"  &c. 

These  extracts  from  the  testimony  of  fourteen  general 
officers,  out  of  eighteen  examined,  nearly  all  of  them 
experienced  and  distinguished  in  the  service,  show  that 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.       105 

there  was  no  difficulty  whatever  in  ascertaining  the  true 
cause  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run.  Each  gave  his  opinion  as 
to  what  caused  the  defeat  on  that  day,  all  going  to  show 
conclusively  that  the  defeat  was  attributable  to  the  fol 
lowing  causes : 

1st.  The  failure  of  General  McDowell  to  attack  Ma- 
nassas,  as  he  could  have  done,  before  the  21st  of  July, 
prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  enemy's  reinforcements,  in 
stead  of  on  that  day,  after  they  had  arrived. 

2d.  The  delay  of  the  whole  army  for  several  hours 
on  the  21st  of  July. 

3d.  The  throwing  of  two  of  our  batteries  to  the  front, 
beyond  support,  thus  causing  their  capture. 

4th.  The  failure  to  have  within  supporting  distance, 
and  to  bring  into  action  at  the  critical  moment,  the 
ample  reserves  of  that  army,  which  were  more  than 
double  the  number  of  my  entire  command. 

5th.  The  want  of  discipline  in  the  troops. 

In  the  face  of  this  testimony,  the  Committee  assert  in 
their  report : 

"  That  the  principal  cause  of  the  defeat  on  that  day  was, 
the  failure  of  General  Patterson  to  hold  the  forces  of  John 
ston  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah." 

Had  the  arrival  of  Johnston,  five  days  after  the  time 
I  was  directed  to  hold  him,  had  the  effect  attributed  to 
it,  common  fairness  should  have  induced  the  Committee 
to  say,  not  that  it  was  my  failure  to  hold  Johnston,  but 
that  it  was  the  delay  in  fighting  the  battle  of  Bull  Run 
that  was  the  principal  cause  of  the  defeat  of  General 
McDowell. 


106  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

I  have  thus  thrown  together,  as  concisely  as  I  could, 
the  facts  bearing  on  my  case.  It  has  been  necessary  to 
refer  to  many  documents  and  papers,  the  perusal  of 
which  will  be  tedious,  and  even  when  read,  not  so  satis 
factory  to  the  unmilitary  reader  as  the  opinion  upon 
them  by  competent  and  intelligent  officers.  The  pre 
sent  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas,  whose  reputa 
tion  as  a  soldier  and  a  man  is  second  to  none,  and  who 
served  under  me  during  my  whole  campaign,  in  a  letter 
received  a  few  months  ago,  after  an  experience  of  three 
years  of  most  arduous  service,  thus  writes : 

"HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

BEFORE  ATLANTA,  GA.,  Aug.  8th,  1864. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  Your  favor  of  the  16th  July,  was  only  received  a  few 
days  since,  owing  doubtless  to  the  irregularities  of  the  mails 
to  the  front.  In  the  council  of  war  at  Martinsburg,  I  in  sub 
stance  advised  an  advance  towards  Winchester,  at  least  as 
far  as  Bunker  Hill,  and  if  your  information,  after  the  army 
reached  Bunker  Hill,  led  you  to  believe  that  Johnston  still 
occupied  Winchester  in  force,  then  to  shift  our  troops  over 
to  Charlestown,  as  that  move  would  place  our  communica 
tions  with  our  depot  of  supplies  in  safety,  and  still  threaten 
and  hold  Johnston  at  Winchester,  which  I  understand  was 
all  that  you  were  expected  or  required  to  do.  I  should  have 
advised  a  direct  advance  on  Winchester,  but  for  the  charac 
ter  of  the  troops  composing  your  army.  They  were  all,  with 
the  exception  of  a  couple  of  squadrons  of  the  Second  U.  S. 
Cavalry  and  two  batteries  of  regular  artillery,  three  months' 
men,  and  their  term  of  service  would  expire  in  a  few  days. 
Judging  of  them  as  of  other  volunteer  troops,  had  I  been 
their  commander,  I  should  not  have  been  willing  to  risk 
them  in  a  heavy  battle,  coming  off  within  a  few  days  of  the 
expiration  of  their  service. 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SHENANDOAH.  107 

"  I  have  always  believed,  and  have  frequently  so  expressed 
myself,  that  your  management  of  the  three  months'  cam 
paign  was  able  and  judicious,  and  was  to  the  best  interests 
of  the  service,  considering  the  means  at  your  disposal,  and 
the  nature  of  the  troops  under  your  command. 

"  With  much  respect  and  esteem,  I  remain,  General, 
"Very  sincerely  and  truly  yours, 

"GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

''Major-General  U.  S.  V. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  EGBERT  PATTERSON, 

"  Philadelphia,  Pa." 


I  also  take  great  pride  in  presenting  other  testimonials, 
from  officers  who  were  familiar  with  the  events  as  they 
occurred : 

Letter  from  Major-General  W.  H.  Keim : 


"  SURVEYOR-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  STATE  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
HARRISBURG,  PA.,  Nov.  22,  186i: 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  I  read  your  vindication  of  the  campaign  in  Virginia,  de 
livered  at  the  First  Troop  festival,  and  believe  it  places 
your  action  in  the  proper  light,  and  enlightens  the  piiblic 
upon  a  subject  which  is  little  known  to  the  people.  I  know 
that  you  had  the  advice  and  support  of  the  regular  army 
officers,  as  well  as  those  of  the  volunteer  service.  The  diffi 
culties  under  which  we  labored,  of  men  called  out  for  three 
months,  a  serious  evil ;  the  short  supplies  of  transportation, 
and  the  difficulty  to  keep  up  the  subsistence,  are  not  known 
to  the  army  at  this  matured  state  of  affairs,  and  can  hardly 
be  fully  appreciated  by  any  persons  not  connected  with  mili 
tary  movements  on  a  large  scale.  I  had  the  pleasure  of  an 
interview  with  the  President  a  few  weeks  since,  when,  in 
speaking  of  my  connection  with  your  column,  I  took  occa 
sion  to  speak  freely  of  the  injustice  done  to  you  and  your 


108  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

command,  enumerated  the  trials  and  obstacles  thrown  in  our 
way,  and  the  folly  of  attacking  an  intrenched  force  with 
equal  or  inferior  forces.  I  have  no  doubt  time  will  vindi 
cate  and  do  justice  to  all. 

"  Yours,  very  truly,         fr 
"  W.  H.  KEIM. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  PATTERSON." 

I 

Letter  from  Colonel  Richard  A.  Oakford  : 


"  SCRANTON,  December  4,  1861. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  PATTERSON. 

"  DEAR  SIR  :  By  reason  of  a  lame  hand,  I  have  been  unable 
for  some  time  past  to  use  my  pen ;  with  the  returning  use  of 
my  hand,  I  cannot  resist  the  desire  to  express  my  gratifica 
tion  that  you  have  (at  the  supper  of  the  First  City  Troop), 
seen  a  suitable  time  to  defend  yourself  in  part,  against  the 
false  and  unjust  charges  made  against  your  strategy  in  Vir 
ginia. 

"  Living  as  I  do  in  a  part  of  Pennsylvania  which  is  from 
circumstances  closely  connected  with  New  York,  and  draw 
ing  most  of  its  newspaper  opinions  from  that  city,  I  have 
found  it  difficult  to  disabuse  the  minds  of  my  neighbors,  of 
the  false  opinions  they  had  received  through  the  New  York 
press. 

"Your  speech  has  had  a  good  eifect.  I  hope  you  will, 
when  a  fitting  time  arrives,  publish  all  the  orders,  &c.,  con 
nected  with  the  movements  of  your  corps  d'armee,  feel 
ing  well  assured  that  when  the  public  are  aware  of  all  the 
facts,  that  you  will  not  only  be  exculpated  from  all  censure, 
but  that  all  your  moves  will  be  not  only  approved,  but  ap 
plauded. 

"  With  best  wishes,  yours  truly, 

"  RICHARD  A.  OAKFORD, 

"  Late  Colonel,  Commanding  15th  Eeg't  P.  V." 


IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.       109 

From  Major-General  James  S.  Negley. 

"HEADQUARTERS  NEGLEY'S  BRIGADE, 

CAMP  NEVIN,  November  24th,  1861. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  ROBERT  PATTERSON, 

"Philadelphia. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  read  your  speech  at  the  Continental 
with  much  pleasure.  While  I  deeply  regretted  the  necessity 
of  an  old  officer  and  well-tried  friend  of  the  Union  having  to 
vindicate  his  honor  and  patriotism  at  a  festive  board,  I  hope 
your  words  have  reached  the  ears  of  an  impartial  public, 
who  will  now  be  willing  to  do  you  justice.  I  think  there  is 
no  longer  a  necessity  to  blame  the  weak  to  shelter  the  strong. 

"  My  staff  join  me  in  offering  you  their  congratulations, 
and  sincere  wishes  for  your  good  health  and  continued  pros 
perity,  and  assure  you  that  you  still  have  our  friendship  as 
warmly  as  when  on  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  and  only  re 
gret  that  you  are  not  with  us. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  remain  yours,  very  truly, 

"JAMES  S.  NEGLEY." 

Also  a  letter  from  Colonel  (now  General)  George  H. 
Gordon,  formerly  of  the  Regular  army  : 

"HEADQUARTERS  SECOND  MASSACHUSETTS  EEGIMENT, 
FREDERICK,  MD.,  December  22,  1861. 

"  GENERAL  ROBERT  PATTERSON, 

"Philadelphia. 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  Your  letter  of  the  20th  inst.  reached  me 
yesterday.  It  is  with  pleasure  I  reply.  You  are  aware  there 
are  many  facts  known  to  me  only  as  common  rumor,  in 
relation  to  your  movement  from  Martinsburg  to  Bunker  Hill, 
thence  to  Harper's  Ferry,  Virginia,  such  as  the  actual  infor 
mation  you  received  as  to  when  General  McDowell  was  to 
give  battle,  and  from  whom  you  received  it.  also  as  to  the 
number  of  the  rebels  at  Winchester,  their  armament,  defen 
sive  works,  &c.  Of  these  subjects,  so  vital  in  forming  an  exact 
conclusion,  I  have,  as  said  before,  no  information  but  general 


110  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

rumor.  I  believe  the  rebels  have  never  given  us  either  their 
number  at  Winchester,  the  number  or  calibre  of  their  artil 
lery,  or  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  fortifications ;  if  they 
have,  I  think  you  can  accept  their  statements  as  conclusive. 
If  it  agrees  with  or  is  larger  than  your  estimate  at  Bunker 
Hill,  to  have  attacked  Winchester  with  the  force  and  arma 
ment  you  had  would,  in  my  judgment,  have  been  bad  general 
ship,  would  have  been  followed  by  certain  defeat,  with 
terrible  loss  of  life.  I  again  have  to  regret  that  the  few  days 
intervening  between  my  arrival  at  Martinsburg,  Virginia, 
where  I  joined  your  column,  and  the  day  you  marched  to 
wards  Winchester,  did  not  give  me  an  opportunity  of  better 
informing  myself  of  the  number  and  nature  of  the  troops 
under  your  command.  I  joined  you  on  Thursday,  the 
llth  day  of  July,  1861,  and  marched  as  one  regiment  of 
your  column  on  the  Monday  following,  the  15th.  From 
my  own  observation,  and  from  what  was  told  me  by  officers 
generally,  I  believed  your  force  to  consist  almost  entirely  of 
those  whose  time,  in  a  large  majority  of  the  regiments,  was 
about  expiring.  I  also  believed,  from  what  I  heard,  that 
my  own  was  the  only  three  years7  regiment  under  your 
command.  Much  of  your  force,  indeed  I  can  except  few 
regiments,  I  found  more  in  rags  than  uniforms,  and  quite 
indifferent  to  discipline;  some  regiments  appeared  more 
like  mobs  than  soldiers.  As  to  the  numbers  of  your  column, 
I  had  been  led  to  believe  that  it  varied  from  thirty  to  forty 
thousand,  but  was  astonished  to  learn  from  your  Adjutant- 
General,  now  General  Porter,  commanding  a  division  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  you  had  less  than  twenty  thou 
sand  men  under  your  command.  WTien  we  left  Martins- 
burg  en  route  to  Winchester,  it  was  the  prevailing  opinion 
among  all  officers  of  rank  that  you  had  been  informed  Mc 
Dowell  would  engage  the  rebels  near  Manassas  on  the  15th 
or  16th  of  July  at  farthest.  For  one,  I  placed  implicit 
confidence  in  the  report. 

"On  Monday  night  your  whole  column  reached  Bunker 
Hill,  my  regiment  encamping  on  ground  vacated  that  after 
noon  by  the  rebels,  their  fires  still  smoking,  and  evidences 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SHENANDOAH.  Ill 

of  their  hasty  retreat  apparent,  We  were  but  a  few  miles 
from  Winchester ;  the  road  thence  was  obstructed  by  logs ; 
rebel  pickets  thrown  out  almost  within  sight  and  sound  of 
our  own.  Here  we  remained  until  Wednesday  morning, 
the  17th  of  July. 

"  At  this  time,  from  general  rumor  and  from  information 
received,  I  had  no  doubt  of  three  facts :  first,  that  a  battle 
near  Manassas  had  been  fought  by  McDowell ;  second,  that 
we  had  held  the  rebel  leader  at  Winchester,  Jo.  Johnston, 
in  check,  and  thus  prevented  his  uniting  his  forces  to  those 
under  the  rebel  Beauregard;  third,  that  the  rebels  at  Win 
chester  numbered  between  thirty  and  forty  thousand,  sup 
ported  by  thirty  or  forty  pieces  of  heavy  siege  artillery,  and 
well  posted  behind  strong  fortifications.  Then  there  seemed 
nothing  more  for  your  column  to  do  but  to  establish  itself 
on  a  different  base-line  than  that  from  Williamsport  to  Mar- 
tinsburg.  A  road  over  which  supplies  must  be  hauled  by 
wagons  from  Hagerstown,  Maryland,  to  Martinsburg,  Vir 
ginia,  thence  by  some  mode  of  conveyance  to  any  other 
portion  of  Virginia  southward,  is  certainly  not  preferable  to 
one  which  conveys  all  the  way  by  rail,  both  in  the  loyal  and 
rebel  portion  of  the  country.  If  we  could  establish  ourselves 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  to  operate  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and 
southward,  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  Potomac,  there 
can  be  but  one  opinion  of  its  military  propriety,  when  it  is 
known  that  the  rebels  had  evacuated  all  the  region  north  of 
Winchester,  and  that  opinion  must  be  favorable  to  you. 

"  You  thus,  on  Wednesday,  the  18th  of  July,  moved 
your  column,  of  less  than  twenty  thousand,  with  all  its  en 
cumbering  wagon  train,  by  flank,  around  Winchester,  reach 
ing  Charlestown,  Virginia,  on  line  of  rail  from  Harper's 
Ferry  to  Winchester,  Virginia,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day.  Xone  doubted  that  we  were  risking  much  in 
making  this  detour. 

"  An  exasperated  force  of  rebels,  largely  outnumbering 
our  own,  with  metal  heavier  and  more  numerous,  would  not, 
we  supposed,  permit  us  to  get  between  them  and  the  sources 
of  our  supplies,  would  not  permit  us  to  hold  the  key  to  the 


NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

Shenandoah  Valley  and  the  Valley  of  the  Potomac,  without 
at  least  fighting  a  severe  battle,  and  seeking  compensation 
for  the  loss,  which  we  supposed  we  had  occasioned  them  by 
preventing  a  junction  with  the  rebels  opposite  Washington. 
But  the  movement  was  made,  and  made  with  signal  ability, 
each  brigade  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  throw  itself  into 
line  of  battle,  to  protect  its  train,  and  to  manoeuvre,  as  occa 
sion  might  require.  I  felt,  sir,  on  Wednesday  night  that  you 
had  outwitted  the  rebel  Johnston.  On  Thursday  morning, 
the  18th  of  July,  you  discovered  the  expected  battle  opposite 
Washington  had  not  been  fought.  We  were  now  at  Charles- 
town,  Virginia,  but  about  ten  miles  from  Winchester,  rebels 
and  patriots  occupying  about  the  same  relative  position  as  at 
Bunker  Hill,  although  we  had  greatly  the  advantage.  If  the 
rebel  Jo.  Johnston  expected  an  attack  from  Bunker  Hill  side, 
and  had  fortified  accordingly,  we  had  obviously  gained  much 
by  appearing  on  the  opposite  side  of  Winchester,  with  a  paved 
road  and  a  railroad  from  Charlestowri  to  that  place.  He 
could,  in  my  judgment,  be  as  well  checked  by  your  column 
at  Charlestown  as  at  Bunker  Hill,  and  unless  he  had  been 
attacked  from  the  latter  place  immediately  after  our  arrival, 
and  defeated  or  severely  cut  up,  we  gained  much  by  goinjr 
to  Charlestown  in  opening  a  way  for  future  subsistence  and 
receiving,  if  needed,  by  rail,  other  forces.  If  you  could  not 
defeat  or  cut  up  the  rebel  Johnston,  it  was  wise  to  place 
yourself  in  better  communication  with  your  rear.  In  this 
you  were  governed,  as  I  have  said,  by  your  reconnoissance. 
On  Thursday,  the  18th  of  July,  the  day  after  your  arrival  at 
Charlestown,  I  knew  of  your  intention  (having  learned  that 
McDoAvell  had  not  engaged  the  rebels  up  to  that  time)  to 
advance  on  Winchester,  the  rebel  Jo.  Johnston  then  being 
there  with  his  forces.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  I  had 
been  ordered  to  issue  three  days'  rations  to  my  command 
for  this  movement,  but  during  the  afternoon  I  received 
orders  to  move  with  my  regiment  to  Harper's  Ferry,  to 
hold  that  place.  I  knew,  by  common  report,  that,  in  fur 
therance  of  your  plan  to  attack  the  rebel  Johnston,  you  on 
Thursday  and  Friday,  the  18th  and  19th  of  July,  made 


IN   THE   VALLEY    OF    THE   SHEXANDOAH.  113 

repeated  efforts  to  induce  your  command  (many  regiments 
of  which  were  then  out  of  service)  to  remain  with  you  for 
only  a  few  days,  while  you  advanced  and  held  the  rebels  in 
Winchester,  or  give  them  battle  if  they  had  met  you.  I 
heard  that  you  plead,  entreated,  and  expostulated  with  regi 
ments  whose  term  of  service  had  expired,  but  with  few  ex 
ceptions  it  availed  nothing.  I  was  informed  that  the  number 
of  your  force  with  which  you  could,  under  these  circum 
stances,  have  attacked  the  rebels,  did  not  exceed  seven  or 
eight  thousand  men ;  with  these,  in  my  judgment,  to  have 
moved  elsewhere  than  Harper's  Ferry  would  have  been  folly. 

"  To  sum  it  all  up,  it  appears  to  me,  writing  from  memory, 
after  some  six  months  have  intervened,  that  if  you  had 
known  that  McDowell  had  not  attacked  the  rebels,  while 
you  were  at  Bunker  Hill,  the  question  of  whether  you  should 
have  attacked  Johnston  depended  upon  your  reconnoissance 
and  means  of  information  of  his  strength.  The  force  of 
your  reasoning,  that  you  ought  not  to  attack,  is  much  more 
cogent,  if  your  information  was  positive  that  McDowell 
would  attack  on  Monday  or  Tuesday,  the  15th  or  16th  of 
July,  or  if  you  were  only  ordered  to  hold  Johnston  in 
check  during  those  days,  for  then  you  were  holding  him 
in  check.  Your  movement  to  Charlestown,  whether  Mc 
Dowell  had  attacked  or  not,  was  wise  for  reasons,  and  also, 
that  you  were  in  better  position  to  make  the  attack.  You  certainly 
lost  nothing,  as  the  rebel  Johnston  did  not  leave  Winchester  during 
your  flank  movement.  Your  attempt  to  hold  Johnston,  when 
you  learned  at  Charlestown,  McDowell  had  not  engaged  the 
rebels,  failed  from  causes  not  within  your  control.  Men 
whose  term  of  service  had  expired,  would  have  fought  no 
better  at  Bunker  Hill  than  at  Charlestown  or  Bull  Run.  I 
am  very  sure,  attacks  upon  you  would  never  have  been  made, 
for  the  course  you  pursued,  had  McDowell  fought  the  battle 
of  Manassas  when  you  were  informed  and  had  the  best  of 
reasons  for  believing  he  was  going  to. 

"  If  these  statements,  hurriedly  thrown  together,  meet  your 
conviction  as  arguments,  I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  furnish 
them.  At  the  time,  I  heard  none  condemn  you,  but,  my 


114  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

dear  sir,  when  will  man  cease  to  be  reviled  by  the  ignorant 
and  malicious  ? 

"  I  am,  very  truly, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

4      "  GEORGE  H.  GORDON, 

"Colonel  Second  Massachusetts  Keg't." 

From  the  gallant  General  Shields : 

"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,Feb.  20th,  1862. 
"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  I  long  wished  to  write  you,  and  write  you  as  an  old  and 
true  friend,  who  feels  the  full  force  of  the  injustice  that  has 
been  attempted  towards  you,  but  I  determined  to  wait  until 
I  could  see  what  the  Senate  was  disposed  to  do  in  my  own 
case.  Yesterday  I  was  confirmed,  after  holding  up  my  nomi 
nation  for  weeks 

"  But  your  case  was  one  of  crying  injustice.  It  was  for  the 
attacking  army  to  wait  until  you  could  co-operate  with  them. 
They  had  the  power  to  time  their  attack  to  your  movements, 
but  you  had  not  the  power  to  accommodate  your  movements 
to  the  attack.  But,  General,  military  men  do  you  justice,  and 
the  country  is  beginning  to  do  it ;  and  for  one  I  have  never 
failed  everywhere  to  cry  shame  upon  the  base  treatment  you 
have  received,  and  now  I  don't  hear  a  man,  who  has  a  parti 
cle  of  sense,  who  does  not  do  the  same 

"  Your  sincere  friend, 

"  JAMES  SHIELDS. 

"  GENERAL  ROBERT  PATTERSON, 

"Philadelphia." 

From  Colonel  Gibson,  a  Regular  officer  of  great  dis 
tinction  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  FORT  DELAWARE,  DEL., 
July  25,  1861. 

"  GENERAL  : 

"  I  am,  my  dear  sir,  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  your 
service,  and  the  difficulties  opposed  to  you,  in  your  recent 


IN   THE   VALLEY   OF   THE   SIIENANDOAH.  115 

campaign.  It  is  impossible  for  an  officer  of  ordinary  intel 
ligence,  to  refer  to  the  disasters  of  this  week,  without  reflect 
ing  upon  the  untimely  and  crude  plans  of  offensive  opera 
tions  in  which  no  commander  could  take  part  but  as  a 
victim.  I  make  allusion  to  these  matters  only  to  assure  you 
of  my  respect,  and  that  I  shall  consider  it  fortunate  to  be 
under  your  command,  with  the  able  staff  that  served  you, 
should  you  be  called  upon  to  take  the  field  again. 

"A.  A.  GIBSON, 

"  Captain  Second  Artillery,  Commanding. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  EGBERT  PATTERSON, 

"  Philadelphia." 

The  following  resolutions  of  two  regiments,  the 
Twenty-fourth  and  Fifteenth  Pennsylvania,  who  served 
under  me,  and  were  ready  to  remain  if  required,  it  gives 
me  great  pleasure  also  to  refer  to. 

"  Proceedings  of  a  Meeting  of  the  Field,  Staff  and  Company 
Officers  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Regiment,  Pennsylvania  Volun 
teers,  commanded  by  Colonel  Joshua  T.  Owens,  held  at  the 
Encampment  near  Charlestown,  Virginia,  on  the  ~LSth  July, 
1861. 

"  Whereas,  We,  the  officers  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Regiment 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  believing  that  in  the  contest  in 
which  we  are  now  engaged  is  involved  the  maintenance  of 
constitutional  freedom,  and  being  devotedly  attached  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  because  of  the  great  bless 
ings  it  confers  alike  upon  rich  and  poor,  native  and  foreign 
born  citizens,  and 

"  Whereas,  A  sense  of  duty  as  citizens  induced  us  to  take 
the  field  in  defence  of  the  Government,  and 

"  Whereas,  Major-General  Robert  Patterson  has  this  day 
appealed  to  us  as  patriots,  to  prolong  the  period  of  our  ser 
vice,  in  order  that  he  may  maintain  his  present  strategical 
position,  without  detriment  to  the  cause.  Therefore, 

"  Resolved,  That  having  entire  confidence  in  the  capacity 
of  our  Commanding  General  as  a  soldier,  and  his  integrity  as 


116  NARRATIVE   OF    THE   CAMPAIGN 

a  patriot,  and  admiring  the  skill  with  which  he  has  advanced 
his  column  thus  far  without  loss,  or  unnecessary  delay,  we 
will  stand  by  him  until  our  places  are  supplied  by  other 
troops." 

Second,  those  of  the  Fifteenth  Regiment,  whose  gallant 
Colonel,  Richard  A.  Oakford,  was  killed  on  the  battle 
field  of  Antietam  : 

"HEADQUARTERS  FIFTEENTH  REGIMENT  P.  V., 

HARPER'S  FERRY,  July  24,  1861. 

"  At  a  meeting  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Regi 
ment,  held  this  evening,  they  expressed  unanimously  their 
approval  of  General  Patterson's  official  administration,  at 
the  same  time  deeply  regretting  that  his  military  judgment 
should  be  questioned,  knowing  as  they  do  the  superior  force 
of  the  enemy  in  position,  and  the  unavoidable  circumstances 
which  controlled  the  movements  of  this  column.  It  is  also 
painful  to  their  feelings  to  find  the  many  important  but 
bloodless  victories  achieved  by  his  command  overlooked  in 
the  hasty  opinion  of  the  public. 

"  RICHARD  A.  OAKFORD, 

"  Colonel,  Commanding." 

In  the  debate  in  Congress  to  which  I  have  referred 
(ante,  p.  79),  the  representative  of  the  District  where 
I  live,  the  Hon.  Charles  J.  Biddle,  distinguished  in  the 
war  with  Mexico,  and  commanding  at  the  beginning  of 
this  war,  a  body  of  State  troops,  addressed  the  House 
as  follows  : 

<  MR.  BIDDLE.  I  ask  the  gentleman  from  Massachusetts  to 
yield  to  me. 

"  MR.  LOVEJOY.  I  object. 

"  MR.  BIDDLE.  I  ask  the  gentleman  from  Illinois  to  with- 


IN    THE   VALLEY   OF   THE    SHENANDOAH.  117 

draw  his  objection.  It  can  do  him  no  harm  to  hear  a  few 
words  from  me  on  this  subject. 

"  MR.  LOVEJOY.  I  withdraw  my  objection. 

"  MB.  GOOCH.  I  yield  to  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania, 
but  I  take  it  for  granted  that  if  my  time  expires,  that  I  shall 
be  allowed  two  minutes  after  he  has  concluded. 

"  MR.  BIDDLE.  I  thank  the  gentleman. 

"  Mr.  Speaker,  General  Patterson  is  my  townsman  and 
constituent,  and  I  may  assume  to  know  as  much  of  him  as 
the  gentleman  from  Tennessee.  I  have  no  personal  know 
ledge  of  the  movements  of  the  column  which  he  commanded 
in  July  last.  I  was  at  that  time  in  the  military  service,  but 
in  another  part  of  Virginia,  within  the  limits  of  General 
McClellan's  command.  But  I  have  personal  knowledge  of 
the  character  of  General  Patterson.  In  his  command  were 
many  of  my  constituents,  connections,  and  friends,  and  I 
never  heard  one  of  them  mention  him  in  other  terms  than 
those  of  respect  and  confidence.  He  had  upon  his  staff  some 
of  the  most  distinguished  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  now 
deservedly  filling  positions  of  great  trust;  he  had  on  his 
staff  men  of  high  character  from  civil  life.  They  were  fully 
cognizant  of  General  Patterson's  conduct  and  motives ;  their 
characters  are  additional  guarantees  for  his. 

"  I  believe  that  no  man,  really  cognizant  of  the  facts,  has 
ever  brought  any  charge  against  him,  and  that  the  vague, 
baseless  rumors  that  have  been  circulated  to  his  disadvantage 
are  but  hearsay  upon  hearsay,  like  the  statement  of  the  gen 
tleman  from  Tennessee.  Upon  the  occasion  before  Martins- 
burg,  a  brilliant  affair  at  that  time,  when  our  greater  and 
more  glorious  victories  had  not  eclipsed  it,  General  Patter 
son's  conduct  was  distinguished  alike  by  military  skill  and 
personal  intrepidity.  All  the  contemporary  accounts,  verbal 
and  published  in  the  newspapers,  from  all  sources,  agreed  in 
that. 

"  With  respect  to  his  character  at  an  earlier  period,  in  the 
war  with  Mexico,  I  would  not  offer  my  humble  testimony ; 
but  I  sent  to  the  adjoining  library  and  have  had  brought 
here  the  volume  of  reports,  from  which  I  can  cite,  under  the 


118  NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN,    ETC. 

clear  and  venerable  name  of  Winfield  Scott,  the  high  testi 
mony  that  was  then  borne  to  General  Patterson's  character 
as  a  soldier.  At  the  siege  of  Vera  Cruz,  General  Scott  says 
that  <  he  can  only  enumerate  the  few  who  are  isolated  by 
rank  or  position,  as  well  as  by  noble  services.'  He  then 
mentions  '  Major-General  Patterson,  second  in  command.' 
At  Cerro  Gordo,  General  Scott  says : 

"  '  Major-General  Patterson  left  a  sick-bed  to  share  in  the  dangers  and  fa 
tigues  of  the  day,  and  after  the  surrender  went  forward  to  command  the 
advanced  forces  towards  Xalapa. ' 

"  He  also  served  during  the  war  of  1812,  as  lieutenant  and 
captain,  in  the  Regular  Army.  Of  course  I  had  no  contem 
porary  knowledge  of  his  services  there ;  but  I  know  that  by 
those  who  had,  he  was  esteemed  as  a  soldier,  even  at  that 
early  period  of  his  life. 

"  This  statement  I  have  felt  bound  to  make  in  behalf  of  a 
man  who  is  my  constituent,  and  who,  I  believe,  has  been 
unjustly  aspersed  by  vague  rumors  and  suspicions,  only  too 
common,  and  gaining  too  easy  credence  with  us.  Let  me 
add,  however,  that  irf  so  doing  I  take  no  part  in  the  criticisms 
upon  General  Scott,  for  whom  no  man  living  entertains 
higher  respect  than  I  do."  (Congressional  Globe,  Feb.  17, 
1862.) 

The  numberless  private  communications,  both  ver 
bal  and  written,  which  I  have  received,  approving  my 
course,  I  shall  refer  to  no  further  than  to  say,  that 
they  will  ever  merit,  as  they  have  always  received,  my 
Warmest  gratitude. 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

Abercrombie,  General,  Brigade  of,  at  Falling  Waters,    ...  47 

at  Council  of  War  at  Martinsburg,     .         .  52-55 

opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,      ...  57 
report  from  Winchester,  1862,    .         .         .62,  63 

Annapolis,  route  through,  established  by  Patterson,         ...  27 

Army,  Patterson's,  strength  of,  June  25th-29th,      ....  43-47 

"                    "             July, 63 

Johnston's          "             June, 43,  44 

July, 57-62 

Artillery,  Patterson's  amount  of  field,  June  29th,  ....  47 

Johnston's        "                   " 61 

Patterson's       "               siege, 91 

Johnston's        "               left  at  Winchester,       .         .         .  62 

Averill,  W.  W.  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,  .  103,  104 

Babcock,  Lieutenant,  II.  S.  A.,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,   .         .  49 

repairs  canal  at  Sandy  Hook,         .  76 

Baltimore,  passage  forced  through, 27 

Banks,  N.  P.  General,  relieves  General  Patterson  July  25th,  .         .  85 

Barnard,  J.  G.  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,    .  98,  99 

Barry,  W.  F.         "                                                                                      .  96.  97 

Beckwith,  Captain,  U.  S.  A.,  at  council  at  Martinsburg,         .         .  52-55 

opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,  .         .  57 

Berkley  County,  citizen  of,  statement  of  Johnston's  force,       .         .  57,  58 

Biddle,  C.  J.  Colonel,  commanding  Brigade  south  of  Bedford,        .  65 

speech  in  Congress  in  regard  to  General  Patterson,  116 

Biddle,  Craig  Major,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,     ....  49 

minutes  of  council  at  Martinsburg.         .         .  54 

letter  to  Hon.  F.  P.  Blair,      ....  88 

Blair,  F.  P.  Hon.,  states  that  General  Scott  knew  of  Johnston's 

coming,  before  Bull  Run,     ....  79-83 

states  the  despatch  of  General  Patterson  received,  79-83 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  popular  feeling  about, 9 

false  theory  as  to  loss  of,  .....  10 

causes  of  defeat  stated  by  General  Richardson,  .  93 

"          il                 "       Heintzelman,  94 

"       Franklin,        .  95 

"              "          "                "       Wadsworth,  .  96 

u               "          "                 "       Slocum,           .  96 

9 


122 


INDEX. 


Bull  Hun,  battle  of,  causes  of  defeat  stated  by  General  Barry, 
"  "     Keyes,     . 

"     Barnard, 
"     Griffin,    . 
Colonel  Davies, 
"  General  D.  Tyler, 

"     A.  Porter, 


Bickette, 


"       summary  of,   . 
Bunker  Hill,  Patterson  advances  to, 

reconnoissance  sent  out  from, 


PAGE 

96,  97 

98 

98,  99 

99,  100 

101 

102 

103 

104 

105 

70 

70 


Cadwalader,  Geo.  General,  opinion  on  recall  of  Patterson's  troops,  35 
at  council  at  Martinsburg,    .         .         .  52-55 
report  of,  on  Johnston's  force,        .         .  59 
Cameron,  Simon  Hon.,  Secretary  of  War,  approves  conduct  of  Ge 
neral  Patterson, 17 

Cavalry,  Patterson's  force,  June  18th,      ......  35 

"           "     28th, 45 

Johnston's      "           "       " 45 

Chambersburg,  camp  formed  at,        .......  31 

Charlestown,  Patterson  proposes  to  move  to, 67 

' '          ordered  there  by  General  Scott,  ...  68 

reports  when  he  will  go  to,          ...  70 

"        what  route  he  will  take,  .  70 

"•       preparation  for  advance  from,         .  76-112 

time  of  troops  expire  at,      .         .         .         .         .         .  77-84 

movement  to,  not  a  retreat,         .....  84-112 

Congress,  debate  in,  regarding  despatch  of  Patterson,      .         .         .  78-83 
Covode,  John  Hon.,  false  assertion  regarding  despatch,  .         .         .  79-82 
Curtin,  A.  G.  Governor,  call  upon,  for  troops  by  Patterson,    .         .  28 
promptness  of  response  by,        ...  29 
organizes  Pennsylvania  Reserves,     .         .  30 
Crossman,  Colonel,  Deputy-Quartermaster  General,  efforts  to  fur 
nish  transportation, 50 

at  council,  Martinsburg,    .....  52-54 

opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,  ....  57 

Davies,  T.  A.  Colonel,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,       .  101 

Falling  Waters,  engagement  at,        .......  47 

General  Patterson's  official  report  of,  47 

Felton,  S.  M.,  patriotically  furnishes  steamboat,      ....  27 

Franklin,  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,    .         .  95 

Gibson,  Colonel,  letter  to  General  Patterson, 114 

Gooch,  D.  W.  Hon.,  false  assertion  regarding  despatch  of  Patterson,  79-81 


INDEX.  123 

PAGE 

Gordon,  General,  review  of  Patterson's  campaign,  ./•    •.     ..-•£•       .  109-114 

Griffin,  Charles  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  of  Bull  Kun,  .  99,  100 

Halleck,  Major-General,  U.  S.  A.,  favorable  criticism  on  Patter 
son's  campaign,  ..........  39 

Harper's  Ferry,  preparation  to  capture, 31 

instructions  of  General  Scott  regarding,         .         .  31,32 

evacuated  by  rebel  forces, 33 

Patterson's  preparation  to  hold,      .         .         .         .  71 

Heights,  Maryland,  examination  of,  by  General  Newton,        .         .  41 

Heintzelman,  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  of  Bull  Kun,      .  94 

Hicks,  Governor,  assistance  rendered  by,          .....  27 

Hudson,  Lieutenant,  commands  battery  at  Falling  Waters,    .         .  48 

Infantry,  force  of  Patterson's,  June  25th, 43-47 

"          Johnston's         "        " 43-45 

"              July, 58-63 

"          Patterson's      " 63 

Inquiry,  Court  of,  asked  for  by  General  Patterson,          ...  13 

refused  him,          .                  15 

Intrenchments  at  "Winchester,           .......  57-63 

plan  of,  by  Captain  Simpson,  U.  S. 

Top.  Engineers,        ...  71 

Jackson,  "Stonewall"  General,  attacks  Patterson  at  Falling  Waters,  47 

Johnston,  Jos.  E.  General,  not  related  to  General  Patterson, .         .  21 

driven  from  Harper's  Ferry,       ...  33 

pursuit  of,  by  Patterson,      ....  33 

pursuit  stopped  by  orders  of  General-in-chief,    33,  34 

force  of  June  28th, 43-45 

"         July, 58-63 

plan  to  entrap  Patterson,     ....  56 

detained  at  Winchester  by  Patterson,         .  70-77 

departure  telegraphed  to  Washington,        .  78 

arrival,  effect  of  his,  at  Bull  Kun,        .         .  93-105 

Keim,  W.  H.  General,  appointed  by  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  .  26 

in  command  at  Chambersburg,  ...  31 

at  council  at  Martinsburg,  ....  52-55 

letter  to  General  Patterson,  .  .  .  107 

Keyes,  E.  D.  General,  opinion  on  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Kun,      .  98 

Lackland,  Mr.,  report  of  Johnston's  force  at  Winchester,       .         .  60 

Leesburg,  Patterson  proposes  to  go  to,      .         .         .         .         .         .  38 

advantage  of  position  at, 38,  39 

opinion  of  General  Halleck  on  position  at,       .         .         .  39 

McCall,  G.  A.  General,  letter  of,  regarding  Pennsylvania  border,  65 

McClellan,  General,  forbidden  to  send  reinforcements  to  Patterson,  35 

mentioned, 117 


124  INDEX. 

PAGE 

McDonald,  Mr.,  statement  of  Johnston's  force  at  Winchester,        .  59 

McDowell,  General,  success  of,  announced, 72-77 

movements  of,  unknown  to  Patterson,     .         .  74 

Martinsburg,  false  position  for  Patterson,        .         .  *      .         .        40-55,  111 

entered  by  Patterson's  forces,   .....  49 

Patterson  too  far  advanced  at,  .....  57 

Narrative,  summary  of  Patterson's,          ......  85 

Negley,  Major-General,  at  council  at  Martinsburg,          .         .         .  52-55 

report  on  Johnston's  force  at  Winchester,  58 

letter  to  General  Patterson,       .         .         .  109 
Newton,  John  Major-Gcneral,  advises  Patterson  to  ask  for  a  Court 

of  Inquiry,        ....  12 

examines  Maryland  Heights,  .         .  41 

at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,     .         .  49 

at  council  at  Martinsburg,       .         .  51-55 

at  Harper's  Ferry,   .         .         .  74,  76 

opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,  .         .  57 

Oakford,  Colonel,  letter  to  General  Patterson,          ....  108 

Owens,  Joshua  T.  Colonel,  commands  24th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  115 

Patterson,  Robert  General,  honorably  discharged,  ....  9 

application  for  Court  of  Inquiry,  .         .  12 

receipt  of  application  of,  acknowledged,  15 

Court  of  Inquiry  refused,      ...  15 
conduct  of,  approved  by  Secretary  and 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  .         .  17 

conduct  of,  approved  by  the  President,  18 
application  through  Senate  for  letters 

and  orders,      .....  19 

false  accusations  against,       .         .         .  20,  21 
questions  furnished  Committee  on  War 

by, 22 

appointed  Major-General  of  Pennsyl 
vania  troops,           ....  26 
placed  in  command  of  Department,      .  26 
opens  Annapolis  route  to  Washington,  27 
calls   on  Governor   Curtin   for   25,000 

more  troops,  .....  28 

call  of,  revoked  by  War  Department,  .  29 
asks  to  enlist  three  regiments  for  the 

war, 29 

refused  by  War  Department,        .         .  30 

prepares  to  retake  Harper's  Ferry,        .  31 

instructions  to,  of  General  Scott,  .         .  31,  32 

crosses  Potomac  in  pursuit  of  Johnston,  33 

troops  of,  recalled  by  General  Scott,     .  34,  35 

censured  by  public  for  not  pursuing,    .  36,  37 


INDEX.  125 

PAGE 

Patterson,  Kobert  General,  asks  to  change  his  line  and  go  to  Lees- 
burg,       37 

presents  the  advantages  of  that  move,  38,  39, 66 
proposes  to  drive  enemy  to  Winchester,  42 
force  of  June  25th,  .  .  .  43,45,47 
asks  for  reinforcements,  ...  46 
crosses  Potomac  without  them,  .  .  47 
column  attacked  at  Falling  "Waters,  .  47 
official  report  of  engagement,  .  .  47 
enters  Martinsburg,  ....  49 
orders  advance  on  Winchester,  .  .  51 
suspends  order,  .....  52 
calls  council  of  war  on,  ...  52 
statement  to,  .....  53 
force  at  Martinsburg,  ....  63 
less  than  G-eneral-in-chief  intended,  .  63 
probable  result  of  a  defeat,  ...  64 
desires  to  protect  the  Shenandoah  Val 
ley,  64 

letter  to  Brigadier-General  McCall,  .  64 
inability  on  this  line  to  hold  Johnston,  66 
proposes  to  go  to  Charlestown,  .  .  67 
ordered  to  go  there,  ....  68 
asks  when  he  shall  approach  Winches 
ter,  68 

ordered  to  make  demonstrations,  Tues 
day,  July  16th,        .         .         .         .  68,  69 
success  of,  in  retaining  Johnston,          .  70,  75 
informs   General-in-chief  the    day  he 

will  go  to  Charlestown,           .         .  70 
warns  of  expiration  of  term  of  service 

of  troops, 70,  84 

goes  to  Charlestown  by  Bunker  Hill,   .  70 

makes  reconnoissance  from  Bunker  Hill,  70 

prepares  to  hold  Harper's  Ferry,           .  71,  74 

asks,  "Shall  I  attack?"         .         .         .  73,74 

appeals  to  troops  to  remain,  .         .      74,  76,  113 

reports  arrival  at  Charlestown,     .         .  75 

prepares  to  advance  from,     .         .         .  76,  112 

refusal  of  troops  to  remain,  .         .         .  77,113 

keeps  Johnston  at  Winchester,     .         .  77 

ignorant  of  McDowell's  failure,    .         .  78 
informs  of  Johnston's  departure  from 

Winchester, 78,  83 

relieved  by  General  Banks,  ...  85 

summary  of  Narrative,          ...  85 

remarks  on  testimonybefore  Committee,  86 

review  of  General  Scott's  statement,     .  89-93 


126  INDEX. 


Patterson,  Robert  General,  allusion  in  Scott's  Autobiography  to 

Patterson's  service  in  Mexico,        .  92 

not  "Chief"  in  Shenandoah  Valley,    .  92 
review  of  testimony  about  battle  of  Bull 

Run, 93-105 

gives  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,       .  105 
letter  to,  from  Major-General  Geo.  H. 

Thomas,  U.  S.  A.,          .         .         .  106 

letter  to,  from  Major-Gen.  W.  H.  Keim,  107 

"           "     Col.  Richard  A.  Oakford,  108 

"     Major-Gen.  J.  S.  Negley,  109 

"           "      Brig.-Gen.  G.H.Gordon,  109 

"            «•               "         Jas.  Shields,  .  114 

"     Colonel  Gibson,  U.  S.  A.,  114 

resolutions  regarding,  of  24th  Regiment 

Pennsylvania  Volunteers,      .         .  115 
resolutions  regarding,  of  15th  Regiment 

Pennsylvania  Volunteers,      .         .  116 

service  of  in  War  of  1812-15,        .         .  118 
remarks  in  Congress  regarding,  by  Hon. 

C.  J.  Biddle, 116 

Patterson,  Francis  E.  General,  opens  route  through  Baltimore,      .  27 

Pennsylvania,  Governor  of,  organizes  Reseryes,       ....  30 

Reserves,  origin  of, 30 

volunteers,  llth  regiment  at  Falling  Waters,  .         .  48 

"  15th  and  24th  regiments,  resolutions  of,  115, 116 

quota  of,  promptness  in  supplying,         .  25,  26 

Perkins,  Lieutenant,  U.  S.  A.,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,    .         .  48 

President,  the,  approves  conduct  of  General  Patterson,   ...  18 
protests  against  fighting  at  Bull  Run  till  his  force 

arrives,       ........  79,  80 

Price,  R.  Butler  Major,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,        ...  49 

Porter,  Andrew  Brigadier-General,  on  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,  103 
Porter,  Fitz  John  Major-General,  advises  Patterson  to  ask  for  a 

Court  of  Inquiry,         .....  12 

at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,         ....  49 

opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,    ....  57 

Rankin,  A. N.,  statement  of  artillery  left  by  Johnston  at  Winchester,  62 

Richardson,  J.  B.  General,  opinion  on  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,  93,  94 

Ricketts,  General,  opinion  on  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run,    .         .  104 

Sandford,  Major-Gen. ,  expected  with  two  guns  and  three  regiments,  54 

Scott,  Lieut. -Gen.,  goes  to  Europe,  .......  16 

instructions  to  General  Patterson,      .         .         .  31,  32 

recalls  artillery  and  cavalry  of  Patterson,         .  34,  35 

forbids  pursuit  of  Johnston,        ....  35 

transmits  supposed  plan  of  rebels,      ...  56 


INDEX.  127 

PAGE 

Scott,  Lieut.-Gen.,  statement  of  artillery  left  at  Winchester,  .         .  61,  62 

orders  Patterson  to  Charlestown,       ...  68 

"               «               hold  Johnston,  June  16th, .  68 

informs  Patterson  of  McDowell's  success,          .  72,  77 

asks  Patterson  if  Johnston  has  stolen  a  march,  .  73 

asked  by  Patterson,  "Shall  1  attack?"     .         .  73,  74 

informed  of  Johnston's  departure  by  Patterson,  78,  82 

warned  of  expiration  of  term  of  service  of  troops,  70,  84 

review  of  Patterson's  statement  to  Committee,  86,  88 

knew  of  Johnston's  departure  from  Winchester,  88 

on  General  Patterson's  character  in  Mexico,     .  92,  118 

Scott,  T.  A.  Hon.,  in  favor  of  granting  Court  of  Inquiry,       .         .  17 

Senate,  U.  S.,  resolution  asking  for  correspondence  and  orders  of 

General  Patterson,      .         .                  •>      •         •  19 

resolution  not  complied  with,    .         .         .         .         .  19,  20 

Shenandoah,  Valley  of  the,  Patterson's  efforts  to  protect,         .         .  64 
difficulty  of  advancing  in,     .         .         .  91 
failure  of  other  commanders  to  hold,    .  92 
Sherman,  John  Hon.,  moves  in  Senate  for  orders  and  correspon 
dence  of  Patterson,         ....  19 

on  staff  of  General  Patterson,       ...  29 

sent  to  Washington  about  Annapolis  route,  27 
reports  refusal  of  War  Department  to  enlist 

more  troops,    ......  29 

opinion  on  recall  of  troops  from  Patterson,  36 
informs  General  Patterson  of  injustice  done 

him, 37 

Shields,  James  General,  letter  to  General  Patterson,       .         .         .  114 

Simpson,  Captain,  U.  S.  Top.  Eng.,  at  council  at  Martinsburg,      .  52,  55 

plan  of  works  at  Winchester,     ....  71 

Slocum,  H.  "W.  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Kun,  .  96 

Stone,  Colonel,  joins  General  Patterson,  ......  49 

at  council  at  Martinsburg,       .....  52,  55 

Thomas,  Geo.  H.  Major-Gen.,  advises  Patterson  to  demand  Court 

of  Inquiry,  ....  11 
at  affair  of  Falling  Waters,  .  .  48 
at  council  of  war  at  Martinsburg,  .  52 
advises  to  go  to  Charlestown,  .  .  55 
opinion  of  Johnston's  retreat,  .  .  57 
letter  approving  Patterson's  cam 
paign,  106 

Times,  New  York  Daily,  article  of  General  Halleck  on  art  of  war  in,  39 

Transportation,  inadequacy  of  Patterson's,       .....  49,  70 

Tripler,  Surgeon,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,           ....  49 

Troop,  Philadelphia  City,  at  affair  at  Falling  Waters,    ...  48 

Troops,  call  on  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  for  25,000  additional,    .  28 

"    revoked  by  War  Department, 29 


128  INDEX. 

PAOl 

Troops,  Patterson  asks  to  enlist  for  the  war,     .....  29 

enlistment  of,  refused,           .......  30 

recalled  from  Patterson  when  across  the  Potomac,      .         .  34,  35 

opinion  of  General  Cadwalader  on  recall  of,        ...  35 

"             Hon.  John  Sherman  on  recall  of,                 .         .  36 

number  of  Federal,  June  25th,     ......  43,47 

"             rebel            "                  43,  44 

July, 57,  62 

"            Federal,     «         .         .         .                 ...  63 

expiration  of  term  of  service,        .         .         .         .         .         .  46,  85 

appealed  to  by  Patterson  to  remain, 74,  113 

clothing  of, 76,  110 

refusal  of,  to  remain, 77,113 

Tyler,  Daniel  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Kun,     .  102 

Valley  of  Shenandoah,  efforts  of  Patterson  to  protect,     ...  64 

difficulty  of  advancing  in,    ....  91 

failure  of  other  commanders  to  hold,  .         .  92 

Wadsworth,  James  General,  opinion  of  causes  of  defeat  at  Bull  Run ,  96 

"War,  Committee  on  Conduct  of,  action  of,       .....  21 

unfairness  of  mode  of  proceeding,  22 

opinion  of  Congress  upon  it,          .  25 

false  statement  of  members  of,      .  79 

testimony  before,  ....  86 

"          as  to  Bull  Run,     .         .  93 

War,  Council  of,  called  by  Patterson  at  Martinsburg,     ...  52 

minutes  of, 54,  55 

War,  Secretary  of,  approves  conduct  of  General  Patterson,     .         .  17 

declines  to  furnish  orders  to  Senate,  .                  .  19 

Assistant,  in  favor  of  granting  court,         .         .  17 

Wellmore,  Captain,  statement  of  Johnston's  force,           .         .         .  57,58 

Whiting,  Major,  plans  defensive  works  at  Winchester,  ...  61 

Winchester,  Patterson  proposes  to  drive  enemy  to,          ...  42 

orders  an  advance  on,  .......  51 

"       suspended, 52 

intrenchments  at,          .......  57,  63 

Johnston's  forces  detained  there,          .         .         .  70,  77 

his  departure  from,  telegraphed  by  Patterson,    .         .  78 

Wisconsin,  1st  Regiment,  Colonel  Stark  weather,  at  Falling  Waters,  48 

3d           "          at  Harper's  Ferry, 76 


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